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ABSTRACT
American diplomatic historians are most familiar with 
trusteeship in the context of the United Nations Trusteeship 
System and, consequently, associate it with international 
supervision of colonies and the dismantling of the western 
empires. This dissertation is an analysis of trusteeship in 
a broader chronological and conceptual framework. Far from 
being a new concept developed during the Second World War as 
a repudiation of imperialism, trusteeship was a 
centuries-old concept and a euphemism for "enlightened" 
imperialism.
Simply stated, trusteeship was the conviction that 
advanced states must control or supervise peoples deemed too 
immature or incompetent to manage their own affairs and 
property. A coincidence of the best interests of the 
"backward" peoples themselves, the controlling power, and 
the world at large— a coincidence which this study dubs the 
"triple mandate"— demanded that "trustee" states control 
incompetent peoples and rule them for the benefit of all 
concerned parties.
This study reconstructs the worldview that made 
trusteeship over "backward" nations seem legitimate and 
necessary. It then explores the influence of trusteeship 
and the forms it took in American policy toward the "Third 
World."
Individual chapters examine the interaction between 
trusteeship and American policy in a diversity of geographic 
regions and contexts, especially as revealed in the thought 
and policies of a few selected statesmen. The chapters are 
case studies of American policy toward the Philippine 
Islands, Cuba and the Caribbean, and China, and American 
involvement in the origins of the League of Nations Mandates 
System.
A study of trusteeship reveals an American "imperial" 
tradition and sheds light on its character. Trusteeship was 
clearly imperialistic, since it was a systematic denial of 
self-determination to "backward" peoples. But because it 
renounced the stereotypical "old-style" imperialism and 
ostensibly promoted the best interests of subject peoples, 
American policymakers claimed that, in the context of its 
times, trusteeship was actually "anti-imperialistic." A 
study of trusteeship thus allows historians to better 
understand and evaluate American imperialism.
v i i
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INTRODUCTION 
THE CONCEPT OF TRUSTEESHIP
In April 1940 President Franklin D. Roosevelt explained 
at a press conference what he boasted was "a new conception 
of relations” between powerful and weak states. "[W]e have 
in civil life the theory of trusteeship,” he noted. The 
trustee is "the person who takes over, for the benefit of 
cestuique [sic] trust, takes over the property, looks after 
their education, looks after their physical needs, builds up 
their estate and protects them against accident or attack 
for no remuneration, no profit."1 It was in the era of 
World War II that such a notion of trusteeship in 
international affairs gained its widest currency and was 
ultimately enshrined in the United Nations Trusteeship 
System. During the war trusteeship was closely associated 
with America's aborted effort to compel the gradual 
abolition of the western empires, and, consequently, became 
associated with America's supposedly "anti-colonial" 
tradition.
This dissertation emphasizes two fundamental points.
One is that, contrary to FDR's proclamation of a "new 
conception of relations," trusteeship was a much older 
concept, virtually endemic to imperialism. It thus provides
2
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a useful tool for understanding American policy since at
least the 1890s. This study concurs with the assertion of
historian William Best Hesseltine that "The concept of the
trustees that the Elect should rule society, that wealth in
money, skills, and talents should be ustd for the general
good, have dominated American participation in world 
2affairs." The second point is that trusteeship was not a 
manifestation of a stereotypical American anti-colonial 
tradition. Instead, the concept was the centerpiece of a 
complex and significant American imperial tradition. The 
primary purpose of this study is to use trusteeship as a 
tool for understanding this imperial tradition.
I
American statesmen, scholars, and policy observers
often explicitly employed the term trusteeship to describe
aspects of U. S. foreign policy, especially in America's
policy toward what earlier generations shamelessly called
3"backward" nations. There was, however, no formal 
definition for trusteeship as it pertained to foreign 
policy. Our first task, therefore, must be to fashion a 
suitable working definition of the concept.
The logical starting point for this inquiry is with the 
definition of trusteeship in its civil law context.
Virtually all those who employed the term in regard to 
international relations had in mind an analogy with civil
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4law. According to its legal definition, a trust is "any 
arrangement whereby property is transferred with [the] 
intention that it be administered by [the] trustee for 
another’s benefit."4 In foreign affairs this meant that a 
trustee state assumed control of another people's territory, 
resources, and sovereignty in the best interests of the 
inhabitants. Assuming control over another people's 
"estate" was a vital part of trusteeship, but this 
definition was incomplete. Alpheus H. Snow, a Washington 
D. C. attorney and authority on international law, wrote an 
analysis of international trusteeship for the American 
delegation to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference in which he 
rejected the literal denotation of trusteeship. He conceded 
that in its "generic" sense trusteeship included property 
relations, but concluded that it was primarily a 
relationship between peoples. Trusteeship, Snow wrote, 
"covers all the relationships of a fiduciary character in
which one person assumes a relationship of responsibility
5 . .for or to another." That is, the trustee's relationship
with and responsibility to a ward involved property, but was
also of a personal character.
A comprehensive study of the concept of trusteeship 
reveals that it was used interchangeably with several other 
related terms. "Trusteeship" often meant in fact 
"guardianship." According to its legal definition, a 
guardian is
a person lawfully invested with the power, and
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5charged with the duty, of taking care of the 
person and managing the property and rights of 
another person, who, for defect of age, 
understanding, or self-control, is considered 
incapable of administering his own affairs, [or] 
One who legally has the care and management of the 
person, or the estate, or both, of a child during 
its minority.
'.Trusteeship, as this dissertation employs the term, could 
denote trusteeship, guardianship, stewardship, receivership, 
or other metaphors which had important common elements. 
Trusteeship involved the control or supervision by a 
competent state over the persons and property of a nation 
deemed too immature or incompetent to manage its own 
affairs. The trustee state claimed to act with the 
implicit, often explicit authority of the family of 
"civilized" nations which demanded that every nation behave 
in accordance with civilized standards. The trustee 
ostensibly acted under what this study terms a "triple 
mandate," a right and duty to control and supervise a "ward" 
state in the best interests of the ward, of the family of 
civilized nations, and in the best interests of the trustee 
state. One function of trusteeship in foreign affairs as in 
civil affairs was to protect the community (of which the 
trustee was a prominent member) by limiting the freedom of 
an irresponsible member. The trustee was also to protect 
the ward's property and protect the ward from himself.
Trusteeship was obviously both ethnocentric and 
paternalistic. The notion of a harmony of interests between 
community, ward, and trustee rested on the assumption that
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6the world order most conducive to American interests also 
served the best interests of other peoples. A corollary of 
this assumption was the belief that many of the world's 
peoples could not provide those conditions necessary for the 
ideal world order. The most crucial of all assumptions was 
that capable nations, the "elect" in William Hesseltine's 
nomenclature, had a right and duty to provide order and 
instill in backward peoples the essential values and habits 
of "civilization." The apostle of the "stewardship of 
wealth," Andrew Carnegie, aptly noted in his 1886 essay that 
the role of a trustee was to do for "his poorer 
brethren. . . better than they would or could do for 
themselves." Trusteeship rested on a worldview, or 
Weltanschauung, that delineated which peoples were the elect 
and which were backward, and which provided economic, 
strategic, and legalistic reasons why the former could act 
as trustees for the latter.
There is no doubt that the concept of trusteeship was a 
rationalization for decisions pursued out of national 
self-interest, but it is erroneous to dismiss it as only a 
rationalization. Conversely, it is not accurate to assert 
that trusteeship was really a motivating factor. Statesmen 
did not impose trusteeship over other nations because they 
believed that all peoples deemed backward needed trustees. 
They did not, in other words, embark on quixotic crusades to 
place all backward peoples under trusteeship in order to be 
philosophically consistent. The motivations behind
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7policymaking were pragmatic. Trusteeship provided a viable 
tactic— some degree and kind of control over other 
peoples— when pragmatic considerations made it a prudent 
policy alternative. But while trusteeship was not a 
motivation, we must recognize that it was not a mere 
rationalization; on the contrary, it rested on assumptions 
and principles that were persuasive parts of the 
turn-of-the-century western worldview.
The concept of trusteeship did not belong to a 
particular country or even to a particular era. It was not 
a uniquely American product, but part of the larger milieu 
of western imperialism. Because trusteeship was virtually 
endemic to the relations between states and equally endemic 
to civil affairs, this dissertation does not attempt to 
trace the origins of the concept. It is useful, however, to 
discuss briefly the immediate background of the term. 
Trusteeship came into common usage in the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. British imperial reformers spoke
of Britain's obligation or trusteeship to the peoples of its
*
dependent empire. It was in other words a euphemism for 
"enlightened" imperialism, a precursor of the "white man's 
burden." The operative assumption was that colonial rule 
was a sacred trust, not an absolute right of ownership. The 
legitimacy of British rule necessarily rested on Britain's 
faithful fulfillment of its obligations to serve the best
O
interests of its wards.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, trusteeship
i
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8began to acquire the connotation of international regulation
of imperialism. The older understanding of trusteeship
simply meant that imperial powers had an obligation to
"regulate" their own colonial rule and make it conform to
humanitarian standards. Especially with the Berlin Congo
Conference of 1884-5, at which the western powers devised
formal rules for regulating the exploitation of Central
Africa, trusteeship acquired the connotation of formal
international supervision and enforcement of consensus
standards, it was, of course, this version that was
embodied first in the League of Nations Mandate System and
then in the United Nations Trusteeship System. While
international trusteeship became the most familiar
connotation of the concept and certainly an important
development in the history of western imperialism (and the
subject of chapter VII), it is important to remember that it
was not the only meaning of trusteeship. As historian
George R. Louis observed, international trusteeship was a
latter-day innovation, but national or unilateral
trusteeship was "probably as old as the notion of overseas 
9colonization." Both connotations rested on the same 
fundamental assumptions about the necessity and legitimacy 
of controlling incompetent or immature peoples when such 
control was undertaken as a trust on behalf of that people 
and on behalf of "civilization."
Trusteeship was for several centuries a kind of 
corollary of western imperialism. The primary focus of this
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9study is on the relationship between trusteeship and 
American imperialism. It is, therefore, essential to 
discuss briefly the general nature of this relationship. In 
many ways trusteeship was virtually synonymous with 
imperialism. This dissertation borrows historian. Joseph 
A. Fry’s definition of imperialism as "a relationship in 
which a stronger nation controls, or consciously attempts to 
control, the actions of a weaker country or group of 
people."10 It also defines trusteeship to encompass 
indirect and informal modes of control as well as formal 
colonial rule. The similarity between imperialism and 
trusteeship is obvious. Both involved some type and degree 
of control of one nation over another. Indeed, this study 
emphasizes that trusteeship was above all a form of 
imperialism and was an important component of an American 
imperial tradition.
However, to simply equate trusteeship with imperialism 
and probe it no further is to neglect another significant 
aspect of the concept. Trusteeship was not just a euphemism 
for imperialism, but a distinct type of imperialism. 
Turn-of-the-century era statesmen and theorists— in the 
United States and Britain— used trusteeship to describe a 
kind of control somehow considered distinct from 
"imperialism." Just as international trusteeship became in 
1919 an alternative to the existing imperial order, 
trusteeship always implied an "anti-imperialistic" 
imperialism. If we consider any type and degree of control
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over another people to be imperialistic, regardless of the 
motives and objectives underlying that control, then the 
distinction between trusteeship and imperialism cannot be 
very compelling. This dissertation recognizes and 
emphasizes that trusteeship was a form of imperialism, but, 
for the sake of analysis, it also accepts the validity of a 
functional distinction between the two concepts.
The distinction between trusteeship and imperialism 
rested on several points. One was simply a matter of 
definition. Instead of being a broad, relatively objective 
term referring to the control of other peoples,
"imperialism" usually implied oppression and exploitation of 
other peoples and carried a pejorative connotation. 
"Imperialistic" states claimed a fee-simple ownership over 
other lands and peoples, and asserted the right to do 
whatever was necessary to maximize their own wealth and 
power. Trusteeship, in contrast, meant that a controlling 
power viewed its right of control as a trust, conditional 
upon its fulfillment of obligations to the inhabitants and 
to civilization.
The distinction also rested on an assumption about the 
nature of international relations during the late nineteenth 
century. Subtle definitional distinctions were credible in 
an era in which, unlike today, the direct control of one 
nation over another was the accepted norm. One's perception 
of trusteeship depends largely upon perspective. Looking 
back from the late twentieth century, trusteeship inevitably
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appears to have been a rationalization for a blatant 
assertion of national power. But in the context of an era 
that took for granted that many peoples of the world could 
not govern themselves, trusteeship was indeed an enlightened 
policy, perhaps in the same genus as imperialism, but 
certainly a separate species.
Trusteeship was considered a benevolent and conditional 
control, restricted by an informal set of rules and 
obligations. Trusteeship had to serve the best interests of 
all interested parties— especially the inhabitants— and 
could not just be an exercise in self-aggrandizement. 
Trusteeship rested on the assumption that a power could 
control a backward state and by doing so serve a harmony of 
interests. It was this harmony of interests that this 
dissertation dubs the triple mandate. According to the 
triple mandate, the best interests of the ward, of the 
community of civilized nations, and (as part of that 
community) of the trustee compelled the control of one state 
over another, and, conversely, the trustee had an obligation 
to serve each of those interests.
The triple mandate was a virtual corollary of 
trusteeship. Advocates of trusteeship commonly argued that 
a harmony of interests compelled and justified trusteeship. 
The notion of a triple mandate was in fact, as noted 
earlier, endemic to the concept of trusteeship. The phrase 
is a modification of the "dual mandate," the popular slogan 
for Britain's inter-war imperial responsibilities coined by
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the colonial statesman Lord Frederick Lugard. Whereas 
Lugard emphasized that Britain ruled under an implied 
mandate from "civilization” and from its subject peoples, 
this dissertation considers the self-interest of the trustee 
as a third source of authority for trusteeship. Without 
doubt Lugard would have conceded the accuracy (but probably 
not the propriety) of this change. He noted in his major 
work that the British and European empires sought to meet 
the needs of their "industrial classes,” and candidly 
admitted that "European brains, capital, and energy have not 
been, and never will be, extended in developing the 
resources of Africa from motives of pure philanthropy."11 
American statesmen acted on the same "realistic" assumption 
and undertook trusteeship only when they perceived it to be 
in the national interest. The self-interest of the trustee 
stood, therefore, as a subtle, but paramount third pillar of 
trusteeship. It was in fact the most important factor in 
determining where, when, and how a state undertook the 
duties of trusteeship.
It is essential to recognize that the triple mandate 
was a literal mandate. That is, the obligations of 
trusteeship also constituted the justification for 
trusteeship. It is easy to erroneously conceive of 
trusteeship as a set of obligations, restrictions, and 
reforms that mitigated an otherwise indefensible imperial 
control. Trusteeship consisted of both the control and the 
obligations. The trustee was charged with the duty to serve
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the interests of the ward and of the civilized nations 
precisely because the ward was considered incapable of doing 
so. Trusteeship was both an imperialistic assertion of the 
right to control another people and a qualification and a 
restraint of that control. The two dimensions were by 
definition coexistent and symbiotic.
II
This dissertation is an examination of the nature of 
trusteeship in American foreign policy and especially of the 
implications of trusteeship for American imperialism. Its 
primary value is to enhance our understanding of an American 
imperial tradition. As historians have long noted, this 
imperial tradition was, paradoxically, based on the rhetoric 
of "anti-imperialism." A study of trusteeship is a study of 
the assumptions, principles, and priorities that underlay 
America's paradoxical imperialism.
The study focuses on trusteeship as it was manifested 
in American policy toward backward nations between 1898 and 
1934. This was of course the apogee of America's formal 
colonial empire and quasi-colonial adventurism in the 
Caribbean. The era began with the annexation of the 
Philippine Islands and the beginning of the American 
occupation of Cuba, and it ended with a commitment to grant 
independence to the Philippines and a tacit renunciation of 
interventionism in Cuba and the Caribbean. It was the era
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in which the United States was most overtly imperialistic. 
The reason for focusing on this era is to illustrate the 
long association between trusteeship and imperialism and to 
show the influence of trusteeship in American policy decades 
before the discussions of trusteeship during World War II.
This study also takes a broad view of American 
imperialism, exploring America's informal and often indirect 
control in Latin America and China as well as America's 
formal colonial rule. The decision to do this arose from 
the assumption that the varying degrees and modes of 
American control in each of those regions were all 
imperialistic and shared common attitudes. Research has 
vindicated those assumptions.
This study draws upon the private, public, and official 
papers of a wide diversity of American statesmen, scholars, 
and policy observers, especially those who best articulated 
the concept of trusteeship. Although such figures as 
Woodrow Wilson, William Jennings Bryan, Robert Lansing, Paul 
Reinsch, and Sumner Welles receive some attention, this 
dissertation is in large part a study of a remarkably 
like-minded and powerful clique of Republican statesmen that 
included Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, Elihu 
Root, Henry L. Stimson, Leonard Wood, and W. Cameron Forbes. 
This small clique exerted startling influence during an era 
of Republican domination of the national government. Over a 
period of 35 years these men collectively served twelve 
years as U. S. President, eight as Secretary of State, ten
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as Secretary of War, fourteen as Governor General of the 
Philippines, as special diplomatic representatives to the 
Philippines, Japan, China, Haiti, Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, 
Russia and the World Court, and as Governor General of 
occupied Cuba, Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army, Chief 
Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court, U. S. Senator, and 
receiver of the Brazilian railways.
This study is divided into chapters following the 
traditional geographic divisions of American foreign policy 
historiography. The concept of trusteeship does not offer a 
neat framework for analysis. Similarly, neither individual 
statesmen nor foreign policy constituencies articulated 
distinct types of trusteeship, and would not serve as 
discrete, analytically valuable chapters. In contrast, the 
geographical divisions of U. S. policy clearly generated and 
shaped distinct varieties of trusteeship. The nature and 
priorities of U. S. policy in various regions accounted for 
variations in trusteeship. Trusteeship was a flexible 
policy which easily conformed to the diverse American 
objectives around the world. Topical coverage of 
U. S. policy toward non-European peoples provides the most 
suitable vehicle for studying trusteeship in action.
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CHAPTER I 
THE TRUSTEESHIP WELTANSCHAUUNG
Trusteeship was a posture, a general attitude and 
policy that "advanced" states assumed toward backward and 
disorderly ones. It was a policy in which some states 
asserted their right to control and supervise peoples deemed 
too incompetent or immature to manage their own affairs. 
Several questions arise from this basic definition: What
qualified some people to be trustees and condemned others to 
be wards? What were the visions of the "general good" and 
of the "best interests" of the inhabitants that constituted 
the mandate for trusteeship? In what ways could trustees 
actually help their wards?
Trusteeship rested on a worldview, or Weltanschauung, 
on intellectual, economic, and political assumptions and 
principles which dictated that the control over backward 
peoples was legitimate and necessary. The purpose of this 
chapter is to introduce and discuss in general terms those 
assumptions and principles. In order to sketch a broad, 
composite picture of the trusteeship Weltanschauung, this 
chapter draws primarily upon the writings of intellectuals 
and observers who articulated the fundamental principles.
It lays the groundwork for subsequent chapters, which 
consider and evaluate the views of American statesmen and 
the ways in which they acted upon those views.
18
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The trusteeship Weltanschauung consisted of several 
interrelated strands of ideas. The first major strand began 
with the assumption that the expansion of western commerce 
and civilization were engines of human progress. The 
expansion of the West made the peoples of the world 
interdependent, and thus required that each nation organize 
itself in such a way as to guarantee the prosperity and 
progress of all. The growing interdependence of the world 
meant that each people must sacrifice a portion of its 
sovereignty for the good of the whole. Each nation's 
sovereignty was conditional upon its ability to maintain the 
kind of order, stability, and economic progress that the 
world— especially the western states— demanded.
Many peoples of the world were, in the view of 
westerners, unable to use their sovereignty efficiently and 
properly. According to another important strand of the 
trusteeship Weltanschauung, the races of mankind had unequal 
capacities. Many were racially or politically backward. 
Peoples who, for whatever reason, could not properly manage 
their affairs or their property had to yield some part of 
their sovereignty to advanced states that would act as 
trustees for civilization.
Yielding sovereignty to an outside power was not, 
according to the trusteeship Weltanschauung, a disguise for 
conquest and aggrandizement, since the backward peoples 
themselves benefitted from the arrangement. Advocates of 
trusteeship viewed backward peoples not as helplessly
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inferior races who could, at best, be artificially preserved 
from extinction, but as "child" nations that were capable of 
slow maturation under patient tutelage. The notion of child 
races gave the concept of trusteeship one of its most 
important corollaries. It explained why some peoples were 
incapable of fulfilling the obligations of modern nations, 
and provided a cogent rationale for denying to backward 
peoples the full sovereign privileges of "adult" nations. 
Child races, like children in civil society, must be 
prepared for adulthood and, in the meantime, must be 
supervised and have their freedom restricted.
The trusteeship Weltanschauung thus offered several 
explanations why advanced states had a legitimate interest 
in the affairs of other nations and a right to exercise 
control over them. The objective of this chapter is to 
reconstruct and explore those explanations more fully.
I
Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1897 pondered the 
"portent" that "civilizations on different planes of 
material prosperity and progress, with different spiritual 
ideals, and very different political capacities, are fast 
closing together."1 Mahan was not alone in his 
speculations on this subject. He in fact identified the
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fundamental geopolitical fact of the age and the foundation 
of the trusteeship Weltanschauung.
The "closing together" of the world's peoples resulted 
from the physical, technological, and economic expansion of 
the West. It in turn intensified western interest in 
conditions throughout the globe. Westerners perceived a 
backwardness throughout much of the world that posed an 
obstruction to the peaceful, mutually beneficial intercourse 
that the West desired. Confident that their institutions 
and western civilization were the vanguard of human 
progress, westerners believed that they must bring order, 
efficiency, and civilization to backwr^d areas. The right 
and duty to perform this necessary task devolved upon the 
advanced nations. Since it was in the interest of all 
peoples— members of a world community— to insure the 
maintenance of minimum standards of order and efficiency 
throughout the world, the state acting to enforce those 
standards did so as a mandatory or a trustee for all. All 
nations had a stake in preserving order, preventing 
epidemics, and developing the world's resources. The 
interests of the whole took precedence over the interests of 
each member of world society. In such a world and according 
to this reasoning, trusteeship was legitimate and necessary.
The "shrinking" world created a genuine community of
nations, a condition which the popular writer, the Reverend
2Josiah Strong, appropriately termed a "world life." The 
coming of the world life occasioned many fears and
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anxieties, but most considered it an indication and
instrument of progress. “Isolation,11 Josiah Strong often
declared, "is the mother of barbarism." Progress occurred
only when peoples were exposed to new moral and material
standards and became dissatisfied with their conditions,
3and, therefore, aspired to new things. While this logic 
was ostensibly universally valid, it meant in fact that 
contact with the West was, despite the death and disruption 
it usually brought, a beneficial and unavoidable experience 
for backward peoples. Few men of the era advocated measures 
designed to arrest the inexorable shrinking of the world. 
According to western priorities, the emerging world life was 
a positive good; the West must face and cope with the 
attendant problems, not seek to avoid them.
The world life translated into an interdependence that 
necessarily detracted from the sacredness of national 
independence. As one United States Army officer remarked in
1912: "The world once tolerated many things it will no
4 . . .longer permit." Columbia University professor Talcott
Williams, a consistent advocate of trusteeship over backward
peoples, clearly stated the implications of the world life
in a 1900 article: "When communities were isolated, came in
infrequent contact, and were able to develop alone, a
condition which disappeared with the invention of steam, the
presumption in favor of the individual development,
independence, and self-rule of each community was far
5
greater than it is to-day."
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The integration of the world occurred primarily on
economic terms and carried economic consequences. The
West's commercial expansion was the force that broke down
geographical barriers. The resulting economic
interdependence (or, more precisely, the West's perceived
economic dependence on the rest of the world) compelled the
surrender of absolute national sovereignty. Three years
before he left academia to enter the political arena,
Woodrow Wilson explained how the growth of enterprise
affected relations between nations:
Since trade ignores national boundaries and the 
manufacturer insists on having the world as a 
market, the flag of his nation must follow him, 
and the doors of the nations which are closed 
against him must be battered down. Concessions 
obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by 
ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of 
unwitting nations be outraged in the process. 
Colonies must be obtained or planted, in order 
that no useful corner of the world may be 
overlooked or left unused.
Wilson argued that every nation had a right to trade 
with every other, and that no nation had a right to isolate
7
itself from the world's commerce. Beyond this lay another 
assumption that every people had an obligation to maintain 
whatever degree and type of order was necessary to allow 
legitimate use of their territorial resources. Peoples who 
could not establish and maintain such conditions were by 
definition "backward” and were subject to the control of 
foreign powers.8
The most important article of the trusteeship 
Weltanschauung held that the right of the world at large to
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exploit legitimately all world resources was tantamount to a 
kind of "international eminent domain" over the sovereignty 
of each and every nation. In international as well as civil 
affairs, the rights of the whole ultimately took precedence 
over the rights of individuals. States that imposed 
trusteeship over backward peoples ostensibly promoted the 
progress of "civilization," and served the interests of 
"civilized" states by bringing order and prosperity to the 
"waste spaces" of the earth. The principle refines and 
sharpens the meaning of historian William Hesseltine's 
"trustee tradition." The "elect" were not simply obligated 
to use their own wealth for the "general good." Trusteeship 
required and empowered them to use the collective wealth for 
the general good.
Forbearance and respect for the absolute sovereignty of 
peoples were qualities that an interdependent world could 
not afford. The widespread conviction throughout the United 
States and Europe that the "waste spaces" in the "temperate 
zone" were nearly exhausted, combined with the perceived 
socio-economic crisis of the late nineteenth century
9reinforced the doctrine of international eminent domain.
The world, especially the "civilized" world, had a 
theoretical claim to the world's resources; it also had a 
real and immediate need for these resources. In the very
I
near future, wrote British social theorist Benjamin Kidd in 
1898, "the last thing our civilization is likely to 
permanently tolerate is the wasting of the resources of the
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richest regions on earth through the lack of elementary 
qualities of social efficiency in the races possessing 
them.''10
Since the beginning of European overseas expansion, the 
principle of international eminent domain implied that 
national sovereignty was qualified or conditional. A 
people's unfettered control over its own affairs depended 
upon its ability to fulfill certain conditions. The most 
important condition was the ability to use properly or allow 
others to use properly its natural resources. According to 
the doctrine of vacuum domicilium, western powers were not 
obligated to respect the sovereignty of a people over an 
area which they failed to adequately or efficiently exploit. 
Many authorities asserted that western states need not 
respect the sovereignty of peoples who would not or could 
not organize their societies, economies, and polities 
according to western standards. Most authorities and 
statesmen did not follow this reasoning to its extreme 
conclusions, but nearly all continued to view the world from 
this perspective.11
Almost all authorities of the era agreed that national 
sovereignty was conditional, not absolute. At the very 
least, sovereignty entailed the performance of duties as 
well as rights. The most important obligation was the 
maintenance of a "stable" government, that is a government 
able to protect life and property within its recognized 
borders, fulfill all international obligations, and claim
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the support of its subjects. Authorities debated whether or
not the failure of one nation to maintain a stable
government justified the intervention by other nations.
Almost all agreed that a state at least had the right to
"abate a nuisance" in another state if that nuisance posed a
12threat to a state's security. Advocates of trusteeship
seized upon the notion of conditional sovereignty to
reinforce their case. The fulfillment of certain
conditions, namely those conducive to orderly commerce, not
the inviolability of national sovereignty, constituted the
cornerstone of modern international relations.
The principles of international eminent domain and
conditional sovereignty reflected a vision of how the world
must be ordered, and were instruments for the realization of
that vision. Above all else, the "civilized" world needed
and demanded what one American scholar and commentator,
H. H. Powers, termed "access and order" to and in all areas
of the globe. Insistence on access and order was the
central motif of American trusteeship. And, as Powers
noted, access and order did not necessarily require
"absorption" of or formal colonial control over other 
13peoples. Imperial control was only one means for 
achieving the objective of a world order conducive to 
peaceful commerce and development. As journalist Walter 
Lippmann wrote in 1915, peace and progress could be achieved 
in the world if the stable, advanced states could "organize" 
the world through the conquest, indirect control, or merely
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. . 14advising of weak, backward states. It was by spreading
the order and efficiency that were the foundations of modern
civilization that trustee states discharged their
obligations to other civilized nations.
The trusteeship Weltanschauung rested primarily upon 
the simple formula that because the interests of the whole 
held eminent domain over the interests of individual 
nations, strong advanced states could act as trustees of 
civilization to do for and in the incompetent states what 
they could not do for themselves. Trusteeship defined 
"backwardness”— and thus dictated which nations were subject 
to foreign control or supervision— according to clear, 
albeit ethnocentric criteria. In addition, the prevailing 
racial theories of the era coincided with those economic and 
political criteria, and constituted another important 
dimension of the trusteeship Weltanschauung.
The leading pseudo-scientific racial theories of the 
era attributed differences in mental and political capacity, 
and in economic and material conditions to inherent or 
environmentally-determined racial characteristics. Their 
practical effect was to reinforce the political and economic 
bases for assigning the roles of trustee and ward. It was 
of course no coincidence that non-European peoples of the 
globe were precisely those who failed to develop western 
standards and institutions. This close correlation between 
institutional backwardness and racial difference predisposed 
westerners to believe that the "darker” races were naturally
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incapable of creating or supporting orderly government.
Since cultural relativism was a new and still novel idea, 
westerners found in racial theory more reasons why civilized 
races could not allow backward ones the privileges of 
unconditional sovereignty.
Without doubt the most convenient racialist theory of
the era was the dogma of the "tropics," Climatological and
biological determinism doomed people living in the
tropics— those regions about twenty-seven degrees latitude
on both sides of the equator, and not coincidentally the
location of the resources that the West most coveted— to
lethargy and backwardness. Tropical peoples could not help
but be "lazy” because of the heat, humidity, and of the many
debilitating diseases. H. H. Powers asserted that there was
a necessary link between physical activity and intellectual
and political development. "Condemned to inactivity" in the
tropics, Powers concluded pessimistically, "man lacks the
stimuli which elsewhere develop the powers of the mind."15
Others asserted that nature's bounty of tropical fruits
"robbed [inhabitants] of the incentive of necessity. . . . "
In contrast, wrote sociologist Edward A. Ross in a 1921
textbook, winter in the temperate zones "puts a premium on 
16brains." The most vigorous proponent of the tropics 
dogma was English-born University of Chicago investigator 
Alleyne Ireland. Ireland's argument that tropical peoples 
were incapable of sustained progress rested on explicit 
geographical determinism. "It is clear," he wrote in 1902,
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"that any civilization which is based on the fertility of 
the soil and not on the energy of men contains within itself 
the seeds of its own destruction." The implication of this 
convenient theory was that if fertile areas were to be 
opened to the world's commerce, providence itself dictated
that white men from the temperate zone must rule and
. . . 17administer them as colonies.
Another, even more pervasive pseudo-scientific racial
theory explained why some peoples were destined to be
"trustees" for backward peoples and for all mankind. An
increasingly popular school of thought held that Aryans,
Teutons, or, more specifically, Anglo-Saxons stood at the
pinnacle of a hierarchy of the world's races. They were
above the Latin, Slavic, and "barbarian" peoples. The cult
of Anglo-Saxonism had many variations, but all of its
adherents believed that the Anglo-Saxon peoples possessed in
abundance those qualities and excelled in those skills that
were the driving force of human progress. Chief among those
qualities were efficiency, expansiveness, and the ability to
18maintain orderly self-government. By the middle of the
nineteenth century, many Americans believed that the
capacity to practice representative self-government was an
exclusive possession of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, and,
therefore, that further human progress required the physical
19expansion of one race. Many turn-of-the-century 
Americans believed that the further progress of humanity 
depended upon Anglo-Saxon emigration to backward areas or
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upon a clear triumph in the "warfare of the cradle" between
20superior and inferior peoples. Many more believed that 
colonial rule was an essential tool for spreading 
Anglo-Saxon influence.
The implication of Anglo-Saxonism for trusteeship lay 
in the merging of racial and human destiny. Anglo-Saxons 
were an "elect," possessing wealth in material goods and in 
the talents and skills that were essential to forging an 
orderly world and perpetuating human progress. The 
expansion of the English-speaking peoples and their 
institutions served the best interests of mankind. Racial 
chauvinism coincided with the general good. Many of those 
who advocated trusteeship over backward peoples did so with 
the confidence that the facts of biology and anthropology, 
the interests of mankind, and even the will of God supported 
their cause. Human progress required a world of peace, 
order, and commerce, and it seemed that the realization of 
such a world depended upon the leadership of one race.
The influential writings of Columbia University 
political scientist John W. Burgess articulated most clearly 
the theoretical link between the political-economic and the 
racial justifications for trusteeship. Burgess vigorously 
asserted the principles of international eminent domain and 
conditional sovereignty. Like many intellectuals of his 
age, he denounced the notion of absolute "natural rights" 
and of a utopian state of nature. There was no such thing 
as liberty outside of or anterior to the organized state.
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Burgess believed that the nation state was the perfect 
embodiment and instrument of human progress. All of the
world's peoples must eventually be organized into stable
21 . . nation states. Backward, "non-political" peoples who
were incapable of organizing themselves into nation states
could not, therefore, claim exclusive possession of their
"fatherland.” Nor did they have a right to be left alone if
their incapacities hindered the progress of civilization.
"There is no human right to the status of barbarism,"
Burgess wrote in his 1891 work, Political Science And
Comparative Constitutional Law. "The civilized nations have
a claim upon the uncivilized populations, as well as a duty
towards them, and that claim is that they shall become
civilized; and if they cannot accomplish their own
civilization, then must they submit to the powers that can
do it for them."22
Burgess conceived of mankind divided into civilized and 
barbarian races, with the "Teutonic" peoples as the most 
enlightened race. Backwardness and barbarism were not 
merely chauvinistic descriptions of behavior and customs; 
they were inherent and historically-determined racial 
characteristics. Burgess believed that most European 
"races'," whatever their contributions to civilization, were 
not politically competent. The peoples of Africa and Asia 
were completely incapable of organizing themselves 
politically. In contrast, the Teutonic peoples were 
political nations par excellence and they thus had a
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"political mission" "to assume the leadership in the
23establishment and administration of states." History
suggested that the Teutonic peoples could accomplish their
mission only by the "political subjection" of "the
unpolitical nations," that is, of those people who could not
24or would not organize themselves.
Burgess's intermingling of racial and political thought 
was common among advocates of trusteeship. For the most 
part, scientific racism simply offered an explanation why 
some peoples were backward and others advanced, and 
reinforced perceptions resting on the more important 
criteria for determining backwardness. But racism 
predisposed westerners to assume that non-western peoples 
were backward, and to view with skepticism and contempt 
their indigenous governmental and economic systems. Racial 
thought also delimited the perceived ability and pace of 
backward nations to progress, and thus played a crucial role 
in determining the terms of trusteeship.
II
If trusteeship entailed the control of an advanced 
people over a backward one, a control justified by the 
trustee's right and duty to bring order and modern 
efficiency to backward areas on behalf of the civilized 
world, where did the backward peoples themselves figure into 
this scheme? Theoretically, their best interests were in
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perfect harmony with the interests of the trustee and the 
world community: they had a right and a duty to become
civilized. Since the world was tending toward western 
commercial, industrial, and political ideals, a backward 
people could want and ask nothing more than to have an 
opportunity to join the mainstream of progress. Thus, when 
a trustee nation took control of a backward area and brought 
order and modern methods to its people, it was discharging 
its obligations to the "wards" as well as to civilization.
In opening a backward area to western commerce and 
investment, a nation did not not necessarily incur any 
special obligations to the peoples of the region. Many fin 
de siecle Americans believed that inhabitants of such areas 
were merely obstructions to civilization. The choice for 
backward peoples was simple, declared U. S. Indian
Commissioner Francis Walker in 1885. They must become
. 25civilized or "they must be relentlessly crushed."
President Theodore Roosevelt told Congress in 1901 that wars
against barbarous or semi-barbarous peoples were "a most
regrettable but necessary international police action which
must be performed for the sake of the welfare of 
2 6mankind." Pursuing the interests of civilization might, 
in other words, pose a direct threat to the survival of 
backward peoples.
But trusteeship carried the connotation of being a 
benevolent policy and a repudiation of the attitude that 
Walker and Roosevelt expressed. Indeed, the overwhelming
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ethical and policy sentiment of the era was to avoid
"relentlessly crushing" any people except in self-defense or
as a means of establishing benevolent control. Trusteeship
inverted old values, giving primacy to the interests of the
ruled. Even the consummate American foreign policy
"realist," Alfred Thayer Mahan, conceded that "where the
relations are those of trustee to ward [as they are in
colonial rule], the first test to which measures may be
27brought is the good of the ward."
Did Mahan mean that trusteeship was an exercise in
international philanthropy, selfless altruism for benighted
peoples? Such an interpretation is inconceivable; Mahan
frequently and explicitly defended the primacy of national
28self-interest in international affairs. When Mahan and 
virtually every other person proclaimed the primacy of "the 
good of the ward," they had in mind several important 
unspoken assumptions. Mahan clearly implied that the duty 
of trustee to ward could not prevent the fulfillment of the 
interests that compelled the establishment of trusteeship.
As a consistent advocate of international eminent domain and 
the right of advanced peoples to abridge the sovereignty of 
backward ones, Mahan conceived of a trustee's duties to his 
wards within the larger duty to bring order and "civilized" 
life to benighted peoples. The trustee could obviously not 
work for the good of the ward if it conflicted with national 
self-interest or the general good of civilization, on behalf 
of which the trustee had asserted his control in the first
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place. The good of the ward had to be subordinate to or 
coincident with the general good. But most importantly, it 
was the trustee who had the power to interpret what exactly 
consituted the ward's welfare.
In other words, the trustee state's attempt to create 
conditions of order and access in backward areas also 
defined in general terms the trustee's responsibilities to 
his wards. The trustee was to do whatever was necessary to 
insure that the opening and civilizing of the world worked 
for the benefit of backward peoples. The obligation to 
serve the welfare and promote the interests of the ward was 
a by-product of western expansion and of the assertion of 
international eminent domain. Serving the interests of the 
ward was usually synonymous with performing the larger 
service of bringing order, stability, and modern efficiency 
to backward areas.
There were several explanations and theories of how 
exactly trusteeship served the best interests of the ward 
and of what exactly the trustee was obligated to do to 
properly discharge his trusteeship. The most basic one 
simply postulated that the benevolent control by a civilized 
government provided necessary protection for peoples unable 
to cope with modern civilization. The shrinking, 
interdependent world meant that backward peoples were 
potentially helpless victims of the "adventurers” that were 
inevitably in the vanguard of western expansion. According 
to this "blaming the victim" mentality, the wise benevolent
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control of a civilized power was the best way to substitute
29"civilized virtue" for "civilized vice."
The American economist Simon Patten argued, for 
example, that since "we control the lives and morality of
I
those who supply us goods or furnish us with service," and
since the United States could not progress without those
goods and services, the U. S. must take control of and
bestow the blessings of an "industrial civilization" upon
3 0its tropical neighbors. Western expansion was a positive 
good and, since it inevitably affected all the world's 
peoples, the advanced states must be sure that they exported 
the best features of their civilization. Similarly, 
advanced nations which executed the right of eminent domain 
over backward peoples must insure that the development of 
those areas worked for the advantage of the inhabitants. 
States exercising trusteeship must "share the wealth" with 
their wards. Only thus could a trustee truly claim that he 
was using the wealth for the general good and doing for the 
ward better than he could or would do for himself.
There was little argument over the conviction that 
trusteeship must at least materially benefit backward 
peoples. Disagreement arose over whether trusteeship could 
"elevate" backward peoples. Was the trustee obligated to 
train backward peoples in the political, economic, and 
administrative skills necessary to provide access and order 
in their own lands? Most people of the era found this a 
wise and noble objective; it became in fact virtually
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synonymous with trusteeship. This of course was consistent
with the concept of trusteeship, or guardianship, since it
was a guardian*s duty to pepare his ward for "maturity."
But there was substantial disagreement over the degree to
which such "tutelage" of backward nations was actually
feasible. Scientific and social thought of the day provided
ample evidence to support both sides of the debate.
Many American thinkers believed in permanent, immutable
racial inequality and ridiculed the notion of elevating
backward peoples. H. H. Powers, speaking for many who
believed in the deterministic dogma of the tropics,
dismissed the prospect of tutoring backward peoples for
31eventual self-government as "an irredescent dream."
Post-Civil War racist thinkers supported this belief by
resurrecting the antebellum "positive good" justification
for slavery. They argued that only the restoration of a
paternalistic social order would allow emancipated slaves to
32survive the rigors of freedom. The darker peoples, many 
racists argued, could not survive as free peoples and could 
not really progress beyond a very basic level of 
civilization.
In contrast to this extreme racist view was the 
emerging orthodox belief that the tutelage of advanced races 
could improve backward races and even artificially 
accelerate nature's own slow pace of race improvement. This 
belief constituted part of the theoretical foundation for 
trusteeship. Americans shared with Lyman Abbott, reformer
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and editor of The Outlook, a faith in America's ability to
"expedite" the development of "the dormant capacity of all
33men for self-government." It was not necessary for 
savage or barbarian peoples to retrace at the same slow pace 
the exact same steps that their predecessors had trod on 
their march to civilization. As one sociologist wrote in 
1911, "the 'capitalization of achievement' for the whole of 
humanity [may] be useful in accelerating the rate of 
progress among backward races by saving them the necessity
j
of doing over again what has already been done." The 
theoretical foundation for tutelage of dependent peoples 
thus pervaded the biological and social sciences of the era.
A faith in the prospects of tutelage was an important 
part of the trusteeship Weltanschauung. But there were 
important qualifications on this faith. Advocates of 
tutelage did not believe that advanced nations could take a 
thoroughly savage people and fit them for self-government in 
a mere matter of years or decades. The dominant 
nineteenth-century paradigm for classifying peoples and 
their progress was a three-tiered model of savagery, 
barbarism, and civilization. According to this model, there 
were universal stages for the development of mankind. Each 
race passed through each stage and, more importantly, 
peoples in different stages could and did coexist. Thus the 
savage peoples in the backward areas of the modern world 
were mirrors of civilized man in earlier millenia. While 
this thesis could lend backward peoples the dignity of at
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least being on the path toward civilization, it also 
underscored the current inequality of peoples. Furthermore, 
other theorists believed that "historical races," 
essentially permanently distinct and inferior peoples 
limited in their capacities and destinies, had emerged over 
the centuries. Differences in stages became in effect 
permanent inequalities. Because the civilized races 
continued to progress, and at a faster pace than the others, 
backward races would always be at least relatively 
inferior.35
The widespread faith in the capacity for race progress 
and "capitalization of achievement" had important 
limitations. Most American theorists were "gradualists," 
and believed in the necessity of slow tutelage through 
successive stages. They were also "organicists," that is, 
they were opposed to the rapid, wholesale introduction of 
alien institutions and customs to native societies. 
Indigenous conditions determined the pace and the course of 
race progress. States that undertook the tutelage of 
backward peoples must not expect rapid progress.
r
Woodrow £ilson wrote the most widely quoted
i
observations on the tutelage of backward peoples in a 1908 
treatise on consitutional government. Wilson insisted that 
the United States could facilitate the political development 
of its primary wards, the Filipinos, by providing them with 
a strong, American-controlled constitutional government.
But he warned that this did not imply that tutelage was a
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simple process of creating institutions and handing them
over to the Filipinos. The United States, he asserted in a
passage that would soon haunt his own Philippine policy,
"cannot give [the Filipinos] self-government.
Self-government is not a thing that can be 'given' to any
people, because it is a form of character and not a form of
constitution. No people can be 'given' the control of
maturity. Only a long apprenticeship of obedience can
secure them the precious possession, a thing to be no more
3 6bought than given." American policy toward backward 
peoples embodied this theoretical ambiguity over the correct 
means and proper pace of tutelage.
The most important assumption dictating the necessity 
of controlling backward peoples and supporting a policy of 
tutelage was the belief that backward peoples were 
"children." The childhood metaphor was a logical and 
significant corollary for the concept of trusteeship. It 
vindicated both the righteousness of control and a policy of 
tutelage. If backward races were in reality "child races," 
this explained why they were backward and suggested that the 
backwardness was not immutable, but merely an inevitable 
passing stage. The childhood metaphor also suggested how 
advanced races should deal with backward races. "Adult" 
races must raise child races as parents raised their own 
offspring, using a blend of compulsion and persuasion, 
supervision and indulgence. Child races were victims of 
biology, geography, and history, not enemies of
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civilization. Their progress required sympathy and
corrective handling, not extermination and remorseless
struggle. G. Stanley Hall, psychology professor and
president of Clark University, went so far as to develop a
scientific theory of "adolescent races." These peoples were
physically mature, but culturally "arrested and stunted."
They were capable of progress and could, like today's
advanced races, look forward to a distant maturity. As "the
world's children," they were, in the meantime, entitled to
37the sympathy and care of the advanced races.
But just as the concept of trusteeship could appear 
either as a benevolent retreat from exploitive rule or the 
assertion of the right to rule, the child analogy also had 
two dimensions. Ostensibly it meant temporary rule with the 
purpose of preparing a ward for "maturity." In practice, 
trusteeship was often so long term as to be essentially 
permanent. And, since turn--of-the-century social theorists 
emphasized the gradual nature of race education and the 
limits of learning through imitation, tutelage often came at 
a glacial pace. In many ways the most significant fact 
about the child metaphor was that it justified foreign 
control over a backward people for some unspecified period.
Because they were "children," backward races could not 
expect to enjoy the same privileges as adults. Most 
importantly, they could not be allowed to manage their own 
affairs. The entire trusteeship concept rested, after all, 
on the assumption that the ward was not competent enough to
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manage his own affairs. The trustee, in contrast, was wise 
and beneficent, and was duty-bound to govern the ward 
according to his own good judgement, not the ward's foolish 
desires. This logic was universal among all advocates of 
trusteeship, even those who did not believe that tutelage 
could really elevate backward races. The sine qua non of 
the trustee's relationship with his wards was that the 
trustee must manage affairs for the ward's best interests, 
not his expressed interests. The childhood metaphor thus 
reinforced the doctrine of qualified sovereignty. It was 
one of the most important justifications of the right of 
advanced states to exercise control over backward ones. It 
also empowered the trustee to ignore, contradict, and even 
coerce his wards.
The principle that the politically competent nations 
owed to the backward or child races only what adults owed 
children, the best possible rule in their true interests, 
had extensive and distinguished theoretical support. The 
English liberal sage John Stuart Mill addressed the problem 
of ruling barbarous or semi-barbarous peoples in his 1861 
classic, Considerations on Representative Government. 
Although Mill was not a partisan of imperialism, he believed 
that peoples at different levels of civilization required 
different kinds of government, perhaps even "a vigorous 
despotism." The acid test for imperial rule, as for any 
government, was that "it is the one which in the existing 
state of civilization of the subject peoples most
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facilitates their transition to a higher stage of 
38improvement."
American sociologist Franklin H. Giddings similarly 
argued that dependent peoples did not necessarily have the 
right to determine their own future. A people had no right 
to give or withhold approval of their rulers' action until 
after they reached "full maturity of reason to understand 
and to interpret it." In a remarkable example of circular 
reasoning, Giddings then asserted that the "test" of the 
rightfulness of imperial rule was based on "the degree of 
probability that, after full experience of what the 
government can do to raise the subject population to a 
higher plane of life, a free and rational consent will be
given by those who have come to understand all that has been
39 . . .done." In effect, imperialists had unspecified time and
powers, within reason no doubt, to compel their subjects to
see the wisdom of their actions. The right of disapproval
came only after the trustee decided that the tutelage was
complete. The subject peoples could decide only whether or
not they wished to continue under the trustee's rule.
An obvious implication of this logic was that the 
venerable Anglo-Saxon principle of "consent of the governed" 
did not apply to backward peoples. Child races had no more 
right of consent than did children or women in American 
society.40 Trusteeship advocates consistently denied that 
consent of the governed and its rhetorical successor, 
self-determination, were universally valid. Inequality of
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peoples was an indisputable fact. Consent of the governed
evolved from the historical experience of mankind's most
enlightened people. Elihu Root thought the prospect of
applying the principle to all peoples violated not only
reason, but also American history. The United States had,
as Root and others argued, denied consent to the Indians and
even to the French inhabitants of Louisiana. "That maxim,"
Root noted in his 1902 War Department report,
was enunciated with reference to a 
highly-civilized, self-governing people. Its 
unqualified application to barbarous and 
semi-civilized peoples is contrary to the course 
of civilization. Its unqualified application 
without regard to the rule and progress of 
humanity and ordered liberty among men, is 
contrary.to the whole course of American 
history.
As Root implied, trusteeship was deeply ingrained in 
the American experience of dealing with dependent peoples. 
The official basis of U. S. Indian policy had, since Chief 
Justice John Marshall's 1831 decision in Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia, been one of trusteeship. The Indians, Marshall 
argued, were "domestic dependent nations," who were "in a
state of pupilage" related to the United States Government
42 . . .as "a ward to his guardian." Especially since the Civil
War, the makers of Indian policy asserted the right and duty
of the United States to civilize the Indians, even if it
required pacifying them first through force of arms.
U. S. Indian Commissioner Edward Smith articulated in 1874
the first principle of America's relationship with the
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Indians, that it was "unwise. . . to defer wholly to their
wishes without reference to what is clearly for their own 
43good." As the United States was on the brink of formally
joining the ranks of the imperial powers, the nation's
Indian policy embodied all the essential elements of
trusteeship and the trusteeship Weltanschauung.
It became an article of faith among the formulators of
U. S. Indian policy and among American imperialists that a
good trustee must "educate and care for his wards so as to
44make them able to care for themselves." But rather than 
seeing this duty as a quixotic exercise in international 
altruism, we must view it in proper perspective. A good 
trustee sought to educate his wards in such a way as to make 
their maturity conducive to and compatible with the larger 
interests of the civilized nations. To educate and develop 
the wards was also to modernize and stabilize a backward 
area. Furthermore, the trustee had the authority to decide 
what the ward required in order to properly care for 
himself, and in the meantime, had the authority to control 
the ward and his property. Little wonder that advocates of 
trusteeship believed that a harmony of interests supported 
control over backward peoples.
Ill
Advocates of trusteeship were usually concerned with 
the forging of a world of order and access to commercial and
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economic opportunities, that is, with the tangible 
dimensions of creating a modern world order. But, 
occasionally, the necessity of controlling and civilizing 
backward peoples assumed apocalyptic proportions. Statesmen 
and intellectuals of the era tended to view world affairs 
through the prism of speculative history; they viewed the 
challenges of modernizing backward areas and peoples in 
terms of the rise and fall of civilizations. Anxious men 
warned of the "Slavic menace" and the "yellow peril."
History was the story of racial struggle. Was it 
conceivable that contact with other races of the world could 
precipitate the demise of the West?
Trusteeship thus had a profoundly pessimistic and
defensive dimension. Controlling and civilizing backward
peoples were not merely matters of convenience, or a means
of facilitating the spread of western commerce and
influence, but a dire necessity. Because of the world's
interdependence, the progress of the entire international
community depended on the progress of each and every member
of the human family. "Our close relations with the
ignorant, the degraded, the vicious, which it is impossible
to escape," asserted Josiah Strong, "are forcing us to do
45them good in self-defence." Theodore Marburg, noted 
internationalist and President Taft's minister to Belgium, 
envisaged trusteeship as a grand strategy of frontier
r
defense against the latent forces of reaction. "The wider 
the spread of civilization," he wrote, "the less danger is
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there of its again receiving such rude shocks as overwhelmed
A g
ancient civilizations. . . . 11
Few writers seriously harbored fears of barbarian 
hordes overrunning western civilization, but many were less 
than sanguine over the impending clash of civilizations. 
English writer Charles H. Pearson's 1893 "forecast" raised 
spectres that haunted many of his contemporaries. In 
contrast to the general optimism of the age, Pearson 
believed that white races could never control the tropics. 
Climate and geography rendered it impossible. Instead, 
white rule would bring order and industry to the tropics, 
making it possible for tropical peoples to expand, and to 
eventually confine the white races to a small area of the 
globe. While the white races lived in highly centralized 
"stationary states," the so-called backward races would 
dominate the world and its commerce. Pearson wrote with 
stark objectivity of a near future when Europeans would look 
back at
a world which we thought of as destined to belong 
to the Aryan races and to the Christian faith; to 
the letters and arts and charm of social manners 
which we have inherited from the best times of the 
past. We shall wake to find ourselves elbowed and 
hustled, and perhaps even thrust aside by peoples 
whom we looked down upon as servile, and thought 
of as bound always to minister to our needs. The 
solitary consolation will be, that the changes 
have been inevitable. It has been our work to 
organise and create, to carry peace and law and 
order over the world, that others may enter in and 
enjoy. Yet in some of us the feeling of caste is 
so strong that we are not sorry to think we shall 
have passed away before that day arrives.
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Pearson touched an extremely raw nerve when he noted the 
irony that "our science, our civilization, our great and 
real advance in the practice of government are only bringing
us nearer to the day when the lower races will predominate
48m  the world. . . . "  The best that the white races
could do was to control the growth of China, whose 400
million Asian peoples made it the greatest potential
leviathan, and to render Africa less dangerous by converting
49its peoples to Christianity and western ideals.
While most of Pearson's contemporaries condemned his
pessimism and his underestimation of western civilization's
resiliency, they could not completely dismiss his 
50argument. Observers such as Alfred Thayer Mahan shared 
Pearson's concern that the influence of the West on Asian 
peoples tended to be "one-sided." Machine technology, a 
mixed blessing even in the West, had been the West's primary 
export. As a result, affected areas had undergone economic 
and social change without undergoing a political and moral 
regeneration. The West must also export its "mental and 
material" forces in order to make Asian peoples both modern 
and benign.^
There was, in short, a latent fear that selective 
contact with the West would equip backward peoples with the 
potential power of the West's material civilization, but not 
with the necessarily concomitant pacifying influence of 
western ideals. This prospect did not then lead to the 
conclusion that all contact should be avoided; given the
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
4 9
commercial ambitions of the West, this was unthinkable. It 
simply meant that the advanced nations must see their 
trusteeship over the peoples of Africa and Asia through to 
its desired conclusion, and that they must manage their 
trusteeship so that their wards would not turn on their 
guardians.
The apocalyptic dimension of the trusteeship 
Weltanschauung gained new momemtum in the wake of 
World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution. Those dual shocks
intensified speculation over the fate of western
. . . . 52 . .civilization. The popular writings of Lothrop Stoddard
articulated the fears that Bolshevism— "the standard bearer
of a revolt against civilization which girdles the
globe"— was leading Asians, Africans, and other inferior
races in an all-out assault on the temples of civilization.
Stoddard resurrected Pearson's argument that it was the
medical and ethical progress of the West that allowed the
inferior races to survive and thrive and become biologically
"fitter" than the "best" races. But while Pearson was
coldly objective, Stoddard was wildly alarmist. Instead of
being resigned to the West's fate and perversely amused by
the irony of the situation, Stoddard suggested desperate
remedies. A disciple of racist publicist Madison Grant,
Stoddard advocated eugenics to control the growth of the
lower races. More importantly, he urged western states to
maintain control over tropical America and Africa, the
natural "patrimonies" of the white race, and to control and
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guide, as far as possible, the development of the Asian 
53peoples.
Few American statesmen shared the intensity of 
Stoddard's fears, but there was a little bit of Stoddard in 
many adherents to the trusteeship Weltanschauung.
Especially when addressing the question of America's role in 
the Orient, Amerian statesmen often betrayed the belief that 
U. S. control and guidance meant much more than securing 
markets and fostering order and access. Trusteeship was a 
means for achieving a desirable world order in a larger 
sense: that of adjusting peoples and civilizations to each
other on western terms. The influence of this perspective 
is difficult to measure, but without doubt it tended to 
raise the stakes of trusteeship. Trustees could hardly 
afford to relax or surrender their control when the fate of 
western civilization and human progress hung in the balance.
IV
The trusteeship Weltanschauung constituted a rather 
coherent posture toward the "Third world" and its place in 
the world order. Drawing on precedent and on many popular 
currents of thought, it provided a set of rules to regulate 
relations between civilized and backward nations. The sine 
qua non of the trusteeship Weltanschauung was the belief 
that bringing order, stability, and modern efficiency to all 
areas of an interdependent world was necessary for the
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general good, and, therefore, required that advanced states 
manage the affairs of backward peoples.
Trusteeship stemmed from the eminently realistic vision 
of an "open” world in which the United States could easily 
satisfy its national interests. The trusteeship 
Weltanschauung was closely intertwined with more tangible 
economic and strategic considerations of American policy.
The trusteeship Weltanschauung was above all an intellectual 
milieu within which a generation of American statesmen 
formulated U. S. policy toward the Third World. It was not 
deterministic; that is, it did not consistently impel 
policymakers to impose trusteeship over backward peoples.
It was not in fact an independent motivation of policy, but 
a milieu through which policymakers filtered other 
considerations. American statesmen did not actively search 
for backward states to control and supervise. They simply 
operated within an intellectual milieu that made control and 
coercion of weak, disorganized states a viable alternative 
when the circumstance demanded it. A policy of trusteeship 
did not exist apart from or work against economic and 
strategic interests. It was an instrument of them, a 
flexible means for achieving realistic objectives. Whether, 
when, and how the United States actually pursued a policy of 
trusteeship depended largely upon immediate and tangible 
considerations. Subsequent chapters illustrate the 
interaction between the relatively coherent trusteeship 
worldview and variable policy circumstances.
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CHAPTER II
AMERICAN TRUSTEESHIP AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM: 
Reflections and Refractions
The trusteeship Weltanschauung was not a unique 
American possession. Nor was the United States the only 
imperial power to describe its control of other nations as 
trusteeship. The major elements of the trusteeship 
Weltanschauung were part of a general western worldview 
dating back at least as far as the first Iberian conquests 
in the New World. In addition, European powers, especially 
Great Britain, had for centuries articulated the principles 
of trusteeship and declared their control of other peoples 
was for their own good and for the good of civilization. 
Thus, far from representing an innovative American approach 
to the persistent challenge of dealing with backward 
peoples, trusteeship placed the United States squarely 
within the western imperial tradition. Could Americans, 
with their militantly anti-imperial national self-image, 
acknowledge their debt to "old world" imperialism? This 
chapter explores the answers to this question and their 
implications for American trusteeship by examining American 
attitudes toward European, especially English, models of 
trusteeship.
\
The fin de siecle American attitiude toward English 
imperialism was above all ambivalent. Many Americans still 
harbored a grudge from 1776 and unequivocally condemned
58
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imperialism and colonialism; others found it expedient to 
denounce imperialism ritualistically. Still others 
jealously admired the British Empire and hoped that the 
United States could follow its example and someday supplant 
it as the greatest power on earth.1 The most important 
strand of the American attitude was the surprisingly strong 
support for the British imperial idea. Even before the 
United States symbolically joined the ranks of the imperial 
powers in 1898, Americans of all political camps 
acknowledged the advantages of British rule, and shared the 
enthusiasm for the White Man's Burden. British statesmen 
and proconsuls articulated theories and principles of 
trusteeship which their American counterparts shared and 
emulated.
We can learn much about trusteeship in American thought 
and policy by studying how American statesmen and scholars 
evaluated British imperial trusteeship. Such a study 
underscores at least three points. First, it reinforces our 
recognition that American and British imperialism rested on 
many of the same ideas and, at least in the abstract, worked 
toward similar ends. Secondly, it suggests that in order to 
understand fully the influence of trusteeship in American 
policy, we must look beyond America's own imperial and 
quasi-imperial adventures. Trusteeship was not simply a 
worldview convenient as a self-serving justification for 
American imperialism. It was a bona fide worldview that 
informed America's overall policy toward the Third World and
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toward other empires. American acquiescence in and 
encouragement of the control of backward areas by other 
civilized states was also a manifestation of the influence 
of trusteeship. Trusteeship could in effect be a "passive" 
as well as an active policy.
Lastly, a study of American attitudes toward British 
trusteeship shows that the British model also served a 
negative function in the development of an American 
trusteeship style. Beneficent and enlightened as it was, 
British imperialism served as a foil for American 
trusteeship. Americans perceived a marked contrast between 
Britain’s alleged failure to prepare its colonies for 
eventual independence and its resistance to native 
nationalism and America's self-proclaimed great departure in 
imperial trusteeship. Americans may have conceded that they 
were sharing the White Man's Burden with other enlightened 
imperial powers, but they were not willing to surrender the 
myth of American exceptionalism.
I
American attitudes toward European imperialism softened 
throughout the nineteenth century as Americans began to 
perceive a fundamental distinction between "good" and "bad" 
imperialism. Bad imperialism was characterized by conquest 
and profit, and resulted in the ruthless extermination of or 
oppression of native peoples. It placed the value of
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profits over the value of humanity. Good, or enlightened
imperialism was synonymous with trusteeship. It sought to
forge order but of chaos and bring the benefits of modern
western civilization to backward peoples. The branding of
some powers (notably, at some point between 1898 and 1934,
Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Germany, and Japan) as
practitioners of bad imperialism highlighted by contrast the
virtues and qualities of enlightened imperialism.
Those Americans who adopted an imperial mindset came to
regard Great Britain as the archetypical good imperialist.
Britons had in fact developed their own ideal of colonial
trusteeship shortly after losing their North American
colonies. Edmund Burke in 1783 indicted Lords Clive and
Hastings and the East India Company for betraying the
2 . ."trust" that ruling subject peoples entailed. British 
humanitarians appealed to the nation's responsibilities as 
trustees in their campaign for abolition of slavery in the 
West Indies and protection of the aborigines in Australia
3
and New Zealand. Many Americans perceived the 1857-1858 
Sepoy Mutiny in India as an important chastening experience 
for British imperialism. The British Government abolished 
the East India Company and turned the administration of its 
major colonial possession over to wise, competent, and 
selfless civil servants, an object of much American
4
admiration during the "Gilded Age."
By 1898 British imperialists made trusteeship the 
semi-official slogan of their policies. Imperial
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propagandist Benjamin Kidd wrote in 1898 that "the tropics
can only be governed as a trust for civilization, and with a
full sense of the responsibility that such a trust 
5entails." In an important speech in 1897, Colonial 
Secretary Joseph Chamberlain announced that in the British 
empire "the sense of possession has given place to a 
different sentiment— the sense of obligation. We now feel 
that our rule over those [tropical] territories can only be 
justified if we can show that it adds to the happiness and 
prosperity of the people."6 Chamberlain, like his American 
counterparts, considered colonialism as a trust, as a 
conditional rule based on the performance of obligations, 
not on the mere fact of possession. Americans and Britons 
distinguished between trusteeship and the "real 
Imperialistic idea," which America's "father" to the 
Philippines, William Howard Taft, defined as extending a
7
state's influence "by purchase and conquest."
The enunciation of an enlightened colonialism and the 
divorce of imperialism from its sordid past made it possible 
for Americans to praise openly the accomplishments of 
western imperialism. Of course the most celebrated American 
cheerleader for western imperialism was Theodore Roosevelt. 
His life-long conviction that western expansion served the 
best interests of all mankind found theoretical and 
practical expression. "Every expansion of civilization 
makes for peace," he declared in 1899. "In other words, 
every expansion of a great civilized power means a victory
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for law, order, and righteousness. . . .  In every instance 
the expansion has been of benefit, not so much to the power
Q
nominally benefited, as to the whole world.” In his 
letters and speeches, Roosevelt noted the contribution to 
civilization made by the British in India, Egypt, the Sudan, 
and South Africa, the French in Algeria and Morocco, the 
Russians in Central Asia, and even the Austrians in Bosnia,
9
and the Japanese m  Korea.
During the last year of his presidency, Roosevelt 
delivered a speech intended to counteract widespread 
American public criticism of Britain's policies in India. 
The following year, in his fabled address at the London 
Guildhall, he lambasted British officials for failing to 
live up to their own standards of colonial rule.10 
Roosevelt's fellow "large policy” advocate, Admiral Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, consistently praised Britain's "noble record” 
in Egypt, the Sudan, India, and South Africa. The British 
had achieved "benefits immeasurable and lasting" employing 
"the power of the word in the hands of enlightenment and 
justice.n11
It was not, however, only this vocal clique of men who 
applauded British imperialism. The editors of The Nation, 
soon to become America's most virulently anti-imperialistic 
weekly, acclaimed Britain's 1882 occupation of Egypt. Once 
they assured themselves that the intervention was not 
intended to simply rescue careless investors, the editors 
expressed pleasure at the long overdue rolling back of
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fairest lands on the globe into wastes which no civilized 
man ever traverses without shame and indignation.11 They 
further correctly anticipated that Liberal Prime Minister 
William E. Gladstone would "undoubtedly disregard the 
nationality chimera, as he is in duty bound to do, and treat 
Egypt as a patch of Islam in which circumstances have 
imposed on the Western Powers the duty of keeping 
order."12
The Nation also approved of British rule in India, 
which, at that time, was still highly distasteful to many 
Americans. "The management of this great trust has been 
largely in the hands of Englishmen of the highest order of
ability. . . the editors commented in 1895. They
consistently ridiculed the suggestion of giving India its
independence. While British rule was in some ways
13
"oppressive," native self-rule would prove even more so.
For the surprisingly large number of Americans who
shared this admiration of British imperialism, one man
personified all that was creditable about it. That man was
Evelyn Baring, the Earl of Cromer, who was, from 1882 to
1907, Britain's First Agent and de facto ruler in Egypt.
The sometime anti-imperialist Charles Francis Adams neatly
summarized American opinion in 1906 when he returned from a
tour of Egypt and wrote: "Lord Clive and Lord Cromer are
ear-marks of a very different kind— typical of two periods
14and two systems." Through his personal example and in
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his later writing, Cromer exhibited the essential qualities
of the archetypical enlightened proconsul. He was a pillar
of strength, impervious to criticism, sensitive to the needs
of the people, but willing to use the iron fist for their
own good. He was a deeply moral man, a "Christian
gentleman," driven by a sense of duty, integrity,
self-control, an instinct of fair play, and a respect for 
15law and order.
Cromer had an unwavering faith in the righteousness of
British imperialism and especially Britain's occupation of
Egypt. It was Egypt's financial incompetence that compelled
the occupation, and Cromer was unapologetic in his belief
that, because of this, western standards must prevail in
Egypt. The occupation, he asserted, could only end with the
existence of "a fairly good, strong, and— above all
things— stable Government which will obviate anarchy and
bankruptcy, and will prevent the Egyptian question from
16again becoming a serious case of trouble for Europe." In 
the meantime, Britain could not allow the Egyptians with 
their "unreformed propensities" the luxury of 
self-government? they "should only be permitted to govern 
themselves after the fashion in which Europeans think they 
ought to be governed." They were clearly not yet able to do 
this.17
Cromer was most influential as an embodiment of and a 
spokesman for the principles of trusteeship. He was, wrote 
his admiring countryman, John St. Loe Strachey, "an ideal
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trustee.11
The weak administrator is always liable to govern, 
not in the interests of the governed, but in what 
the governed think is in their interests— to do 
what they actually desire rather than what they 
should desire if they were better judges. Weak 
governors, that is, act as if they were servants 
and not trustees. . . It is wrong when you stand 
in loco parentis to those whose affairs you 
administer.
This interpretation of a trustee's duties guided Cromer's 
actions in Egypt. "We need not always inquire too closely," 
he wrote in 1908, "what these people, who are all, 
nationally speaking, more or less in status pupilari
19themselves think is best in their own interest. . . . "
England ruled Egypt for the best interests of the common
fellaheen, but it was a rule for, not by the people. Cromer
wanted to share the burden of rule with Egyptians, he wrote
in 1902, but saw little prospect of doing so. He felt that
English policy in India had gone too far in extending
20representative institutions to the inhabitants.
In theory and practice Cromer felt that the interests
of the common man, "the voiceless millions," constituted the
real trust of colonial rule. Colonial policy must serve the
interests of the whole people, especially against the
selfish interests of the westernized elite. Cromer
caustically denounced "the loquacious semi-educated native"
21and the "pernicious by-products" of East-West contact.
He did not, however, recommend that England cease educating 
native peoples. He affirmed that Britain's policy of a 
broad-based elementary education was "sound" and "the only
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policy worthy of a civilised nation. . . . But education
must have another objective, to prevent the people from
being "left intellectually defenceless in the presence of
the hare-brained and empirical projects which the political
charlatan, himself but half-educated, will not fail to pound
22into their credulous ears."
The proconsul's "primary task" was not to create a
system which allowed a small minority to "mis-govern," but
"which will allow the masses of population to be governed
23according to the code of Christian morality." The 
proconsul must steer a safe course in a sea fraught with 
dangers. He must educate the people despite the fact that 
"it is impossible to impart knowledge without stimulating 
ambition."24 He must promote the spirit of Christianity 
without recklessly forcing western institutions on eastern 
societies. Above all, then, the proconsul must be patient. 
He must not rely on popular gratitude for his service and 
sacrifice.25
The attitudes that Cromer articulated and represented 
were, for the most part, endemic to the concept of 
trusteeship. British proconsuls, their American 
counterparts, and almost all persons charged with governing 
subject peoples employed the imagery of parents and 
children, guardians and wards. Cromer personified the 
ideals of trusteeship for contemporary Americans and wielded 
enormous personal and intellectual influence. This was 
particularly evident in the mystique Cromer held for
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America's own company of imperial proconsuls.
The most renowned of these American proconsuls was
General Leonard Wood, a man often compared with Cromer 
2 6himself. Wood was a career Army officer who first won
fame as commander of the "Rough Riders" in 1898, and as
Military Governor of occupied Cuba from 1899 to 1902. This
experience made Wood a national celebrity, a status he never
surrendered. He subsequently served as a provincial civil
governor and military commander in the Philippines, and, in
the 1920s, as Governor General of the Philippines. Between
these stints as proconsul, Wood was Chief of Staff of the
U. S. Army, a leading figure in the World War I preparedness
movement, and a major contender for the Republican
presidential nomination in 1920. Wood shared Cromer's
personal qualities. He was a militantly moral man and a
27consummate Christian statesman. Hailed since his work in
Cuba as a second Cromer, Wood developed during his colonial
career in Cuba and the Philippines the self-image of a
proconsul. Always confident in his own judgement, Wood was
willing to ignore and frustrate the demands of native
politicians and rule in behalf of the common man. Like
Cromer, Wood expressed contempt for "the gentleman with the
long little finger nail who expects to get his living from
28his wits or from the Government."
On his way to the Philippines in 1903 Wood made what 
became an almost obligatory tour of Europe's eastern 
colonies and spent several days with Cromer. "Like most
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great men who accomplish a great deal," Wood recorded in his
diary, "[Cromer] has had to run into many fakirs and make
29 . . .the usual number of enemies." Wood's empathy intensified
as he weathered his own political tempests in Manila. After
five years as Governor General, he confessed to Roosevelt's
widow in 1926 that "The task of saving a person or a people
from self-destruction is generally a rather thankless one."
Wood, like Cromer, learned to satisfy himself simply with
the knowledge that he had done a good job. He obviously
felt himself part of an ageless fraternity of beleaguered
proconsuls and even took to quoting from Virgil:
So vast a burden and so slow in pace 3Q
Is theirs who seek to found a sovereign race.
Leonard Wood was not the only American to assume a
proconsular identity. His case was only the most striking
evidence of an important and often neglected intellectual
and temperamental affinity between American and English
colonial statesmen.
Cromer's Egypt was an oft-cited model for American
trusteeship in the Philippine Islands, Cuba, Haiti, and even
China. What Cromer and Britain sought to accomplish in
Egypt— to stabilize and regenerate a state that had broken
down under the rule of its incompetent natives— was what the
United States usually sought in its own imperial ventures.
And, as the United States always did, Cromer and the English
pledged to stay only as long as necessary and claimed to
exercise only limited and conditional powers. They were
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
7 0
trustees, or "receivers," not imperial oppressors. 
Furthermore, Cromer performed the unpleasant but necessary 
task of lording over another people for their own good. 
Cromer persuasively articulated the rationale for denying a 
people full sovereignty and self-determination.
Aside from the intellectual affinity, another reason 
why American policymakers could so lavishly praise Cromer 
and British rule in Egypt was because that rule served 
American interests. The United States desired order and 
financial stability in the area of the Suez Canal and 
benefitted from it, but had no intention of providing that 
order for itself. Throughout most of Asia, Africa, and the 
Near East, American interests were too marginal to warrant 
direct involvement in the maelstrom of international 
politics. In such areas, the best American policy was to 
encourage benign and effective European control that inured 
at least indirectly to the benefit of American interests.
In those areas, states such as Great Britain essentially 
acted as trustees, or mandatories, for the United States.
The United States did not act as a trustee or pursue a 
policy of trusteeship in Egypt, India, Morocco, or Central 
Africa, but the pragmatic U. S. policy clearly rested on the 
trusteeship Weltanschauung. Britain, France, and even Spain 
could provide the stability and access that were so central 
to the American vision of a well-ordered world. The United 
States obviously reaped fewer benefits in backward areas 
from the control of other states than it would from direct
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American control, but incidental benefits were more than 
satisfactory in areas of marginal American concern.
In other words, an important dimension of American 
trusteeship policy was the "passive" reliance on "surrogate" 
trustees to perform tasks that American statesmen deemed 
desirable. Subsequent chapters reveal the importance of 
passive trusteeship in the overall scheme of American policy 
toward the Third World.
II
Because of the close affinity between American and
British trusteeship, it is not surprising that in 1898, when
American officials found themselves faced with the task of
formulating colonial policy, they looked to British
31 . .precedents for guidance. The British were happy to 
oblige. In numerous magazine articles and in unofficial 
correspondence, British officials praised their American 
counterparts for finally acknowledging the virtues of 
British imperialism. Together the United States and Britain 
would face the challenge of extending Anglo-Saxon
civilization and ruling backward peoples in their own
32 • •interests. British officials also imparted more specific
advice. They emphasized the necessity of a trained corps of
disinterested colonial civil servants, of continuity in
policy and keeping above partisan politics, and, above all,
the need for patience and restraint. Americans must abandon
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their naive faith in human equality and accept the fact that
colonial rule was a long-term proposition. If a colonial
power moved too quickly in creating representative
institutions and granting the privileges of self-government,
22the damage would be irreversible.
British admonitions against going too fast proved 
prescient. The United States, despite its concurrence with 
most of the assumptions of trusteeship and the tenets of 
colonial rule, took an almost perverse pleasure in ignoring 
those fundamental British maxims. This was not accidental, 
for it was through the promise of self-government to 
dependent peoples that the United States forged its unique 
identity as a colonial power.
In order to understand this obduracy, we must 
appreciate the entrenched ambivalence of all but the most 
dogmatic imperialists toward European imperialism.
Americans emulated English colonial rule, but harbored 
serious reservations over several facets of it. Even 
Cromer's greatest admirers had difficulty with what 
Americans perceived to be a British and European failure to 
truly help the native inhabitants in many of their colonies. 
Theodore Roosevelt, for example, consistently criticized 
Britain's rule in many of its colonies. While the United 
States helped the Filipinos, he asserted, the British had 
"ruined" the natives of the Malay Peninsula.34 On their 
1903 tour of the Orient, Leonard Wood and his long-time 
companion Major (later Major General) Frank R. McCoy
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commented on the depraved state of the "hopeless masses of 
35India." They admired the prosperity and efficiency of
Dutch-ruled Java, but were suspicious of the whole
philosophy of Dutch rule. "Good government," McCoy wrote
3 6after touring Java, "is a trifle too evident." Leonard
Wood summarized in 1926 the American critique of Dutch rule:
"They erred too much perhaps in developing the material side
and not developing the political and educational side [of
the inhabitants]. . . . 1,37
Philippines Governor General W. Cameron Forbes, despite
his personal obsession with economic development in the
Philippines, consistently echoed this critique. The
British, he wrote, "consider the welfare of the people
incidental and trade paramount, instead of considering the
welfare of the people paramount and the trade incidental.
Perhaps I can express it better," he explained in his
journal annotations, "by saying that the two go hand in 
38hand. . . . "  Forbes also excoriated the British for
their airs of social superiority which, he asserted, was
39"the essence of the whole British system." Forbes even 
criticized the colonial philosophy of Lord Cromer. While he 
confessed "unbound admiration for his achievements," and 
attached greater weight to his views than to those of almost 
any living man, Forbes came away jaded from his several 
interviews with Cromer. He found Cromer's advice 
"negative," and felt that it underscored the differences 
between the situation in Egypt and that in the
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American proconsuls consistently portrayed their
nation's colonial policy as the most progressive, largely
because it rejected the Europeans' social pretensions and
materialism. Trusteeship for the natives was not simply
paternalistic protection and a guarantee of a fair share of
the bounty. The U. S. sought to develop not only the
colonies' resources, but also their peoples. Trusteeship
involved administration of the estate and preparation of the
ward for maturity. In the American view, European colonial
powers systematically abdicated the latter 
41responsibility.
In contrast to that failure, American statesmen and
observers emphasized the preparation of native peoples for
self-government or independence as the chief dogma and
distinguishing feature of American trusteeship. Perhaps the
best theoretical statement of this principle came from Clark
University professor and sometime government adviser George
H. Blakeslee. After explaining the necessity of western
control over "schoolage race children" whom the "world
family" could not allow to "run wild," Blakeslee specified
the duties of a "race school." "It must," he explained,
be a school in which there is finally a 
graduation, and from which the race-child can 
pass, sufficiently matured to take his place as a 
man in the world. . . the United States is the
first and only nation of school teachers to found 
a school in which a race-child may look definitely 
to graduation-Tto a time when its school days 
shall be over.
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Europeans, especially the English were overtly hostile to 
any intimation that their colonial rule was a transient 
stage of development. As late as the 1940s, the English 
continued to believe that colonial peoples could not 
reasonably aspire to more than self-government within the 
empire. All Europeans were reluctant to offer their 
dependencies the kind of genuinely representative 
institutions that the United States made the hallmark of its 
colonial rule.
This belief in teaching the natives the skills of 
self-government and preparing them for "graduation" day 
allowed Americans to believe that their country was not 
imitating and thus legitimizing European colonial practices. 
On the contrary it was educating the Europeans how to better 
rule their colonies. Even Alpheus Snow, who always took a 
cosmopolitan view of imperialism, argued that until 1898 
trade was still the prime motivation of imperial powers.
Only with the entry of the United States onto the colonial 
scene was there a policy of "enlightened altruism and 
enlightened self-interest."43 The editors of Scribner1s 
captured in 1906 the typical pugnaciousness of America's 
attitude. "One thing is certain," the editors concluded.
"What we have undertaken is the latest thing in colonies.
44If it should be that we set the fashion!" Americans 
believed by the late 1920s that they had indeed set the 
fashion, that the rising tide of Asian nationalism was 
compelling Europeans to concede greater native participation
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in colonial government. "Thirty years ago," boasted Henry
Stimson, at that time Governor General of the Philippines,
we used to be called the naughty boys of the 
Orient who were upsetting all the established 
systems by our foolish attempt to introduce 
democracy here. . . . Since the Great War there 
has been a great change and we have come into our 
own. The Philippines are really the one peaceful 
and contented spot in this neighborhood and our 
policies have been vindicated. . . .
The graduation doctrine was a conscious and
well-publicized departure from European practice. Its
practical application was most evident in America's rule
over its most important colony, the Philippine Islands.
American imperialists acknowledged that America's Philippine
policy bucked European experience and advice, and insisted
that this was necessary in order to reconcile colonialism
with American ideals. Even more than the British, Americans
must take risks and suffer the consequences of a "liberal"
policy. Hence they sought to educate the masses in the
English language and in academic fields, and established the
most privileged native assembly in the colonial world less
than a decade after acquiring the Philippines. This proved
to be a master-stroke of posturing. English critics such as
Alleyne Ireland were livid at the United States for pursuing
an "American solution" in the Philippines and ruling on
"democratic principles" which, he felt, was "doomed to
4 6certain failure." Such criticism of course validated the 
American imperialists' contention that they were following a 
perilously liberal course. America's first civil governor
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in the islands, William H. Taft, could report in 1908:
The severe criticism to which the policy of the 
Government in the Philippines has been subjected 
by English Colonial statesmen and students, should 
not hinder our pursuit of it in the slightest. It 
is of course opposed to the policy usually pursued 
in the English government in dealing with native 
races, because in common with other colonial 
power, most of England's colonial statesmen have 
assumed that the safest course was to keep the 
native peoples ignorant and quiet, and that any 
education which might furnish a motive for 
agitation was an interference with the true and 
proper course of government. Our policy is an 
experiment, it is true, and it assumes the risk of 
agitation and sedition which may arise from the 
overeducation of ambitious politicians or 
misdirected patriots, in order that the whole body 
of the people may acquire sufficient intelligence 
ultimately to exercise governmental control 
themselves.
Taft's report obscured several important facts. First,
he exaggerated the degree to which the British sought to
keep the natives in its colonies ignorant and quiet. Lord
Cromer, after all, voiced the opinion that Britain must put
up with the irritating side effects of a liberal education
policy. More importantly, even as Taft criticized British
policy, he and other American policymakers continued to
follow the fundamental tenets of colonial trusteeship that
Lord Cromer articulated. Taft's Philippine policy rested on
the conviction that American authority in the islands must
be unquestioned, and that the U. S. had a right and duty to
act in the Filipinos' best interests even if this required
the United States to use force against the Filipinos. Taft,
like Cromer, condemned the "loquacious semi-educated native"
48who demanded an immediate end to foreign rule. In fact,
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Taft and his successors consciously followed the suggestion 
of another British colonial official, Alfred, Lord Milner. 
Milner argued that for tutelage to succeed native peoples 
must assume a permanent foreign presence. If a colonial 
power gave a people definite promises of independence, their
agitation for it would make successful tutelage
49 . . .impossible. In short, the emphasis on graduation did not
mean that American policymakers had really departed from the
antecedents of British trusteeship.
The graduation doctrine did not repudiate the 
fundamental belief that control of backward peoples was 
legitimate and necessary. On the contrary, it reinforced 
the legitimacy of such control by emphasizing the necessity 
of following through on the obligation of regenerating 
backward peoples. The promise of graduation provided a 
powerful mandate for exercising control over another people. 
One consequence of this logic was the existence of a 
shamelessly ethnocentric American policy toward backward 
peoples. A ward nation could graduate only after it had 
sufficiently mastered the skills and habits essential to 
maintain order and develop its economy to the satisfaction 
of its western trustee. As historian Whitney Perkins 
astutely observed, "by renouncing the intent of maintaining 
the empire which it gained, the United States committed 
itself to the profoundly imperialistic objective of remaking 
the societies of its dependencies in such a way that they 
would qualify for self-government on something close to the
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5 0American model."
American colonial theorists and policymakers paid lip
service to the emerging concept of "indirect rule" and the
toleration of indigenous customs and institutions, but
American policy tended inexorably toward the grafting of
51American institutions and values on other societies.
Cameron Forbes bluntly stated the American priorities in his
account of American policy in the Philippines. "The
Americans," he wrote, "endeavored to lay down the foundation
for a true democracy and wherever the existing customs and
traditions jeopardized what they knew to be the secure basis
of democracy, they set themselves to uproot or modify all
52impediments to democratic institutions." Whatever the 
ethical objections to this ethnocentric perspective, it was 
consistent with the assumptions and goals of trusteeship.
It was, however, difficult to enact this perspective 
into policy. Theoretically, graduation occurred only after 
a thorough tutelage and when the wards could maintain a 
truly meaningful independence. Subsequent chapters reveal 
that while Americans continued to believe in the necessity 
of imposing their brand of order and civilization on 
backward nations, the United States was never able to 
accomplish a thorough tutelage of a dependent people. 
American policymakers quickly learned through experience 
that administering a "race school" was not easy, especially 
in an atmosphere of political partisanshihp and an often 
hostile American public opinion.
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Not coincidentally, they also discovered that providing 
a thorough education for "race children" was not essential 
for fulfilling the primary obligation of trusteeship: the
creation of an orderly and accessible world. Instead of 
preparing their wards for a "graduation," American 
trusteeship often put them in what was tantamount to 
"detention." Instead of being a systematic and thorough 
preparation for a viable independence, graduation in 
practice came to mean temporary American occupation or 
control and, after a crash course in the rudiments of modern 
self-government, the conferring of a less-than-absolute 
independence. American policymakers found it easier to be 
trustees, or mandatories, for the interests of civilization 
than trustees for what they believed was the best interests 
of alien peoples.
Ill
This cursory survey of American attitudes toward 
British imperial trusteeship highlights several significant 
aspects of American trusteeship. It underscores the 
affinity in rhetoric and policy between American and British 
perceptions of trusteeship. The affinity owed mostly to 
characteristics endemic to trusteeship itself, but Americans 
also consciously emulated British models. In addition, this 
affinity allowed Americans to acknowledge the benefits and 
accomplishments of British imperialism and the benign
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control of backward peoples by other civilized states. This 
of course had a practical as well as a theoretical 
dimension; the trusteeship of other powers brought order 
and varying degrees of access for American commerce to the 
"waste spaces" of the globe.
British imperialism also provided an important model 
For American trusteeship. By stressing in their own policy 
what they perceived to be the failure of British 
trusteeship, Americans forged what they believed was a new 
approach to dealing with backward areas. A policy 
explicitly intended to prepare dependent peoples for 
graduation was a logical corollary of the trusteeship (or 
guardianship) concept and childhood metaphor. It also 
served to reconcile imperialism with American ideals.
Rather than regarding trusteeship as the antithesis of 
self-determination, Americans could believe that trusteeship 
was the means by which backward peoples achieved 
self-determination. Americans could concede that they 
imposed imperial rule and control over other peoples, but at 
the same time deny that they were "imperialists." The 
graduation doctrine was the basis of America's "unique" 
imperial tradition. Because it ostensibly employed imperial 
control for the ultimate objective of creating stable 
independent states, American imperialism appeared genuinely 
anti-imperialistic in nature. While American policy fell 
far short of this noble goal, the idea and the rhetoric of 
graduation has pervaded the historical understanding of
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trusteeship. Indeed, the willingness to promise a dependent 
people graduation had, by 1945, become the litmus test of a 
meaningful trusteeship policy.
And while the imagery of a "race school" and 
"graduation" was most clearly relevant to colonial 
situations in which the United States maintained full 
control and pursued a policy of comprehensive tutelage, 
graduation was an appropriate metaphor for American 
trusteeship in general. In the Philippines, the Caribbean, 
China, and wherever the U. S. maintained any degree of 
imperial control and exerted its influence, American 
statesmen claimed as their objective the preparation of 
backward nations for stable independent existence. American 
statesmen declared their respect for the ultimate 
sovereignty and self-determination of backward peoples, and 
declared that American trusteeship was intended to enhance 
and promote this self-determination.
Thus far we have defined trusteeship, explored the 
worldview of which it was a part, and identified an American 
approach to trusteeship and imperialism. The chapters which 
follow are essentially case studies of actual policy 
situations. They are variations on a theme, chronological 
and topical discussions of American policy in different 
regions and circumstances, and are intended to explore the 
interaction between the relatively coherent trusteeship 
Weltanschauung and the variable U. S. policy priorities.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
8 3
Each chapter seeks to define the nature and meaning of 
trusteeship in different regions and circumstances, to 
underscore the consistent influence of fundamental 
trusteeship principles, and to identify subtle variations. 
For instance, each chapter explores the immediate reasons 
why American policymakers believed control over backward 
peoples to be legitimate and necessary, and relates those 
reasons to the overall trusteeship Weltanschauung. Each 
chapter also discusses the benefits that ostensibly accrued 
to the wards, and explains how American statesmen 
distinguished trusteeship from imperialism. In sum, the 
following chapters suggest that the trusteeship 
Weltanschauung was a consistent determinant of America's 
posture toward backward peoples, and that trusteeship itself 
was a tactically flexible policy intended as a means of 
organizing the non-European world.
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CHAPTER III 
"THE DANGERS OF PREMATURE INDEPENDENCE": 
Trusteeship and the Spanish Islands
Most Americans believed in April 1898 that their 
country was embarking on a war of "liberation" on behalf of 
the oppressed Cuban people. It was a war to vindicate and 
revive venerable American principles during an age of 
corruption and cynicism. America would win for the Cubans 
the right of "consent of the governed." Yet, by February of 
1899, the United States Senate and a large segment of 
American opinion had repudiated the universality of "consent 
of the governed" in favor of a policy of trusteeship. The 
gross misrule of the vilified Spanish did not mean that the 
revolutionary Cuban and Filipino peoples had an inherent 
right to govern themselves. The Cubans, along with the 
Filipinos, were not yet capable of managing their own 
affairs and enjoying the benefits of national independence. 
This chapter analyzes this apparent irony. It illustrates 
the influence of the trusteeship Weltanschauung in the 
decisions over the fate of the prizes from America's war 
with Spain.
I
The events of the Spanish-American War and its 
aftermath should have surprised no one familiar with the
90
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history of America's policy toward Cuba. For three-quarters 
of a century the United States betrayed a dualistic attitude 
toward Cuba. On one hand, Americans were confident that 
they would someday own Cuba. But, on the other hand, the 
chief objective of American policy was to mainvain Spanish 
rule over its "ever faithful" colony. The reasons for this 
patience suggest the existence of an American trusteeship 
worldview throughout the nineteenth century. While there 
were many reasons why the United States did not try to wrest 
Cuba from the control of Spain, the most relevant was that 
American statesmen simply believed that Spanish rule was for 
the most part advantageous to American interests, and Cuban 
independence potentially too dangerous to risk.
Henry Clay, America's most vocal proponent of 
recognizing the independence of Spain's American colonies, 
dismissed the contention that those peoples were too 
ignorant for independence as "the doctrine of thrones."1 
But, as John Quincy Adams's Secretary of State in the 1820s, 
Clay repeatedly registered his doubts about Cuba's capacity 
for independence. Clay vigorously opposed the well-known 
ambitions of the Mexicans and Colombians to invade Cuba and 
eliminate the last vestiges of Spanish rule in the 
hemisphere. "Liberation" of Cuba would, he feared, bring 
chaos and possibly lead to British control over Cuba. "If 
Cuba had the ability, within itself, of maintaining an 
independent self government against all assaults from 
without or within, we should pre. *r to see it in that
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state," Clay wrote in his instructions to America's
delegation to the 1826 Panama Congress. "But," he added, "a
mere glance at the limited extent, moral condition, and
discordant character of the population, must convince all of
its incompetency, at present to sustain self government
unaided by other Powers." If, "at this premature period,"
Clay warned, Cuba should gain her independence its white
population and the United States "would live in continued
dread of those tragic scenes which were formerly exhibited
2m  a neighboring island. . ." Clay shared with countless 
official successors a fear of "another Haiti" in the 
Caribbean and the dangers it posed for the security of the 
United States.
In contrast, Clay expressed satisfaction with Spanish 
rule. As long as Spain continued its friendly treatment of 
American commerce, he desired no change in Cuba's political 
status. In fact Clay pursued a policy designed to reconcile 
Spain to the loss of its South American colonies by warning 
that failure to do so would incite Latin American efforts to
liberate Cuba, a prospect which neither Spain nor America
3 . . . .relished. Thus, in an era in which friendship for
revolution was still a living American tradition, American
policymakers shared the trusteeship outlook of future
generations. An independent Cuba would probably
self-destruct, and would in any case be a temptation to
other nations and, therefore, a menace to American security.
Until the time when the United States could safely annex it,
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Cuba was best left in Spanish hands. American leaders in 
the nineteenth century were not yet willing to make the 
United States Cuba's trustee, but they preferred Spanish 
control to Cuban independence.
The Cuban insurrection, or Ten Years War of 1868-1878, 
reconfirmed this American policy. While significant 
segments of the American public and Congress agitated for 
recognition of Cuban belligerency, President Ulysses 
S. Grant and Secretary of State Hamilton Fish sailed the 
familiar course of encouraging Spain to put its own house in 
order. Grant and Fish frequently paid lip service to the 
belief that Cuba would someday break its shackles, but 
denied that the U. S. could at that time rightfully 
facilitate this destiny.
Grant enumerated in 1875 the prerequisites for the
existence of a recognizable government, including the
capacity "of performing the corresponding international
duties resulting from its acquisition of sovereignty."
Whatever American sympathies, Cuba did not, in the
administration's opinion, meet these prerequisites for
recognition of belligerency. Premature recognition would
4constitute an "unfriendly act." Fish, like Clay before 
him, preferred to see Spain compromise and therefore hold 
onto its colony. Fish cited the precedent of Britain, which 
had "wisely" relaxed its colonial- system and was "reaping 
the benefits" of its wisdom. The President, Fish explained, 
hoped that Spain could also adopt a policy of
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"reconciliation" leading to "the speedy restoration of peace
and the organization of a stable and satisfactory system of
5government m  Cuba."
The Grant-Fish policy served as a convenient precedent 
when the administrations of Grover Cleveland and William 
McKinley faced a renewed Cuban insurrection beginning in 
1895. As contemporaries and historians alike have noted, 
Cleveland and his Secretary of State Richard Olney aligned 
the United States as a de facto ally of Spain.6 The 
primary objective was to create a condition of peace and 
stability in Cuba conducive to the perpetuation of American 
trade and investment. If Spain were able and willing to 
provide such conditions, there was little reason to agitate 
for a change in Cuba's status. Olney advised the Spanish 
Minister in 1896 that the United States desired to cooperate 
in the "pacification" of Cuba (through the vigorous 
enforcement of America's neutrality laws) and the 
maintenance of Spanish control. Olney did, however, prefer 
to see Spain concede "reasonable" rights of local
7
self-government to the Cubans. American statesmen 
increasingly concluded that only an enlightened and 
liberalized Spanish rule could foster the conditions that 
American interests in Cuba required.
The Cleveland and McKinley administrations' gradual 
escalation of pressure on Spain, first for reform, then 
autonomy, then surrender of Cuba, consistently had as its 
objective the attainment of what they defined as genuine
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stability in the island. As the Cubans escalated their 
demands and exhibited a willingness to continue their 
insurrection to achieve them, the U. S. had to keep pace. 
Spain’s failure to either crush or conciliate the Cuban 
rebels perpetuated the instability that threatened American 
property and investments in the island. And as long as the 
Cuban insurrection lasted, Cuban emigres continued to outfit 
filibustering expeditions from the United States, thus 
compromising American neutrality. The final break with 
Spain came when it was apparent that no scenario involving 
Spanish control of Cuba could bring stability to the
Q
island. "Pacification" of Cuba, first through 
encouragement of Spanish reforms, then through war with 
Spain, was the consistent American objective. Winning 
independence for the Cuban people, despite its popular 
appeal, was clearly not the cornerstone of American policy.
Debates over the nature of America's responsibilities 
toward Cuba revealed the ambiguity of the American position. 
Mouthpieces of the Cleveland and McKinley administrations 
consistently denied between 1896 and 1898 that the U. S. had 
a duty or a right to play midwife to the self-styled Cuban 
Republic. They resurrected the Grant-Fish legalistic case 
against premature recognition of a still invalid government. 
Richard Olney reported to Cleveland in December 1896: "It
is not possible to discern a homogeneous political entity, 
possessing and exercising the functions of administration 
and capable, if left to itself, of maintaining orderly
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government in its own territory and sustaining normal
9
relations with the external family of nations." The 
necessity of order in and commercial access to a valuable 
country took precedence over ideals of liberation.
William McKinley sent his "War Message" to Congress on 
April 11, 1898, detailing the history of Spanish misrule and 
turmoil in Cuba, and specifying the grievances which 
compelled America's "forcible intervention." Conspicuously 
absent from this list was the intention of recognizing any 
Cuban Republic. Instead American intervention would involve 
the "hostile constraint upon both the parties to the 
contest. . . . "  The grounds for intervention were, first, 
duty to humanity to put a stop to the "barbarities" of 
guerrilla warfare; secondly, protection of the lives and 
property of U. S. citizens in Cuba; thirdly, to stop the 
"wanton destruction" of American property and commerce; and 
fourth ("of the utmost importance") to put a stop to 
conditions which, because of the constant filibustering from 
American shores, menaced American peace and security.10 It 
was not unusual, of course, for officials to emphasize the 
legalities of issues which aroused feelings of high 
principle in the public arena. But the administration's 
case for war in 1898 was striking in its deliberate and 
concerted avoidance of recognizing Cuban independence. The 
entire episode was a classic illustration of the trusteeship 
Weltanschauung in action.
Whether or not America should recognize the Cuban
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Republic was the most divisive issue in the Senate's
five-day debate over McKinley's message. Opposing sides
mustered legal evidence and moral arguments for and against
the legitimacy of the Republic. George Frisbie Hoar, senior
Senator from Massachusetts, and soon to be a champion of the
Filipino cause, argued the administration's case. The
alleged Republic did not represent the Cuban people and was
itself responsible for much of the island's suffering.11
Repeating the arguments of Grant and Fish other senators
juxtaposed the "facts" of the Republic with the authorities
on international law, and found that the Republic did not
warrant recognition. Actual independence must precede
12recognition, not vice-versa. Echoing the
administration's position, Stephen Elkins of West Virginia
concluded that international law required that
U. S. intervention must be based on something other than the
13effort to help Cuba win its independence.
The influence of the trusteeship outlook in this debate
was evident in several propositions. America had a
legitimate interest and duty in Cuba on behalf of
"humanity." Because of the interdependent world and
America's proximity to the island, the U. S. must "abate a
nuisance" which threatened to disrupt the interests and
14affairs of all commercial nations. The world would not 
tolerate the turning of Cuba into a "desert."
The situation was analagous to another cause celebre of 
the 1890s, the Turkish massacre of Armenians. Advocates of
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intervention appealed for America to live up to the
obligations that Britain, the Armenians' natural protector,
15had shirked. Senator John Daniel called Spain "the Turk
of the West."16 The analogy was significant. Spain, like
Turkey, had forfeited through misrule its title to its
dependencies. Spain and Turkey stood as examples of
trustees who were guilty of a breach of trust and thus,
according to the implied terms, must surrender their control
17to a more competent and humane power. In essence the
United States in 1898 occupied the position of the judge
presiding over the liquidation of Spain's title, and charged
with finding a successor. The world demanded order and
stability in Cuba regardless of who maintained it. As
McKinley noted in his message, the U. S. , because of its
geographical proximity and paramount economic interest in
Cuba, had the right and the duty to act in Cuba on behalf of
18all civilized nations.
The question of whether or not the Cuban Republic 
actually existed occupied a distinctly subordinate position 
in this discussion. If an independent Cuba could fulfill 
the essential functions of a state, then it could be allowed 
to exist. The critical point was that the administration 
and its supporters did not believe that the Cuban people 
could maintain a stable government. The Cuban population 
included many blacks, and even the Latin majority had no 
experience in Anglo-Saxon-style self-government. Given this 
assumption, adherents to a trusteeship Weltanschauung could
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not, as Louisiana Senator Donelson Caffery said, pass "a
19spurious counterfeit statehood upon the world."
Recognizing Cuban independence could subvert America's
actual responsibility in Cuba. Senator Orville H. Platt of
Connecticut, congressional spokesman for the
administration's Cuba policy, warned that if America
immediately terminated its occupation, it would mean
forfeiting our
high and holy purpose to discharge the imperative 
duty of seeing that the government which shall 
exist in Cuba after the Spaniards leave shall be a 
stable government, one which can secure peace to 
its citizens, protect our citizens, and maintain 
and discharge every international obligation.
The final congressional resolution authorizing the
President to prepare for war was remarkable for its
ambiguity. The Senate version contained an amendment,
struck from the compromise resolution, which would have
recognized the independence of Cuba. The final resolution
did, however, include the Teller Amendment which declared
"that the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control
over [Cuba] except for the pacification thereof, and asserts
its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the
21government and control of the island to its people."
This "self-denying ordinance" became the primary manifesto 
of American idealism in the war. Some observers denounced 
it as an ill-considered obstruction to annexation— which
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those men desired— or at least to America's ability to play
a role in determining Cuba's future. Whitelaw Reid, editor
of the New York Tribune and a major figure in the
adminstration's early colonial policy, predicted that
America would come to regret, and to ignore, the Teller
Amendment just as the British had chosen to ignore Lord
Granville's similar 1882 public disclaimer about the British
22occupation of Egypt. Reid believed that because of
Egyptian and Cuban incapacity for self-government, and
because of strategic and economic necessities, both
self-denying ordinances were in reality self-delusions. As
Reid predicted, the Teller Amendment posed a dilemma, but
not an insurmountable barrier, for advocates of American
trusteeship in Cuba.
In the meantime the primary task was to effectively
liquidate Spain's title to Cuba. Despite the embarrassing
blunders of the Army in Florida and Cuba, the United States
defeated Spain within three months. In the negotiations for
peace, the Spanish Due D' Almodover Del Rio explained to
Secretary of State William R. Day that it had been the
Queen Regent's "desire to spare the great island from the
23dangers of premature independence." Del Rio's 
explanation underscored the irony of America's attitude 
toward Cuba and the Philippines; sparing those islands "the 
danger of premature independence" subsequently became the 
cornerstone of American policy. Day explicitly denied that 
Washington shared Spain's "apprehensions" on this count, but
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he added significantly that the United States "recognizes
I
the fact that in the distracted and prostrate conditions of
M A
the island, aid and guidance will be necessary. . . . "
The Army gave Cuba aid and guidance during an 
occupation that lasted until the establishment of the Cuban 
Republic in May 1902. According to national mythology, this 
occupation was the logical culmination of America's selfless 
war for Cuban independence. Instead of conquering and 
annexing the island or turning it loose to a "premature 
independence," the United States gave Cuba modern sanitation 
and administration, oversaw the creation of 
American-inspired political and judicial institutions, 
forged order out of chaos, consummated a reciprocal trade 
treaty to guarantee economic stability, and did what no 
other modern nation dreamed of doing: it "hauled down the
flag" and sailed away. In contrast to this popularized 
version of the occupation of Cuba, there had been serious 
discussion about annexing Cuba to the United States, and the 
U. S. left Cuba something less than independent. The 
American occupation was, in the context of fin de siecle 
western imperialism, a model of restraint, but it was, 
nevertheless, an imperial venture resting on imperialistic 
assumptions.25
The personification of the American occupation was 
General Leonard Wood, commander of the "Rough Riders," 
Military Governor of Santiago Province, then, from December 
1899 to the inauguration of the Cuban Republic, the Military
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Governor of Cuba. Wood was the leading exponent of the view
that the occupation was an opportunity to "Americanize"
Cuba. He argued that the Cubans wanted to be 
26Americanized. Wood was one of several departmental
commanders who, throughout 1899, attacked the policies of
Military Governor John R. Brooke, and aspiring to succeed
him. Brooke, Wood believed, was not responding to the
Cubans' desire for extensive, American-type reforms, but was
delegating too much authority to' the "Cuban Cabinet."
Instead of permitting the Cubans to govern the island as the
Spanish had, Wood wrote to his old Lieutenant Colonel,
Theodore Roosevelt in 1899, "the system of civil government
which is being developed here has got to be uprooted and
27suppressed entirely." Wood's ideas for overhauling Cuban
law and administration soon became policy. Skeptical from
the beginning of the Cubans' capacity for self-government,
Wood believed that the U. S. must "sometime own or at least
28must always control the destinies of Cuba." While Wood 
initially favored American annexation of Cuba, he came to 
believe that the United States could control Cuban destinies 
by means short of annexation.
General James Harrison Wilson, another vigorous suitor 
for Brooke's post, advocated annexation and statehood for 
Cuba. Like Wood, Wilson believed that the U. S. could 
"Americanize" the island. He not only encouraged American 
investment and the creation of American institutions, he 
also believed that (white) Americans could migrate to Cuba
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2 9without loss of "social efficiency." Wilson submitted in 
his 1899 report to Secretary of War Elihu Root an elaborate 
long-term plan for Cuba's future. He an end to the 
occupation as soon as possible, but insisted that Cuban 
independence be qualified with a treaty defining the close 
relations between the United States and Cuba. In addition, 
the two nations would sign a trade treaty.
Wilson intended this scheme to prove to the Cubans the
advantage of a permanent American connection and impel them
to annex themselves to the United States. It was to "put
matters on the best possible footing for the ultimate
absorption of [Cuba] into the Union by natural, voluntary,
3 0and progressive steps. . . . "  Wilson confided to Root 
that the proposed treaty "would politically bind Cuba hand 
and foot, and put her destinies absolutely within our
control." The elaborate plan was simply designed "to save
• . 31the pride and feelings of the Cubans."
Most policymakers rejected Wilson's assumptions that 
annexation and especially statehood were possible or 
desirable. Cuba's racial composition and Spanish heritage 
were as much a barrier to annexation in 1900 as they were in 
the 1850s. American leaders preferred whenever possible to 
minimize the burden of controlling backward peoples. And it 
was after all not ownership, but control of Cuba that 
American leaders desired.
The perfect solution to the problem of Cuba's future 
and the most important legacy of the American occupation was
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the Platt Amendment. Named for its sponsor, Senator Orville
Platt, the amendment was the culmination of over a year of
discussion regarding the future of Cuban-American relations.
James H. Wilson, Leonard Wood, and Elihu Root were its
32primary authors. Congress attached the measure to an 
army appropriations bill in March 1901, then, in subsequent 
months, Root and Wood compelled the Cuban constitutional
convention to incorporate it into the nation's organic act
. . . 33as a requisite for independence.
The Platt Amendment, which governed Cuban-American 
relations until the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt 
abrogated it in 1934, limited Cuba's treaty making powers; 
its ability to contract foreign debt (which thus reduced the 
excuses for foreign intervention in the island); required 
Cuba to maintain adequate sanitary practices; to lease one 
or more naval bases to the U. S.; to ratify all acts of 
the military occupation; and, in the most controversial 
article, allowed the United States to intervene to preserve 
Cuban independence, maintain "a government adequate for the 
protection of life, property, and individual liberty," and 
to discharge obligations which the U. S. incurred under the 
Treaty of Paris.
The Platt Amendment effectively imposed an American 
protectorate over Cuba. "There is, of course, little or no 
real independence left Cuba under the Platt Amendment," 
Leonard Wood confided to Theodore Roosevelt in October 1901. 
"She is absolutely in our hands, and I believe that no
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European government for a moment considers that she is 
otherwise than a dependency of the United States. . . ,"34 
Wood's opinion was close to universal, and so was his belief 
that such a status was necessary for Cuba.
The American occupation of Cuba and the Platt Amendment 
were illuminating examples of trusteeship in American 
policy. The entire episode vividly illustrated the 
influence of the trusteeship Weltanschauung and of the 
perceived harmony of interests— the triple 
mandate— underlying American policymaking. The effort to 
justify a continuing American military occupation that 
seemed to betray the spirit of the Teller Amendment was 
particularly revealing. The justification rested on a solid 
foundation of legal and treaty rights, and pervasive 
assumptions about the rights and duties of trusteeship.
The Treaty of Paris, signed in December 1898 and 
ratified in February 1899, was the linchpin of America's 
Cuban policy. During the peace negotiations, the 
U. S. adamantly refused Spanish requests to assume 
sovereignty over Cuba and its large foreign debt. Instead, 
American policymakers argued that military government was a 
substitute for sovereignty. Sovereignty was in abeyance "as
though the question of sovereignty were still pending the
35 . .outcome of the war." The treaty specified that as long
as the occupation should last the U. S. must assume and
discharge the obligations under international law to protect
life and property. More importantly, article XVI required
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the U. S. , upon termination of its occupation, to "advise 
any Government established in the island to assume the same 
obiigations."3 6
Charles Magoon, author of a War Department legal brief 
on the occupation, argued that: "Everywhere and at all
times a government of some kind is a necessity, . . . "  he 
argued. And, according to international law, a state that 
destroyed the existing sovereign power— as the U. S. had in 
Cuba— became accountable for replacing it. Magoon, who 
later became the Military Governor during America's second 
occupation of Cuba (1906-1909), defined the duration of 
military rule in terms of objectives, rather than as a 
specific time. He only stated that the "purposes respecting 
Cuba for which the military forces of the United States
37[were] sent into that island are not yet accomplished."
The occupation was, in other words, a continuation of the 
war which was a continuation of earlier diplomacy. The 
U. S. , as the most interested power in the region, had a 
mandate from humanity to end the insurrection and establish 
a stable government in Cuba.
The United States Supreme Court unanimously validated 
the official interpretation of American occupation and 
trusteeship in Cuba in January 1901 in the case of Neely v. 
Henkel. The plaintiff argued that U. S. authority in the 
island ceased with the ratification of the treaty in 
February 1899. Justice John M. Harlan's opinion disputed 
this and echoed Magoon's argument that the U. S. had
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
1 0 7
continuing obligations in the island by virtue of its 
victory. International law and the Treaty of Paris held the 
U. S. accountable for protecting life and property in Cuba. 
Indeed, in the eyes of the world, the U. S. held Cuba as a 
"conquered province." But, citing McKinley's war message, 
the Teller Amendment, and other official statements, Harlan 
concluded that the U. S. did not view the occupation as a 
relationship between conqueror and conquered. Instead, 
Harlan explained, "as between the United States and Cuba 
that Island is territory held in trust for the inhabitants 
of Cuba to whom it rightfully belongs and to whose exclusive 
control it will be surrendered when a stable government
O  Q
shall have been established by their voluntary action."
The Neely decision gave the administration precisely what it 
wanted in Cuba: control without ownership. The United
States did not have to take on the burdens of formal 
colonial rule in order to establish itself as a trustee for 
Cuba.
The Teller Amendment itself supplied further support
for an extended American occupation. Elihu Root admitted in
1901 that the "obvious meaning" of the measure was that the
U. S. should leave Cuba as soon as it expelled Spain. This,
however, was intolerable, since it left the U. S. "in a
worse position as to her own interests than she was when
39 . .Spain held the sovereignty of Cuba. . . . "  The official 
interpretation emphasized the clause that the U. S. should 
not abandon Cuba until it was "pacified."
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During a 1901 public relations offensive administration 
spokesmen defined pacification broadly. Orville Platt 
himself argued that pacification did not simply mean the 
defeat of Spain and hence the cessation of the insurrection. 
McKinley's April 11, 1898 message, which set the terms of 
American participation in the war, clearly linked 
pacification with the establishment and maintenance of a 
stable government. The creation of a stable government, 
Platt contended, was exactly what the U. S. and Cuba wanted 
and what the world demanded. Platt defended the 
controversial intervention article of the Platt Amendment in 
similar terms. "The right to intervene for the abolition of 
a bad government and the right to intervene for the 
maintenance of a good government rest upon the same 
foundation.1,40
Senator Henry Teller renounced his former position and 
denied that the United States should immediately and 
completely abandon Cuba. On the contrary, he asserted that 
in its international relations, "for many years to come at 
least, the government of the United States must speak to the 
world for Cuba." He further suggested the kind of social 
and political manipulation that Elihu Root and Leonard Wood 
later practiced to assure a stable government in Cuba.
Teller based his arguments on several assumptions: that 
tropical peoples could not support a government of 
Anglo-Saxon calibre, and that if Cuba faltered European 
imperial powers would establish a more despotic rule over
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the island. The sine qua non of the situation, Teller
concluded, was that "[The Cubans] must maintain peace and
41order or we must."
Teller's speech, as with almost all of the 
justifications of American control over Cuba, underscored 
the fact that the U. S. was willing to act according to the 
perceived desires of the European powers. The United States 
must guarantee that Cuba discharge its international 
obligations to preclude foreign intervention in an island so 
vital to American strategic and economic interests. Elihu 
Root constantly appealed to this element of self-interest in 
America's position in Cuba. Not only did the economic and 
strategic interests which justified U. S. intervention in 
1898 further justify U. S. control of Cuba's future, but the
"blood and treasure" expended in the war effort solidified
42 . . . .the American claim. The administration's willingness to
"speak to the world for Cuba" also testified to the close 
affinity between American and European views of small 
nations. The U. S. accepted and often asserted the 
necessity of a recognized power acting as a regional 
guarantor of stable government. The world could not expect 
or allow a new nation, especially one devastated by civil 
war and centuries of misrule, to establish overnight the 
conditions of a stable and durable government. Many 
Americans also believed that to grant Cuba a worthless 
independence would betray the interests of the Cubans 
themselves.
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Most observers had no qualms about passing judgement on 
the value of Cuban independence. Robert P. Porter, an 
official McKinley sent -o Cuba to investigate the island's 
economic conditions in 1899, concluded that "dignity does 
not always accompany independence." Porter favored 
annexation and statehood as the best possible course for 
Cuba. While not independent, Cuba was, under American rule,
"free;" it would enjoy "still greater independence" as an
43 .American state. Journalist Mayo Hazeltme articulated a
widespread viewpoint when he wrote that Cuba faced a choice
between prosperity as an American state and "the barren
honor of complete political independence" accompanied by
44"commercial backwardness." The American image of the
Cubans went from patriotic freedom fighter to corrupt,
unsanitary racial mongrels in the immediate wake of the war.
Racial and ethnic factors reinforced the already widespread
belief that an independent Cuba would mean the spoliation of
an island. Published articles and private correspondence
revealed a universal model of what the United States must
prevent: it could not be responsible for creating what
Leonard Wood called "a second edition of Haiti and Santo 
45Domingo."
Haiti was a living symbol of failed national 
independence and a powerful justification for a policy of 
trusteeship. According to prevailing wisdom, the entire 
island of Hispaniola was a once and potentially still rich 
land wasting away because of the political incompetence of
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its racially inferior population. The common people lived 
in poverty and the island's wealth lay dormant despite the 
needs of the civilized world.
The example of Haiti drew into sharper focus the duties
of the United States as trustee of Cuban sovereignty. Cuba
must have a government capable not only of fulfilling
international obligations, but also of developing the
island's resources, caring for its people, and, most
importantly, perpetuating itself. This viewpoint pervaded
the policies of Leonard Wood and Elihu Root during the
occupation. Wood carried through with his promise to
"uproot" the old legal and administrative systems of Cuba.
A surgeon by training and a Christian humanitarian by
temperament, Wood made the care for the poor, weak, and
helpless one of the many implied terms of "stable"
government. On another occasion he offered a definition of
stable government as one "whose credit is good and under
whose administration money will seek investment at rates on
46par with those in other well established countries."
Wood stood firm on the position that the Cubans must 
continue under American supervision until and unless they 
proved their capacity to fulfill the manifold duties and 
services of a modern nation.
Elihu Root believed that the looming threat of Cuba's 
going the way of Haiti, and the irrefutable fact of Cuba's 
political handicaps, made for a constructive coincidence of 
interests between the United States and Cuba. Accepting
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this premise, the rights that the U. S. retained under the
Platt Amendment were not an infringement upon Cuba's
independence, but a safeguard for it. Guaranteeing a
government capable of protecting life and property and
guaranteeing Cuban independence were synonymous.
"Fortunately," Root concluded, "the condition which we deem
essential for our own interest is the condition for which
Cuba has been struggling, and which the duty we have assumed
toward Cubans on Cuban grounds and for Cuban interests 
47requires."
The issue which revealed most about Root's and Wood's
attitude toward America's trusteeship over Cuba was the
manipulation of the Cuban polity. Both men believed that
universal suffrage and the ambitions of selfish politicians
accounted for much of the chaos on Hispaniola. They
therefore engaged in a conscious effort to bring the
educated and business-minded "conservative" men into
politics, and to exclude the politicians and the ignorant
masses. Root initiated a plan to limit suffrage in Cuban
elections. He explained his reasoning to an old friend in
January 1900. Among his considerations were the
determination "to avoid the kind of control which leads to
the perpetual revolution of Central America and the other
West India Islands," and to make the franchise "the reward
for thrift" and thus aid in the development of a civic 
48consciousness.
Leonard Wood proved a zealous accomplice in the effort
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to mold a stable polity. He constantly excoriated (as he
would continue to do in the Philippines) the "small group of
corrupt politicians" in the Cuban constitutional convention
and American accessories, and promised to bring "the
conservative and representative elements to the front.
Shortly after assuming the Governorship, Wood promised "to
give [the opposition] as slender a foundation as possible to 
50stand on." Distressed by the hostile character of the
Cuban constitutional convention, Wood urged Root to stand
firm and continue the occupation until the Cubans came
around to the American position on the Platt Amendment. The
delegates were, Wood warned, "a lot of adventurers and to
turn the country over before a better element has come to
the front will be nothing more or less in effect that [sic]
turning the island over to spoliation." Striking his
characteristically dramatic pose, Wood further proclaimed
that this "would be a terrific blow to civilization 
51here." America was trustee for Cuba; it was not obliged 
to act as its alleged leaders desired, but ’.ccording to its 
own better judgement. Hence it established in Cuba property 
and literacy requirements for voting and provided for 
minority representation to assure the influence of 
"conservative" men.
The underlying philosophy of American trusteeship in 
Cuba was, as Orville Platt and Senator Albert Beveridge 
commented, that the U. S. had a duty "to save Cuba from 
herself." Cuba was at once an innocent victim of war and
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oppression and a potential accomplice in the continuing 
misrule of a valuable island. Leonard Wood, in a 1902 
article, chose a different metaphor to describe Cuba. "Her 
present condition," he wrote, "is not unlike that of a child 
who has been taken charge of by a society for the prevention
of cruelty to children on the ground that its parents were
. 53unfit to care for it." As the community welfare agent
for the western hemisphere, the United States had the
ultimate responsibility for the child's protection and for
its behavior.
The child metaphor was, however, misleading in the case 
of Cuba. Despite the comprehensive modernization plan of 
Leonard Wood and the vision of such men as James Wilson and 
Robert Porter, who anticipated future annexation and 
statehood for Cuba, American policy did not seek to 
comprehensively prepare Cuba for "maturity." The occupation 
sought to create the institutions of a "stable" government, 
hold a crash course in how to run these institutions, and 
gradually turn the government over to the Cubans as "a going 
concern," but to continue supervision. American promises in 
1898, and Cuba's geopolitical position made generations of 
tutelage impossible and unnecessary. America simply 
reserved the right and tools to fix the machinery of 
government when it broke down. The Platt Amendment was not 
a mechanism of political education, but a cheap surrogate 
for it, an alternative mode of trusteeship possible in an 
island ninety miles off American shores. Depending on one's
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perspective, XJ. S. policy in Cuba was either relatively 
restrained and uncoercive, or less generous and more callous 
in its discharging of the duties of trusteeship.
America's role in the birth of the Cuban Republic
became, as historians have noted, an important precedent for
54later policy in the Caribbean basin. The "Cuban model" 
offered an attractive alternative to formal annexation and 
control of colonies, and the most viable tactic for managing 
America's informal Caribbean empire. The United States 
needed to assist in the reconstruction of a stable 
government, secure some residual or conditional control, and 
leave a backward state legally independent. Such a policy 
fulfilled America's minimum obligations as trustee for world 
interests in Cuba. The Cuban occupation was a sterling 
example of America's characteristic "least cost" approach to 
the burdens of imperialism and the duties of trusteeship.
Perhaps the most significant fact about the Cuban 
experience was the widely-held belief that it marked the 
beginning of a "new era" in relations between advanced and 
backward peoples. While there was severe criticism of the 
Platt Amendment's obvious duplicity, most observers 
considered the episode an illustration of American 
generosity. The United States gave a supine potential 
colony national independence. Cuba was the first "graduate" 
of America's "school" for backward peoples. Progressive 
editor and later Ambassador to England Walter Hines Page 
later waxed poetical on the subject. "Our dealing with Cuba
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was a new chapter in the history of the world," he wrote.
While England sought to "India-ize and Egypt-ize" backward
peoples, America would "Cuba-ize" them; that is, it would
impose its control, but relinquish it as soon as 
55possible.
That Americans considered the act of giving Cuba a 
fettered national independence an example of generosity was 
testimony to the times. It also suggested something about 
the American mindset. Many took for granted the assumption 
that the United States, as a civilized power, must 
regenerate, supervise, and continue to insulate a backward 
neighbor. What was a truism in 1900 is as revealing to the 
historian as the seemingly extraordinary hauling down of the 
American flag from the Morro Castle in Havana.
II
America's war with Spain netted the nation several 
imperial prizes, most notably the Philippine Islands. The 
Philippines were destined to become America's most ambitious 
formal colonial venture, and bring the dilemmas of 
imperialism into their highest relief. Long shrouded in 
myths, the American acquisition of the Philippines was 
neither accidental nor inevitable. The Philippines had been 
part of American war plans against Spain before Commodore 
George Dewey's victory at Manila Bay on May 1, 1898, and 
before Theodore Roosevelt's supposedly unauthorized order to
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56 . .Dewey months before. The decision to annex the
Philippines was certainly controversial. It incited a
searching private and public debate and ultimately elicited
an elaborate theoretical rationalization of imperialism.
Whether or not the decision was wise is not the issue here.
What is important is that it was a decision based on
tangible interests, a calculation of costs and benefits, and
on a well-articulated worldview.
After Dewey's victory there were several critical 
points for American policymakers. At each point they 
consciously charted a course leading to American control.
The first critical decision was to land an occupation force 
in Manila. The second was the conscious and persistent 
refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the revolutionary 
Philippine Republic. Simultaneously the American peace 
commissioners in Paris solicited evidence and opinions on 
the Philippines' future and arrived at the decision to annex 
the entire archipelago. Then, in February 1899, after long 
and bitter debate, the U. S. Senate ratified the peace 
treaty and defeated resolutions intended to limit the extent 
and duration of American sovereignty in the islands. Two 
days before ratification, a bloody three-year war erupted 
between the United States and the Filipinos. Thus, in 
February 1899, the situation in the Philippines confronted 
the U. S. with the same kind of theoretical and practical 
problems it faced in Cuba in 1898. It had to justify to 
itself and to the world its control over a foreign people
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
1 1 8
and, more importantly, explain why it ignored, undercut, 
and, in this case, forcibly destroyed an indigenous 
government.
Although the American people were scarcely aware of the 
Filipino insurrection against Spanish rule, the United 
States government faced the same kind of situation with the 
Filipino rebels as it did with the Cubans. In both cases 
the United States was willing to work with native people who 
had their own well-entrenched grievances against the 
Spanish. Commodore Dewey and two American consuls in the 
Orient had extensive contacts with Emiliano Aguinaldo and 
other exiled Filipino rebel leaders in the months before the 
Spanish-American War. As a result of those contacts the 
McKinley administration decided to help the rebels back to 
the Philippines in an effort "to weaken the Spanish in every 
legitimate way. . . .1,57 whether or not this constituted a 
de facto alliance and obligated America to recognize 
Aguinaldo's government became a central issue in the ensuing
C Q
debate over America's Philippine policy. One of the 
American consuls may have made unauthorized promises to the 
Filipinos, but the State Department's rebuke of him and 
McKinley's orders to the commander of the American 
occupation force made it clear that the U. S. consciously
avoided any alliance or "joint occupation" with the
59insurgents. The McKinley administration intended from 
the beginning that any government in the Philippines during 
the American presence was to be for, but not by, the
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Filipinos.
The decision to annex the islands was not, however, 
clear until October 1898. The decision-making process 
revealed as much about trusteeship in American policy as the 
rationalizations that followed the decision did. Some of 
the primary considerations were the same ones that motivated 
American policy in Cuba, such as the necessity to act 
according to European expectations and to preempt European 
action. But most revealing was the widespread desire to 
exercise trusteeship at the least possible cost. Even as 
American imperialists began arguing the case for assuming 
the White Man's Burden, they looked seriously at ways of 
escaping it.
When the American peace negotiators steamed for Paris
the great unresolved question was whether they would demand
the island of Luzon or the entire chain of more than 7,000
islands. The members of the commission were divided on the
issue; but three of the five were at least amenable to
60annexing the entire archipelago. The commission's 
chairman, former Secretary of State William R. Day, spent 
the first month of the conference searching for an 
alternative to American annexation. He recognized the 
islands' commercial advantages and accepted the premise that 
the Filipinos could not rule themselves to western 
satisfaction. He advocated holding the most valuable 
islands and securing the right of free trade in the others, 
leaving the undesirable ones with another power. "I would
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minimize our holdings in the Philippines,” Day wrote
Mckinley, "to the lowest point consistent with our 
61obligations." We can infer from his questions to one
witness before the peace commission what Day considered the
ideal solution. "Is there," he queried English businessman
John Foreman, "an island in the group which has a good
harbor and but few people, sparsely populated, large enough
to have an ample harbor, like Samoa, separated from the
other islands?" He also asked the same witness whether any
"Christian" power other than the United States could rule
62the Philippines better than Spain had.
Day was not the only prominent American official to
consider giving the Philippines to a friendly European
power. His fellow peace commissioners, Senator Cushman
Davis and Whitelaw Reid, broached the idea of giving
Mindanao and other Moslem populated islands to Holland or
63returning them to Spain. Cornell University president
Jacob G. Schurman, soon to become the chairman of the first
Philippine Commission, told McKinley in August 1898 that it
was not America's duty to "spread Christian civilization" to
the Filipinos. "Leave that to England, Russia, France, and
64
Germany," powers that hungered for the archipelago. The 
most famous "large policy" advocates, Theodore Roosevelt and 
Henry Cabot Lodge, contemplated trading the islands to Great 
Britain for some of that empire's Caribbean possessions.65 
All of these men urged that the United States expand further 
in the western hemisphere, but were dubious about annexing
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an "Oriental" nation, and about assuming the 
responsibilities of formal colonial rule. In his legendary 
impromptu sermon to a missionary group, President McKinley 
defended the decision to annex the entire archipelago by 
eliminating and denouncing the alternatives. The 
U. S. could not leave the Philippines to themselves for it 
would certainly lead to chaos and anarchy; it did not 
desirn to repeat the unsatisfactory experience of the joint 
protectorate over Samoa; it would not return the islands to 
Spain for that would be "cowardly and dishonorable;" and it 
could not contemplate giving the islands to a rival power 
for that would be "bad business and discreditable."66 As 
in the religious controversies of the early Christian 
church, there had been indecision and dissent until the 
council rendered its verdict; the decision then became 
dogma from which no true believer dissented.
What then was the case for annexation that finally 
mitigated all those doubts? Most important was the 
accumulation of testimony and evidence which suggested that 
the United States could achieve its objectives in no other 
way. American statesmen were interested in the Philippines 
because the archipelago provided potential strategic and 
economic advantages for the United States. The islands were 
the source of some valuable products, particularly manila 
hemp, but they were valuable primarily because of their 
proximity to the trade of the Orient. American 
expansionists portrayed Manila as the future emporium of
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Oriental commerce. The Philippines gave the U. S. a window
on the East. Convenient access to China and the China
market would prove an invaluable asset during the "century
of the Pacific." This vision of the Philippines convinced
American policymakers that the U. S. could not leave the
islands at the mercy of another power. American military
officers and foreign businessmen in Manila warned that
taking only some of the islands would precipitate incessant
67intrigue with natives and foreign powers alike. And,
whereas, the undisputed American hegemony in the Caribbean
allowed the United States the option of holding Cuba as. an
informal protectorate, the Philippines' position in the
faraway maelstrom of Oriental politics precluded a similar
solution. Given the American desire for a naval and
commercial base in East Asia with as little political
complication as possible, and the determination to annex at
least Luzon, the decision to annex the Philippines was
indeed "inevitable."
The peace commissioners' case for annexation became the
core of the Republican party's imperialist rationale. It
must be noted that partisan politics played a major role in
the imperialist debate. Many loyal Republicans, including
Theodore Roosevelt, privately expressed reservations over
6 8the wisdom of annexations. The basic imperialist argument 
was that "duty and interest alike" demanded that the United
States annex the Philippines and hold them as a trust for
. . . .  69 . . . .civilization. President McKinley's speeches during his
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October 1898 midwest tour emphasized this coincidence of 
interests. In Chicago he noted that "grave national 
responsibilities," though unsought, nevertheless confronted 
America. The United States had no choice but to accept the 
duties for they were part of God's inscrutable "plans and 
methods for human progress." McKinley balanced this lofty 
talk of mission with reminders of the need for national 
expansion and, in other speeches, of the need for "new 
markets."70
The imperialist appeal to civilization included both 
the duty to the tangible interests of European nations and 
the duty to participate in the diffusion of progress and 
civilization. The latter represented an effective seizure 
of the moral high ground. The United States had been mired 
in the habits of individual greed and acquisitiveness long 
enough. It was high time to join the common work of 
civilization by opening the misruled waste spaces of the 
earth to modern methods and ideas. This common work in the 
Philippines included the duty to protect the interests of 
other civilized states. Imperialist sage Whitelaw Reid 
cited the expressed desire and consent of the "whole 
civilized world" and "all Christendom" as the authority for 
American rule.71 The U. S. must do in the Philippines what 
it was doing in Cuba and what it would expect any other 
western power to do if it were in control of the islands: 
provide a government capable of protecting life and property 
and facilitate commercial exploitation of the islands.
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And as in the case of Cuba there was an indiscernible 
line between acting for the interests of civilized nations 
and acting in self-interest. Looming over the McKinley 
administration as it decided the fate of the Philippines was 
the shadow of Germany. That nation's ambitions in the 
Pacific were only the most menacing reminder of the European 
presence in the region. An influential witness told the 
peace commission that American annexation of the Philippines
"would be a great favor to Europe" that might prevent a
72 . .dangerous rivalry. If a nation had ambitions of its own
in the region— as the United States did— realization of this
international rivalry suggested the logical corollary that
73the U. S. take the archipelago as a preventive measure.
While duty and high idealism were their rhetorical big
guns, self-interest was the imperialists' sine qua non. The
U. S. would have no logical interest in preventing other
powers from possessing the islands or suddenly becoming
concerned with the civilization of a few million Malays
unless the islands held some value. Self-interest, declared
Wisconsin Senator John C. Spooner, was paramount. "It is
the foundation of all society." Spooner later confessed
that he did not initially find persuasive the argument that
America must be "'trustee'" for other peoples. The function
of a government is not philanthopy, he opined, but to be a
74"'trustee'" for its own people. Henry Cabot Lodge 
delivered the most famous defense of the primacy of 
self-interest. He told the 1900 Republican National
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
1 2 5
Convention:
We make no hypocritical pretense of being 
interested in the Philippines solely on account of 
others. While we regard the welfare of these 
peoples as a sacred trust, we regard the welfare 
of the American people first. We see our duty to 
ourselves as well as to others. We believe in 
trade expansion. By every legitimate means within 
the province of government and legislation we mean 
to stimulate the expansion of our trade and to 
open new markets. Greatest of all markets is 
China. Our trade there is growing by leaps and 
bounds. Manila, the prize of war, gives us 
inestimable advantages in developing that 
trade.
Defenders of annexation and retention of the
Philippines did not have to proclaim in stark terms the
economic benefits that would accrue to the United States.
The official rationale rested on a belief in the harmony of
interests. Lyman Abbott declared that American history was
proof that "the nation which best serves others best serves
itself." Jacob Schurman concurred, describing America's
course in the Philippines with the adage, "we never find
76happiness by seeking it."
While the United States perceived a harmony of 
interests behind its actions in the Philippines, the 
Filipino resistance to American policy seemed to suggest 
otherwise. During the summer and fall of 1898 Aguinaldo and 
his compatriots established a Philippine Republic, drafted a 
constitution (consciously emulating the American model), and 
determined to force at least a de facto American recognition 
of their regime. The United States, however, operated from
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a shamelessly Eurocentric perspective that included the
trusteeship Weltanschauung. President McKinley's order
establishing military government in Manila gave the
U. S. commander free reign to replace or expel native
government and require the insurgents to recognize American 
77authority. Because of the intense (if sudden) 
international interest in the islands, the corrupt and 
divided rule that would undoubtedly characterize a Filipino 
government was intolerable. General Francis V. Greene 
expressed the consensus opinion that "the Filipinos cannot 
govern the country without the support of some strong 
nation."78
The administration's public case for annexation
elaborated on these points. Imperialists denigrated
Filipino capacity for self-government. The standard
critique of Filipino incapacity rested on racial
backwardness, the heterogeneity of the population, the
legacy of Spanish and monastic rule, and the selfishness of
79the self-styled Filipino leaders. Except for a small 
cadre of Spanish mestizos, the Filipino people, according to 
imperialists, belonged to distinct, and often primitive 
"tribes." Tribal divisions, and the unbridgeable chasm 
between the majority Christian Filipinos and the hostile 
Moslem "Moros," precluded the existence of a viable Filipino 
nation. The so-called Philippine Republic was nothing more 
than an oligarchy of one major tribe, the Tagalogs. 
Imperialists dismissed its leaders as "ambitious chieftains"
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who held the "mass of people" in fear, and Aguinaldo as "a
80natural dictator." American rule was necessary not only 
to expand the base of politically capable Filipinos, but 
also to purge the islands of the Spanish habit of using 
public office for private profit.
More importantly, imperialists denied that independent
self-government was a "natural right" and therefore believed
that Filipino incapacity was a legitimate concern of other
nations. Finding a practical illustration of the belief
that expansion of civilized nations was beneficial and
necessary, Theodore Roosevelt denied that the U. S. had to
respect the Filipinos' "right" to self-government.
Roosevelt echoed the suddenly popular denunciation of an
idle "theory" and "some doctrinaire idea," such as "consent
of the governed," which he felt could not be allowed to
supersede duty and progress. Employing one of his favorite
analogies, Roosevelt told a New York audience in 1899 that
the universal application of consent of the governed "would
have made the entire North American continent. . . the happy
81hunting-ground of savages." The shrill imperialist 
senator Albert Beveridge similarly argued that consent of 
the governed not only was inapplicable to savages, but was 
alien to American tradition. Beveridge and Henry Cabot 
Lodge both asserted that if consent of the governed were a 
universal right, "then our whole past record of expansion is 
a crime." McKinley, in his February 1899 speech to the 
Home Market Club, put the authority for America's "trust"
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over the new acquisitions beyond the pale of human
criticism. The U. S. acted "under the providence of God and
in the name of human progress and civilization. . . . "  The
United States did not need the consent of the Filipinos
83because it was "obeying a higher obligation."
Significantly for the concept of trusteeship, the
imperialist case for American rule in the Philippines went
far beyond Filipino incapacity to provide an adequate
government and the denial of a "natural right" of
self-government. The apparent contradiction between the
perceived objective of the war with Spain and the colonial
rule over a previously unknown archipelago that resulted
from that war required rationalization. Americans must
believe that they were not following European example and
imposing an unwanted and oppressive foreign rule on another
people. On the contrary, imperialists insisted, America
ruled in the the Philippines with the implied consent and
even the expressed desires of the Filipinos. The last line
of defense was the classic trusteeship argument that the
U. S. ruled for the best interests, not the declared
interests of the people. "It must be remembered always,"
Theodore Roosevelt said in one of his 1900 campaign
addresses, "that governing these islands in the interests of
the inhabitants may not necessarily be to govern them as the
84inhabitants at the moment prefer." And even more 
vigorously than in Cuba, American policymakers asserted that 
the supposed Filipino leaders represented only their own
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interests. American rule was the surest way to guarantee 
that the will of the people overcame the caprice of the 
politicians.
Ostensibly, however, American policymakers believed 
that most Filipino people and the "best" Filipino leaders 
desired American rule. Witnesses told the peace 
commissioners this and predicted that American rule would
q  e
meet with only token, short-lived resistance. The 
McKinley administration made this assumption and its 
corollary of a harmony of interests between the United 
States and the Filipinos a hallmark of its Philippine 
policy. In an effort to head off a violent confrontation 
with Aguinaldo’s determined government, McKinley assured the 
Filipinos that American rule would bring the reforms and 
guarantees that they had demanded from Spain. McKinley 
stated these and other promises in his infamous December 
1898 "benevolent assimilation" order. America's "paramount 
aim" was to
win the confidence, respect and affection of the 
Filipinos by giving them that full measure of 
individual rights and liberties which is the 
heritage of free peoples, by proving to them that 
the mission of the United States is one of 
benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild 
sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.
But the velvet glove hid a mailed fist. The obvious premise
of American policy was that there was no place for a
Filipino Republic in the islands and that American
obligations to provide a stable government took precedence
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over all else. McKinley closed his message with the thinly
veiled threat that "there must be seduously maintained the
strong arm of authority to repress disturbance and to
overcome all obstacles to the blessings of good and stable
government. . . . "86
This carrot and stick policy continued after the
beginning of the Filipino "insurrection" and the initial
American effort to create governing institutions. Jacob
Schurman, as head of the first (Schurman) Philippine
Commission, expressed the belief in a coincidence of
interests. Schurman interpreted Filipino motives in their
rebellion against Spain as a desire for reforms, a "bill of
rights," and "a practical measure of home rule," not
immediate independence. "The very thing they yearn for," he
concluded, "is what of all others our Government will
87naturally desire to give." The Schurman Commission, upon 
its arrival in Manila, issued an olive branch in the form of 
a proclamation to the Filipino people. Similar to the 
benevolent assimilation order, the proclamation enumerated 
the benefits of American rule. And like McKinley's message, 
the Schurman proclamation clarified its hierarchy of 
priorities. The United States was anxious to establish a 
government extending the "largest measure of home rule and 
the amplest liberty consonant with the supreme ends of 
government, and compatible with those obligations which the
United States has assumed toward the civilized nations of
88 . • the world." The magna charta of American policy m  the
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Philippines, Secretary of War Elihu Root's April 1900 
instructions to the Taft Philippine Commission, carried the
Q Q
same qualifications.
The Filipinos, according to the imperialist argument,
needed American tutelage and could profit by it. Under
American trusteeship they could assume an increasing degree
of self-government and, within an unspecified number of
generations, "graduate" to autonomy or independence.
Regardless of its duration, American rule would bring the
Filipinos tangible economic and technological benefits and
improve their capacity for self-government. This faith in
the ends of American rule justified the unsavory means:
formal colonial rule of a people, holding them without the
benefits of American citizenship and the constitution, and a
three-year war of pacification in which the U. S. employed
the same tactics that the Spanish used against the Cubans
and the British against the Boers. Arch-imperialist
Whitelaw Reid vigorously defended these tactics. How,
except for the use of force, he asked, "have the blessings
of civilization been diffused? How often in the history of
the world has barbarism been replaced by civilization
90without bloodshed?" Reid would not tolerate the notion
of accepting backward peoples as full citizens of the United
States. Control of the Spanish islands could only be "at
arms's length." If they were to be admitted as states, he
91declared, he would side with the anti-imperialists.
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A brief analysis of the anti-imperialists, those
cassandras and jeremiahs who prophesied that imperialism
held catastrophic consequences for the American Republic, is
necessary to illustrate the diversity of American attitudes
toward trusteeship. As recent historians have noted,
imperialists and anti-imperialists shared many key
assumptions. Historians assert that the opposing sides in
this divisive debate agreed on the need for commercial
expansion and of obtaining overseas bases, but differed on
the question of whether acquiring and ruling colonies were
92the proper tactic. Imperialists and anti-imperialists 
shared important assumptions about trusteeship, but also 
disagreed about important questions. Similarities and 
differences were most clearly manifested in the 
anti-imperialists' views of American responsibilities toward 
native societies, and in their view of the American 
"mission."
Anti-imperialists almost without exception believed in
the cultural and even biological inferiority of non-white
tropical peoples. Carl Schurz, a leader of the
anti-imperialist cause since President Grant's abortive
1869-1871 "Santo Domingo grab," was, for instance, the most
93prominent spokesman for the "law" of the tropics. What, 
however, were the implications of this belief? Rather than 
prompting America to take up the white man's burden,
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anti-imperialists, many of whom were southerners, felt that 
the United States should avoid further annexing of 
unassimilable peoples. Imperialism was more likely to
degrade America than to uplift backward races. A New York
»
congressman stated this objection in the language of
trusteeship. "I do not believe," M. E. Driscoll told a
cool audience of imperialists, "that philanthropy or charity
justifies a father in taking into his family an inferior
child, the effect of whose social contact is to injure the
94character of his own children." Imperialists of course 
agreed that the U. S. could not allow dark-skinned peoples 
to help govern the union; but, whereas imperialists were 
willing to rule backward areas as colonies, 
anti-imperialists believed that this would subvert the 
constitution. Thus while both sides shared racist 
assumptions and a concern for national self-interest, the 
anti-imperialists concluded from these assumptions that 
acquisition of colonies was a mistake, not a national 
advantage.
Similarly, both sides concurred in their belief that 
Filipinos and other tropical peoples were incapable of 
sustaining without assistance a government that met 
Anglo-Saxon standards. But anti-imperialists denied the 
trusteeship assumption that an advanced nation could or 
should tutor a people in the practice of self-government. 
Citing the notorious misrule in American cities during the 
Gilded Age, anti-imperialists challenged American
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credentials as a trustee. There was not credible reason,
they asserted, why the United States would not succumb to
the corruption and greed that had tempted all other western
95imperial powers. Superior peoples could not hope to
hasten the political development of backward peoples. They
must learn by example and by experience "in the rough school
of self-government." The proper policy, asserted Charles
9 6Francis Adams, was "a wise and salutary neglect." While
anti-imperialists were sincere in their belief that people
must learn through experience, their position was often
callous and vindicated imperialists' sense of moral
superiority. Stanford University president David Starr
Jordan revealed a typical anti-imperialist attitude that
combined a precocious tolerance of other peoples'
shortcomings with a racist desire to avoid association with
backward peoples, some of whom, Jordan declared, were "as
capable of self-government or of any other government as so 
97many monkeys."
In what was probably the most significant difference
between the opposing viewpoints, anti-imperialists did not
believe that this incapacity and learning through trial and
error posed a threat to western nations. It was a misnomer
to assert that backward peoples were incapable of
self-government. William Jennings Bryan was fond of quoting
Henry Clay's statement that God would not have created a
98people incapable of self-government. That they could not 
govern as well as Americans could was of little consequence.
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
1 3 5
Tne fundamental difference in perspective was that
anti-imperialists were not convinced that less efficient
governments required trustees to take control and furnish a
western-style rule. Even those anti-imperialists, including
Carl Schurz and David Starr Jordan, who campaigned for the
opening of new markets for American exports, argued that it
was not necessary for the U. S. to own or control these 
99markets. Anti-imperialists did not counsel national 
isolation or complete disinterest in the course of events in 
tropical regions. They simply had a higher threshhold of 
tolerance for "misrule” in backward areas of the globe.
Yet once we have established this fundamental 
difference in perspective, it is useful to note that, first, 
the anti-imperialists were hardly a homogeneous group, and, 
second, that many anti-imperialists went far toward 
concurring with the imperialists' interpretation of 
trusteeship. Significantly, in the years after 1900, the 
Democratic party and the Anti-Imperialist League 
acknowledged the need for good government in backward areas 
and America's responsibility for securing it. Thus both 
organizations endorsed at various times plans to extend the 
Monroe Doctrine to or draft a "Platt Amendment" for the 
Philippines, and an international agreement to "neutralize" 
the islands. These plans conceded the Republicans' point 
that the war and the treaty put the United States in the 
position of big brother to the islands. America would thus 
continue to assist the Filipinos in establishing a stable
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government/ then guarantee their independence "as we 
guarantee the independence of Cuba" until the U. S. could 
negotiate a neutralization treaty. Under this popular plan 
the U. S. would secure a guarantee from other imperial 
powers to abstain from interfering in the islands. 100 
William Jennings Bryan, the titular leader of the 
anti-imperialists, expanded on this position. He proposed a 
plan in 1907 whereby the U. S. would retain bases in the 
Orient to protect the Philippines, while the Filipinos would 
agree "that in their dealings with other nations they would 
not embarrass us."101
Imperialists condemned all such schemes as impractical 
and dangerous for an island nation nearly 7,000 miles from 
the American mainland. Regardless of the obvious 
attractions of exerting control at the least possible cost 
(a temptation to which most imperialists usually succumbed), 
imperialists had already decided that complete control and 
colonial rule was a necessary evil. The U. S. must not, 
went the standard refrain, be in a position of 
responsibility without sufficient authority.
Other anti-imperialists went even further in 
acknowledging the imperialists' fundamental points.
Economist and cotton industry lobbyist Edward A. Atkinson 
and Professor William Graham Sumner agreed that the United 
States would gain by the maintenance of good government in 
backward countries. But both men championed the strategy of 
realpolitik and advised the United States to avoid the
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burden. It would be best for a competent and friendly 
power, particularly Great Britain, to administer the 
islands, and for the United States to simply reap the 
benefits.102
The anti-imperialist position was often tantamount to
what historians have dubbed "informal imperialism." They
sought to extend American commerce and influence at the
least possible cost. William Jennings Bryan, in his 1908
bid for the presidency, argued on behalf of his party’s
platform, that a mere American protectorate over the
Philippines would have all the advantages of ownership,
including the increase in Oriental commerce. His campaign
position reflected his 1907 proposal for a United States
"Oriental Territory” of bases and stations in the Pacific.
These "reservations” would be models of American freedom,
self-government, and public instruction, staging areas for a
peaceful conquest of the East. Bryan hoped to prove that
America could fulfill its Christian service without
resorting to force or coercion. "If we believe that right
makes might and that truth has within itself a propagating
power, we cannot doubt the spread of American civilizations
103from these American centers."
Anti-imperialists and imperialists shared, therefore, a 
faith in the commercial and ideological destiny of the 
United States. Their perspectives diverged again, however, 
regarding the tactics for fulfilling the American mission. 
According to imperialists, trusteeship over backward regions
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and peoples garnered tangible material benefits for the 
nation and discharged a sacred national duty for humanity.
A popular anti-imperialist argument was that America was, 
first and foremost, a trustee of its own ideals. The real 
American mission was to protect, nurture, and diffuse the 
ideals of self-government and liberty, which the United 
States held in trust for the rest of the world. For America 
to emulate the sordid old world habit of imperialism would 
constitute a betrayal of its trust. "Charity begins at 
home," Carl Schurz exhorted an audience. "To perpetuate our
institutions is our first duty. It would be criminal to
104 . . . .disregard it." Anti-imperialists had their own
interpretation of the maxim, "he who serves others serves
himself." But in this version the control of backward
territory and the discharging of the nation's trust were
mutally exclusive.
IV
The decisions that American statesmen faced in 1898 
were obviously the result of the war with Spain and in large 
part unanticipated. But the acquisition of the Spanish 
islands was hardly "accidental," and American statesmen did 
not reach their decisions in an intellectual vacuum. 
Prominent among the influences was the trusteeship 
Weltanschauung. Trusteeship was a powerful chemistry of
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economic self-interest, strategic realpolitik. racism and 
national altruism. The central assumption of trusteeship 
was that Spain's former possessions were too valuable, and 
their peoples too immature to exist independently in such a 
menacing and interdependent world. American policymakers 
adhered to a worldview that required tropical peoples and 
fledgling states to have guarantors and trustees. This 
worldview led to a "passive" trusteeship policy even before 
1898; the events of that year represented a "departure" in 
American policy only in the sense that they marked the 
willingness of at least one administration to pursue an 
active trusteeship policy beyond the borders of continental 
America.
The decisions over the dispositions of Cuba and the 
Philippines also tell us something about the trusteeship 
policy in action. Clearly even among its devoted disciples, 
it was a situational worldview, not a constant driving 
force. Anti-imperialists frequently challenged imperialists 
whether they intended to embark on a quixotic crusade to 
save every backward people from their own misrule. They 
never received an affirmative reply. It was neither 
necessary nor desirable to always be first in line to 
volunteer for trusteeship duty. Passive acceptance of other 
nations' trusteeship, when it served the essential 
functions, was as integral to the trusteeship Weltanschauung 
as American imperialism. Trusteeship was tactically 
flexible. Whether and how to best perform it depended
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largely on geopolitics.
In addition, the United States sought to discharge its 
responsibilities for order and stability in backward areas 
with minimal responsibilities to the backward peoples 
themselves. Few in the United States longed to assume the 
white man's burden of civilizing immature dark races. 
Annexation of the Philippines proved to be an exception to 
the rule, and the Philippines experience discouraged further 
annexations. Immaturity provided a convenient rationale for 
denying-a people self-determination, but immaturity also 
implied the necessity of long and patient tutelage to 
adulthood and was a deterrent, not an inducement to most 
prospective trustees.
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CHAPTER IV 
"THE MOST FATAL POSSIBLE GIFT":
Trusteeship and Philippine Independence
American rule in the Philippine Islands held an exalted 
place in the annals of America's "anti-colonial" tradition. 
According to this tradition, American rule in the 
Philippines was tolerant and generous to a fault, and, more 
importantly, it fulfilled American promises of "graduation" 
by granting autonomy in 1935 and independence in 1946. This 
enlightened policy vindicated the boasts of 1898 that the 
United States would raise colonial rule to a higher plane. 
During the 1930s and 1940s, Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell 
Hull often cited America's Philippine policy as a prototype 
for a new era of imperial relations.1
The relatively brief and liberal American rule in the 
Philippines was without doubt an important milestone in the 
evolution of western imperialism. It reinforced an 
increasing tendency to regard independence as the necessary 
result of colonial trusteeship. It is, however, misleading 
to equate too closely American trusteeship in the 
Philippines with the termination of American rule in the 
Philippines. For most of the thirty-six years of direct 
American rule there, trusteeship carried a much different 
connotation. While trusteeship did promise eventual 
graduation, it more often served to justify continued
150
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retention of the islands and the indefinite postponement of 
graduation.
American control of the Philippines most vividly 
illustrated the trusteeship principles that underlay 
American policy toward other backward countries. American 
Philippine policy embodied the major tenets of the 
trusteeship Weltanschauung. It rested on a hierarchy of 
priorities that valued stability and economic development 
above national independence. It also embodied the 
principles of colonial trusteeship that Lord Cromer 
articulated and which were evident in other areas of 
American policy. Lastly, American Philippine policy 
revealed the influence and the practical implications of the 
triple mandate, the harmony of interests that supposedly 
compelled the control over backward peoples. Together the 
trusteeship Weltanschauung and the triple mandate 
constituted a persuasive justification for a long-term 
American retention of the Philippines.
I
Before delving into a topical discussion of the 
rationale for continued American trusteeship, it is first 
essential to review the major milestones of U. S. Philippine 
policy, and to introduce the dramatis personnae who 
formulated and implemented it.
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There were, in reality, two divergent American policies 
in the Philippines between 1900 and 1934, one Republican and 
the other Democratic. The Republican policy reigned 
supreme throughout the era except for an important 
eight-year interlude during Woodrow Wilson's presidency.
The chief architects of the Republican policy were Secretary 
of War Elihu Root and William Howard Taft, who had his 
finger in the Philippine pie initially as the first Civil 
Governor of the islands, then as Root's successor in the War 
Department, and finally as U. S. President. Root's April 
7, 1900 instructions to Taft constituted the most important 
statement of American duties and rights as ruler of the 
Philippines; Taft translated the instructions into 
effective colonial policy.
The essence of the Taft-Root policy was the unwavering 
determination to remain in the islands until independence 
was actually feasible and desirable, and to jealously guard 
a degree of authority commensurate with American 
responsibilities. Taft, Root, and their successors 
counseled patience. They measured the period of tutelage of 
the Filipinos in generations, perhaps centuries. With 
American authority and determination unquestioned, Taft then 
took as his slogan, "the Philippines for the Filipinos."
The United States would rule in the Filipinos' best 
interests, keeping order, dispensing justice, developing the 
nation's economic infrastructure while protecting against 
exploitation and adventurism, maintaining an
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American-dominated civil service of the highest integrity, 
and allowing an increased number of competent Filipinos to 
participate in the government under American supervision.
The policy was designed to gradually prepare the Filipinos 
for assuming the burdens of self-government at some 
unspecified future date.
The ruling body of the islands was the Philippine 
Commission, initially five men including the Governor who 
were the heads of executive departments. As part of Taft's 
"policy of attraction,11 the United States soon drafted 
several members of the collaborationist Federal party to 
serve on the Commission without portfolio. The Commission 
was for seven years the sole law-making body in the islands. 
The 1902 Cooper (organic) Act made the Commission ultimately 
accountable to the American home government.
The United States took a bold, long-promised step 
toward representative government in 1907 with the creation 
of a popularly-elected unicameral National Assembly. The 
Commission became in effect the equivalent of an upper house 
and retained ultimate authority over budget matters, but 
through the National Assembly and the subsequent appointment 
of Filipino Resident Commissioners to sit as non-voting 
members of the U. S. Congress, the nascent Filipino 
independence movement gained a legitimate public forum. The 
Assembly was both a genuine tool for political education and 
an essential gesture toward fulfillment of America's promise 
of a new-style colonialism.
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Secretary of War Taft returned to Manila to inaugurate 
the Assembly and made clear its position in Philippine 
political life. "The best political education is practice 
in the exercise of political power," Taft told the 
delegates, "unless the subject is too ignorant as to be 
blind to his own interests." He further issued a challenge 
and a veiled warning to the Assembly. Will the Assembly, he 
asked, act responsibly, or, through neglect and obstruction, 
"make it necessary to take away its existing powers on the
3
grounds that they have been prematurely granted?"
Between 1901 and 1913 American officials labored to 
divert Filipino attention away from the increasingly vocal 
independence movement and toward social and economic 
development. The first task was to purge remnants of 
Spanish habits of government and public administration, and 
settle with the Vatican the nagging legacy of the Catholic 
friars' former domination of Philippine civil life. The 
American-founded school system required the teaching of 
English and emphasized a vocational and agricultural 
curriculum. The archipelago's greatest need was economic 
development, without which the islands could not support 
modern government or deter foreign aggression. Taft and his 
successors campaigned for laws to encourage investment and 
development and simultaneously to soothe Filipino fears of 
foreign domination and dispel anti-imperialist charges of 
"carpetbag" government.
The emphasis on economic development reached its apogee
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under the Governor Generalship of W. Cameron Forbes, whose 
term (1909-1913) was the longest of the era. Forbes was the 
grandson of railroad magnate John Murray Forbes, and an 
unassuming Boston businessman and devoted Harvard alumnus 
before joining the Commission in 1904. His meticulous and 
reflective journals revealed an almost childlike discovery 
of his own importance, and included frank annual assessments 
of his performance. He would become, much to his own 
pleasure, one of the leading authorities on Philippine 
matters> and would serve in other important government 
posts. Shortly after becoming Governor General, he 
confessed his lingering doubts over his own qualifications 
to President Taft, and declared his admiration for the 
Taft-Root policy in which he had served a thorough 
apprenticeship. He also forecast the temper of his term.
"I have made material progress my slogan throughout the 
islands ever since I first arrived here. . . . "  he told
4
Taft. Forbes' peculiar and natural bailiwick was roads.
He in fact earned from the Filipinos the nickname of
5"Caminero" (or road-builder) Forbes.
Despite his conscious effort to ingratiate himself with 
Manuel Quezon and other rising stars of Filipino politics, 
Forbes became the first Governor General to run afoul of 
Filipino nationalism. Forbes adamantly defended the 
Americans' right of supervision in the islands and 
obligation to save the Assembly from its own foolishness.
His tenure ended with the Governor and the Assembly
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deadlocked over the budget issue and the larger question 
that loomed behind it: America's right to be trustee for
the Philippines.
The last two years of Forbes's administration also 
foreshadowed the temporary eclipse of the Taft-Root policy, 
as the Democratic party gained control of the House of 
Representative for the first time since 1895. The House in 
1911 debated the first of a series of bills intended to 
grant the Filipinos effective home rule and rapid 
preparation for independence. Manuel Quezon, Manuel Roxas, 
and Sergio Osmena, the big three of Filipino politics, found 
American allies.
The inauguration of Woodrow Wilson brought an 
eight-year reversal in U. S. policy. Wilson and his 
appointee for Governor General, former New York congressman, 
Francis Burton Harrison, determined to substitute a crash 
course in self-government for the Republican policy of slow 
tutelage. In 1913 Harrison gave the Filipinos a majority on 
the Philippine Commission. He also began a systematic 
substitution of Filipinos for Americans in the civil 
service, a "purge" which old Philippine hands never forgot 
or forgave. In 1916 the Democratic-controlled Congress 
passed the Jones Act, a new organic act for the islands. It 
created an elected senate, relegated the Commission to a 
purely executive role, transferred many functions, including 
governing the Moslem minority, or Moros, from Americans to 
Filipinos, and included in its preamble an explicit promise
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
1 5 7
of independence as soon as a "stable government" existed.
Underlying the Wilson-Harrison policy was a critique of 
Republican trusteeship and an alternative to the task of 
tutoring dependent peoples inherited from the 
anti-imperialists. Opponents of the Taft-Root policy 
believed that Republicans had forgotten the second principle 
of colonial rule (the first one being "trusteeship") that 
Lyman Abbott suggested in 1899, "that the best method of 
developing manhood in any men is to throw upon them, as fast 
as possible, the responsibility for their life."6 Despite 
Republican insistence that they were, if anything, moving 
"too fast" in granting privileges of self-government to the 
Filipinos, Democrats and their anti-imperialist allies 
believed that the United States still monopolized key posts 
and exercised too close a supervision. Democratic senators 
charged during the 1916 debates over the Jones Bill that, 
under the Republicans, Americans had been "trustees ex 
maleficio," whose policies had actually made their wards
7
less capable of self-protection. "The child is to learn
to walk under our tutelage," The Nation editorialized
sarcastically in 1916. "Before letting him do that we are
8going to tie him down firmly to his cradle."
Wilson and Harrison still believed that the United 
States was a trustee for the Philippines, obligated to 
exercise discretion and even disciplinary force when 
necessary, but they were not as cautious as their 
predecessors.9 Harrison "Filipinized" the government not
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so much to test whether the Filipinos were capable of
self-government, but to prove that they were capable.
Rather than avoiding the issue of eventual independence, the
Democrats made it the hallmark of their policy. When
Francis Burton Harrison disembarked at Manila on October 7,
1913, he read a statement from President Wilson:
We regard ourselves as trustees acting not for the 
advantages of the United States but for the 
benefit of the people of the Philippine Islands. 
Every step we take will be taken with a view to 
the ultimate independence of the islands and as a 
preparation for that independence; and we hope to 
move toward that end as rapidly as the safety and 
the perijignent interest of the islands will 
permit.
This statement revealed some subtle, but fundamental 
differences in Democratic and Republican conceptions of 
trusteeship. Both used trusteeship to imply conditional 
rule and the existence of responsibilities to the Filipino 
people, and Wilson desired the Filipinos to follow the 
American model of national development. But the Democrats, 
who as a group desired to abandon, or "scuttle," the 
Philippines, portrayed American and Filipino interests as 
conflicting. Republicans systematically sought to prove 
that America’s benevolent, constructive imperialism and the 
Filipinos’ best interests coincided. Most importantly, the 
Democrats considered independence, or graduation, to be the 
acid test of trusteeship. This perspective governed the 
Democratic stance on the Philippine issue during the 
Wilson-Harrison years, and during the years in which the 
Democrats were relegated to critics of Republican policy.
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While Republicans fumed, Harrison gave the Filipinos 
more leash. The Filipinos used this latitude to establish 
government-owned and controlled industries, launch a 
state-sponsored independence lobbying effort, and further 
increase the number of Filipinos in the civil service. 
Several incidents, particularly the mismanagement of the 
Philippine National Bank, cast long shadows over the 
experiment in self-government. Nevertheless, Harrison began 
lobbying in 1918 for the United States to live up to its 
wartime ideals and give self-determination to the Filipinos. 
President Wilson waited until the eleventh hour, but in his 
1920 annual message he seconded Harrison's appeal for 
Philippine independence.11
The election of Warren Harding reinstated the Taft-Root 
policy and its devotees. Under pressure from the Filipino 
lobbyists sent to Washington by the Philipine Assembly, and
in the wake of Wilson's recommendation, Harding decided to
• 12 dispatch an investigating mission to the islands. With
Leonard Wood and Cameron Forbes as co-chairmen, the
mission's conclusion that the Filipinos were not prepared
for independence surprised no one. The Wood-Forbes report
became the bible of the Republican restoration. It
scrupulously avoided gloating over the Filipinos' failures,
and assured them that, as Harding later promised, there
would be no "backward step" in Philippine policy. The new
regime would be one of consolidation; the Filipinos must
take time to digest the privileges they had so ravenously
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consumed. Addressing the paramount question of their 
instructions, Wood and Forbes concluded that the Philippine 
government was "not reasonably free from those underlying 
causes which result in the destruction of government."13 
The United States must reimpose a strong guiding hand and 
again banish all talk of independence until the Filipinos 
could properly maintain it.
Leonard Wood agreed to stay on and oversee the 
restoration. He spent the last six years of his life in the 
center of a- political storm, standing firm against the 
nationalist backlash. Wood's agenda included the 
dismantling of the government-owned corporations, the 
restoration of key American civil servants, and, especially, 
the recovery of the Governor General's authority that 
Harrison had abdicated. Reasserting his authority brought a 
crisis in the Philippine cabinet in 1923 and a subsequent 
series of confrontations over vetoed bills. The Harding and 
Coolidge administrations stood squarely behind Wood despite 
the intense Filipino propaganda campaign that portrayed Wood 
as a "bully" and a militarist who bypassed the constitution 
and ruled through a "cavalry cabinet." Coolidge finally 
flinched and dispatched a political crony, Carmi Thompson, 
to investigate affairs in the Philippines. Thompson's 1926 
report vindicated Wood, but bowed to the political pressure 
and mildly rebuked Wood's high-handed style of rule.
After Wood's death in 1927, former and future cabinet 
officer Henry L. Stimson, a staunch Wood partisan, served a
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one-year term as Governor General. Stimson succeeded in his 
effort to quiet the waters and infuse the old policy with a 
new spirit of cooperation. In return for Filipino approval 
of a staff of American experts to assist the Governor 
General, Stimson began implementing his pet project of a 
quasi-parliamentary system of government. Stimson made no 
secret of his desire for a permanent American-Philippine 
connection modeled after the British Dominions. He stepped 
down to become Herbert Hoover's Secretary of State in 1929, 
but continued to defend his vision against a renewed drive 
for Philippine independence.
The American push to grant independence to the 
Philippines that culminated in 1934 began in the mid-1920s 
when Congress began to consider a number of bills for phased 
independence. The momentum in Congress in favor of 
Philippine independence grew, and in 1933 Congress passed 
the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Independence Act over Hoover's veto, 
only to have the Philippine Assembly reject it because it 
reestablished tariff barriers too quickly. The 
Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 revised the trade provisions 
and the Filipinos accepted the amended act. In 1935 the 
Filipinos inaugurated a quasi-autonomous Commonwealth, and, 
after a traumatic wartime experience, they gained their 
independence in 1946.
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The central issue in U. S. -Philippine relations was 
whether and when the United States would grant Philippines 
their independence. The existence of a vocal 
anti-imperialist bloc in the United States and an articulate 
Filipino independence lobby kept the issue before the 
American public. American toleration of open dissent and 
the creation of the popularly elected National Assembly 
practically guaranteed a contest of wills between the 
Americans and Filipinos. American proconsuls confronted 
almost immediately the "semi-educated native" against whom 
Lord Cromer fulminated. Such, it seemed, was the price of 
an enlightened colonial policy.
Agitation for independence put American officials in 
the position of having to defend constantly the continuation 
of American trusteeship, and, conversely, to reiterate the 
incapacity of the Filipinos to manage their own affairs.
The rest of this chapter analyzes how advocates of the 
Taft-Root policy rationalized their emphasis on trusteeship 
over the ideal of national self-determination. To do this, 
these men not only asserted the virtue, values, and 
necessity of American rule, but also systematically 
denigrated the value of Philippine independence and the 
character of the men who espoused it.
The most persistent justification of continued American 
control was the very logic of trusteeship. American 
officials repeated ad infinitum the familiar adage that a 
trustee's responsibilility was to do what the ward needed,
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not what he wanted. According to the standard logic, the
Filipino masses were children and not unexpectedly yearned
for things they could not comprehend or appreciate. The
standard description of the Filipino people was that they
were kindly, but "child-like,11 "densely ignorant,"
14credulous, and "easily-led." They were easy prey for the 
educated mestizos and their slogans of "independencia." The 
overwhelming popularity of the Nacionalista party owed to 
this credulity, not to a genuine understanding of 
independence and the obligations and dangers it entailed.
The people want independence, Cameron Forbes observed 
shortly after his arrival in the islands, "but they want it
very much as a baby wants a candle because it is bright and
. . 15because it is held out for him to seize at." To Henry
Stimson the independence issue was a purely political one,
"precisely like the five cent fare issue in New York
City."16 "I think," wrote Elihu Root in 1904, "that now
independence would be the most fatal possible gift to the
people of the Philippine Islands. The Filipinos were in
their "political childhood," thus the U. S. must retain "the
17power to control the child's actions."
Reinforcing American skepticism over the masses' true 
understanding of "independencia" was a deep suspicion of the 
motives of Filipino political leaders, the so-called 
"politicos." It became an article of faith among American 
retentionists that Quezon and company had put themselves in 
a bind, arousing for political advantage a mindless popular
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fervor for independence, yet were personally aware of the
need for some form of American protection. Although the
politicos must talk "independencia,” they really only wanted
autonomy and local home rule. The politicos, Leonard Wood
explained, "have talked for years about independence
immediate and absolute and they have raised a frankenstein
18and do not know how to lay it [to rest].11 There was a
seed of truth to this suspicion. Manuel Quezon lobbied
privately for autonomy and against any proposals for
19immediate, unqualified independence. Quezon's double 
game allowed American officials to portray themselves as 
long-suffering scapegoats, guardians rescuing their wards 
from improvident promises.
Even when key Filipino leaders were not confessing 
their doubts about absolute and immediate independence, 
American officials felt justified in dismissing the 
politicos and their arguments. Americans regarded the 
politicos as venal, self-interested politicians, products of 
the Latin political heritage, who continued to be leeches on 
the Philippine body politic. Furthermore, American 
officials applied the same litmus test for "intelligence" 
and "patriotism" to Filipinos that they had to Cubans. The 
"educated" and "conservative" men who opposed independence 
knew and wanted what was best for their country. Although 
some of the most educated and highly regarded Filipinos, 
such as Philippine University Dean Maximo Kalaw, favored 
independence, Americans generally employed circular
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reasoning that equated intelligence and loyalty with at
least private support for the American position.
In the Philippines, Cuba, and in almost all of
America's quasi-colonial ventures, American officials saw
native societies comprised of three elements. As Leonard
Wood explained in a 1925 interview, there were the
politicians who fanned the natural desires for independence
of the second group, the masses of ignorant peoples, and the
educated conservative men who wanted what was best for the
country> but who were politically apathetic or without
influence. The American objective, as it was in Cuba, was
to rule in the best interests of the second group by
educating them about their rights, by neutralizing the
influence of the first group and insuring the participation 
20of the third. The opinions of the "intelligent" few and
the interests of the silent majority clearly outweighed the
desires of the vocal minority.
Americans in the Philippines, like Lord Cromer in
Egypt, believed that their primary responsibility was to the
"common people," the "great mass," the 90 or 95 percent, the
. 21"small man," the poor, the weak, and the ignorant. 
Consequently, the same perceptions about Philippine society 
that allowed Americans to discredit the appeals for 
independence also compelled them to assume commitments to 
protect the downtrodden and to reconstruct Philippine 
society— commitments that required long-term American 
trusteeship. The United States could not in good conscience
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
1 6 6
let loose an independent state resting on an oligarchical,
even feudalistic, social order. This would be a betrayal of
America's trust to create a genuinely strong stable state
and of its obligations to the Filipino people. Most agreed
with Cameron Forbes when he wrote in 1921 that American
trusteeship in the Philippines was for "the common people of
the Islands, the illiterate, the workers, the fellows who
have usually been abused in the past by those in power and
are likely to be again in the future if we fail in our 
22trust. . . . "  Not until the peasants, or "taos," could
stand up to the "caciques," or local elites, was America's
trusteeship fulfilled. A democratic social order and
political system must replace the existing one which Taft
23dubbed "a Mafia on a very large scale."
The most remarkable and controversial of America's 
special responsibilities was to the "uncivilized" tribes of 
Luzon and especially to the Moslem Moros who populated 
Mindanao and the Sulu Islands. The obligation to civilize 
and protect those peoples and to oversee their peaceful 
incorporation into the Philippine mainstream was one of the 
most consistent rationalizations for perpetuating American 
rule.
The Moros were a fiercely independent and warlike 
people who had successfully resisted Spanish conquest and 
enjoyed relative autonomy. After five years of tolerating 
Moro autonomy and their peculiar customs, American forces, 
under the command of Provincial Governor Leonard Wood, began
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"pacifying" the Moros in 1903. For the next three years, 
the Moros felt the iron fist of "benevolent assimilation." 
Wood determined to reduce the Moros to American authority, 
then to civilize and Americanize them.24
Thereafter, American officials held a dualistic view of 
the Moros. On one hand, they were a semi-civilized people 
whose habitual piracy and fanaticism posed a potential 
threat to public order. They must be civilized before the 
Philippines could become independent. The slowest walkers 
in effect determined the pace of the Filipinos' march toward 
self-government. On the other hand, the Moros were, as a 
result of American pacification, disarmed, even dependent 
peoples, potentially easy prey for the Christian Filipino 
majority. Pacification involved a controversial, unwritten 
agreement: the Moros surrendered their arms and agreed to
live peacefully as long as the United States protected them 
from their traditional foes, the Christian Filipinos.
America would betray its trust if it left the Moros and 
the other "non-Christian" peoples at the mercy of the 
Filipino leaders, or left without civilizing them. The 
failure to do either of these would also breed instability 
in any independent Philippine state. As things stood, there 
existed what long-time Philippine Commission member Dean 
C. Worcester described as "a wall of prejudice and hatred" 
between Filipinos and non-Christians. Consequently,
Worcester concluded, "desertion" of the non-Christians "may
25 . .never be considered." The meaning of this special
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responsibility to the Moros was not lost on the opponents of
the Taft-Root policy. As the anti-imperialist Nation
editorialized ruefully in 1916, "It will be a sad day for
the self-styled 'opponents of scuttle1 in the Philippines
26when the Moros are civilized." Democrats and
anti-imperialists accused Republican officials of
exaggerating tribal and religious differences as a ploy to
27deny independence. Republicans retorted that civilizing 
all the Filipino people and forging a relatively homogeneous 
nation was one of the tasks which the United States must 
perform before it could terminate its trust.
Indeed, the Republicans conceived of American 
trusteeship in the Philippines to involve nothing less than 
the creation of a viable, modern, self-governing state. 
Exactly what such a state required was a central issue in 
the debate over U. S. Philippine policy. The Taft-Root 
policy rested on the assumption that economic development, 
popular education, legal and other reforms were integral 
parts of American trusteeship. But its proponents 
consciously avoided laying out a timetable for that trust. 
The preamble of the 1916 Jones Act subverted this policy, 
and explicitly promised the Filipinos independence once they 
proved that they could maintain a "stable" government. The 
Republicans were unable to divorce those issues.
As a result of the Jones Act preamble, defining a 
"stable government" became the focus of debate from 1916 to 
1933. Democrats, not surprisingly, cited the modest
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criteria for stable government commonly used to determine
the recognition of new regimes: the ability of a government
to maintain order within its territory, to fulfill all
international obligations, and to rule with the approval of
its peoples. The creation of a stable government did not,
therefore, necessarily entail a thorough regeneration of
Philippine national life. In contrast, Republican statesmen
set forth a formidable array of qualifications that a
Philippine state must meet if its independence were to be of
real value. Leonard Wood more or less codified the implied
definition of stable government in an August 1921 speech in
Zamboanga, Mindanao. The first requirement was the
existence of a widely-disseminated "Public Spirit" or "civic
courage" on which government efficiency depended. Wood then
enumerated the essential factors which "in combination form
what we call stable government":
good courts, just as good to the poor as the rich, 
no differences on the ground of religion, laws 
under which capital seeks investment at normal 
rates of interest, good schools, good sanitary 
system, proper treatment of insane and poor, 
private charities, also an organized strength 
sufficient at least to make a reasonable defense 
against attack.
Wood's Zamboanga speech confirmed what opponents of 
American policy long suspected, that the United States was 
holding the Philippines hostage to an unrealistic standard 
of national independence. Dean Maximo Kalaw of the 
Philippine University wrote "a critical analysis" of the 
Wood-Forbes report in which he chastised the United States
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for changing in mid-course its requirements for
29 • • •independence. President Coolidge, m  his official
response to one of several Filipino independence missions,
defended Wood's position in the ongoing cabinet crisis and
added a new requirement— the separation of powers of
government— to the list of "fundamentals" of stable
30 •government. This incensed the veteran anti-imperialist
Moorfield Storey who protested that Coolidge's preconditions
for stable government "were not existent when this nation
became independent, and which do not exist in most
31independent nations." This was exactly the point. 
Proponents of the Taft-Root policy did not believe that 
national independence was something that a people could or 
should achieve easily. This parsimonious attitude toward 
Philippine independence had several causes. The most 
obvious was simply a fundamental conservatism, a skepticism 
of the ability of any people to achieve stable 
self-government overnight. Stable governments must have 
solid economic, social, and political foundations, and be 
rooted in the character of the people. A persistent, often 
latent racism toward Asian peoples reinforced this 
conservatism.
It was not, however, merely a concern with the future 
of the Philippine Islands that compelled Republican 
statesmen to advocate long-term retention of the islands.
Of equal, if not greater, importance were the interests of 
the United States and of the "civilized" world. The same
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supposed harmony of interests— the triple mandate— that 
motivated annexation in 1898 required retention of the 
Philippines. Since it was the economic and strategic 
interests of the United States and, by proxy, of the entire 
civilized world, that compelled assumption of the 
trusteeship, it was only logical that the United States 
continue to consider those interests in deciding the 
question of independence. Republicans argued that American 
and world interests and the best interests of the Filipinos 
themselves coincided. Creating a wealthy, modern, stable, 
and secure Philippine state served everyone's interests. 
Conversely, to abandon the trusteeship before such a state 
existed betrayed the trust. This logic was particularly 
evident in Republican economic policy in the islands and in 
the strategic vision of prominent American proconsuls.
Republican policymakers knew that by insisting on 
economic development and financial stability they were 
walking a political tightrope. Economic exploitation was 
the most villified dimension of stereotypical old-style 
imperialism. While no one denied the necessity of economic 
stability for stable government, anti-imperialists and 
Filipinos were wary of American exploitation under the guise 
of development. The Republican Governors from Taft to 
Stimson tried to mitigate this fear while pushing ahead with 
development. They lobbied for general incorporation laws 
and for relaxation of the landholding restrictions that 
Congress wrote into the original organic act. Taft
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acknowledged the "possibility of abuse," but concluded that
"[t]he danger on that side cannot outweigh the fact that the
happiness of these people and their prosperity are dependent
32on a tremendous investment of capital here."
Economic development meant far more than the happiness 
of the people. According to the prevailing American 
outlook, development and economic efficiency were 
indispensable conditions for the existence of modern 
nations. The Philippines must have a solid economic 
foundation before it could worry itself over political 
matters. Wood and Stimson launched a full-scale campaign 
for economic development in the 1920s pointing out that it 
was essential to generate the revenue without which the vast
array of services necessary for stable government would not
33 . .be possible. Stimson further insisted that the ability
to manage large-scale economic concerns, which he felt the
Filipinos wholly lacked, was itself a prerequisite for
34self-government. Failure to develop its resources would
not only threaten the Philippines with internal collapse,
but it would also be an invitation to its covetous
neighbors. Consistent with the trusteeship Weltanschauung,
Americans observed that a nation with a small, scattered
population that refused to develop its rich natural
resources could not expect its overpopulated neighbors to
35resist the temptation it presented.
There were, of course, many other interests at stake in 
the development of economic efficiency and stable government
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in the Philippines besides those of the Filipinos. The
raison d ’etre of American trusteeship in the islands was,
afterall, the unlocking of the archipelago's bounty for its
people, American enterprise, and for the world at large.
Providing order in the Philippines and access to the raw
materials was a paramount American responsibility.
Understandably American statesmen did not persistently
proclaim the right of international eminent domain in the
Philippines, but neither did they deny the existence of
outside economic interests. Just as the Filipinos benefited
from their rising standard of living, so. too, did the
United States. Taft and his successors pointed out that as
the naturally "imitative" Filipinos became wealthier, they
would grow "to regard American products which are now
3 6luxuries to them as necessities." The generation of new 
and higher wants fueled Filipino progress and produced 
American profits. But there were strong indications that 
American economic policy conflicted with Filipino and world 
interests. This was particularly evident in 
American-Philippine trade relations.
Upon the expiration of the trade provisions of the 
Treaty of Paris (which put Spanish trade on equal terms with 
American trade in the Philippines) in 1909, the 
U. S. Congress established essentially free trade with the 
Philippines. Over the next 20 years the U. S. came to 
dominate the islands' import and export markets. This 
obviously conflicted with the notion that American
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trusteeship in the Philippines had a direct benefit for the 
entire commercial world. Ideally, maintaining an open door 
in a nation's dependencies to all foreign commerce and 
investment was how an imperial power discharged its trust to 
the the other commercial nations. Thus the United States 
was guilty of a colossal breach of trust when it brought its 
own major colony behind the wall of its protective 
tariff.37
More importantly, the exclusive free trade policy
seemed designed to prevent the development of an independent
Philippine economy, and to make "graduation" unattractive to
Filipinos. Cameron Forbes and his vice-Governor, Newton
Gilbert, acknowledged this. Each hoped and expected that
the economic link would influence the Filipinos to
voluntarily retain their association with the United 
38States. Similarly, Henry Stimson, in the late 1920s,
used Congressional initiatives toward reimposing tariff
barriers as a kind of blackmail to silence Filipino
39agitation for independence.
Anti-imperialists squawked loudly at this tactic.
Erving Winslow, Moorfield Storey, and the rump of the
Anti-imperialist League, protested to Congress in 1909 that
free trade "constitutes a tie which prejudices the
40independence of the islands. . . . "  Nevada Senator 
Francis G. Newlands was the most persistent critic of what 
he considered the duplicitous intentions of free trade. The 
United States must conduct its Philippine policy with the
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assumption "that the Philippines are to be held as a trust,
not as an asset; that the dependency of today is to become
the independent government of tomorrow and that no
legislation should be indulged which does not have this
41purpose firmly in view." Since imperialists placed a 
higher premium on the creation of a wealthy Philippine 
society than on independence as an end in itself, they did 
not agree that the economic connection constituted a 
betrayal of American trusteeship.
The scramble for tropical raw materials in the 1920s 
also revealed cleavages in the triple mandate. As early as 
1913 Cameron Forbes waxed poetical over the possibilities of 
rubber cultivation in the Philippines.42 In the 1920s 
securing a reliable source of rubber became an obsession of 
American business, and Herbert Hoover's Commerce Department 
fixed its eyes on Mindanao. Ironically, it was in large 
part because of the fierce and divisive competition between 
western industrial states that the United States redoubled 
its efforts to develop Mindanao. There was little harmony 
evident in American-European economic relations.
While most American statesmen cautiously suggested that 
the development of Mindanao was as much in the interests of 
the Filipinos as in those of the Americans, others spoke in 
tones that vindicated anti-imperialist warnings. American 
businessmen in the islands, the so-called "Manila 
Americans," were especially indiscreet. The United States, 
they charged, had been "negligent" in allowing the Filipinos
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to let valuable resources sit idle. American restraint
simply played into the hands of the politicos and caciques
who opposed economic development and the democratization it
would bring. Why wouldn't the United States create
conditons, inquired one writer, "whereby the immense
resources of the islands, both for their own sake and ours,
will be developed in ways to make them of the fullest
43service to the world that has need of them?" As long as 
the United States and the rest of the commercial world 
needed tropical products, the Filipinos had no right to deny 
access to them. And American policy had no right to let the 
Filipinos obstruct progress.
In what was probably the most outrageous exhibition of
self-interest in American policy, Congress in the mid-192 0s
considered a bill that would have begun a phased
independence for the Philippines except for Mindanao and the
Sulu Islands, which would have remained under American
control. America's special responsibility to the Moros and
its special interest in Mindanao's resources conveniently 
44coincided.
America's concern for the Philippines' place in the 
world order similarly revealed the influence of several, 
possibly conflicting interests. There was an inevitable 
interrelationship between the security of the Philippines 
and the stability of the Pacific region. Republicans 
thought it irresponsible to set an independent nation loose 
if it were likely to fall under foreign domination or become
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a source of international friction. Americans were
particularly wary of the Japanese. Defenders of the
Taft-Root policy envisioned a scenario in which, upon
American abandonment of the islands, tribal and religious
wars would erupt and the Japanese, with their increasing
economic presence in and immigration to the islands, would
intervene to reimpose order. Such a scenario, American
imperialists argued, was objectionable not only because it
would be tantamount to replacing America's benevolent rule
in the Philippines with the alleged exploitation and
oppression that characterized Japanese colonial rule, but
also because it would give Japan a dangerously dominant
position in the Pacific, and eclipse American influence in 
45the region.
This interrelationship between Philippine security and 
international conditions had the effect of tethering the 
archipelago's fate to affairs beyond its control. Security 
depended on the strength and attitude of potential 
conquerors and on regional stability as well as upon the 
existence of a stable Philippine government. Although based 
on a realistic assessment of international relations, it 
seemed an unrealistic and unfair precondition for Philippine 
independence. Even more disturbing was the implication that 
the Philippines could not receive their independence until 
the mere fact of their independence— regardless of its 
internal stability— would not disrupt the international 
balance. In other words, "race children" could not
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"graduate," despite their qualifications, until and unless 
their graduation would not create problems for their 
trustees or for the community. While disruption of regional 
stability might theoretically have adverse effects on the 
Philippines, it was difficult to escape the conclusion that 
such a precondition existed primarily for the interests of 
the United States and the other western nations.
There was no American consensus on whether or not 
conditions were ripe for the establishment of an independent 
Philippine state. Democrats argued that the Four Power 
Treaty (limiting defenses in Pacific possessions) and the 
Five Power (naval limitation) Treaty signed at the 
Washington Conference in 1922 assured the security of the 
Philippines. They further argued that America's continued 
presence in the Philippines was itself the source of the 
greatest potential threat to Pacific security; America's 
presence bolstered and legitimized western imperialism, 
which provoked hostile Asian nationalism and endangered the
A g
tranquility of the region.
The Republican assessment of conditions in the Pacific 
and American responsibilities there was diametrically 
opposed to this reasoning. Especially in the wake of the 
world war and the Bolshevik Revolution, Republicans 
perceived grave dangers for American and western interests 
in Asia. They became extremely sensitive to the fragility 
of western civilization. Republican statesmen were 
determined to hold the line against Bolshevism and its
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alleged product, Asian nationalism. They also believed
that, far from stabilizing the region, the Washington
Conference treaties merely made American and western
interests more vulnerable than ever.47 Leonard Wood, Henry
Stimson, and their supporters viewed the question of
Philippine independence through the prism of a much larger
issue, the meeting of East and West. American statesmen
entertained the apocalyptic visions of Charles Pearson and
Lothrop Stoddard, and feared that "barbarian" peoples could
acquire the power and the hostility to overwhelm western
civilization. In the meeting of East and West, the
Philippine Islands occupied a strategic place. They were,
Henry Stimson often declared, paraphrasing one of Leonard
Wood's favorite dictums, "the spear-point of Western
civilization in the great sea of Confucianism and Buddhism
48which surrounds them."
In addition, they were, Leonard Wood wrote to a
disciple, journalist Nicholas Roosevelt, "the most suitable
means we have for Christianizing the Far East and implanting
49Western methods of government and Western standards."
This vision of the Philippines as an outpost in the Pacific 
long antedated the 1920s. William Jennings Bryan's 1907 
proposal for American "reservations" in the Orient reflected 
an old dream. America's enlightened colonialism was the 
last best hope for leavening European colonialism and for 
bringing about a peaceful westernization of the Orient. The 
future disposition of the Philippines was, in other words,
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intertwined with the confrontation of two civilizations, and
had to await the outcome of this epochal event.
This logic led to the conviction that the American
trusteeship in the Philippines, and its prospective
termination, must consider the interests of the other
colonial powers. Leonard Wood told an English correspondent
that the United States "must shape [its] course [in the
Philippines] so as not to betray the interests of Western
Civilization and the Christian effort in the East;'1 and, in
particular, the United States must not add to the "already
heavy burden which western nations with Far Eastern holdings
50are carrying at the present time." Wood, Stimson, and
Nicholas Roosevelt, who became the most prominent publicist
for the Wood-Stimson viewpoint, warned that American
abandonment of the Philippines would precipitate a
domino-like fall of the British and Dutch colonies, and the
triumph of a mindless anti-western hostility. The United
States, England, and the Netherlands must maintain a united
front, continue their benevolent colonial rule, and stand
firm against the effects of "the pernicious and dangerous
. 51doctrine of self-determination." Wood played host to the
Governor General of the Dutch East Indies in 1924. The two
proconsuls agreed on the necessity of a conference between
representatives of western powers with East Asian colonies,
with the objective of "harmonizing" their policies, or "at
least avoiding in any one colony something which would
52excite or upset the people of another."
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American imperialists did not, however, believe that 
they were cynically using the Philippines as an instrument 
to diffuse western culture. On the contrary, they believed 
that the Filipinos, as the only Christian peoples in the 
Orient (and having lived under western rule for 350 years) 
were, despite their geographical location, an "occidental" 
people. American rule engendered in the Filipinos a higher 
standard of living than any of their neighbors. The 
Filipinos had abundant cause to resist Asian 
nationalism.53
The implications of this widely-held vision of American 
trusteeship in the Philippines were incalculable. When 
would the Filipinos "graduate" if the peace of the Orient, 
perhaps the peace of the world, depended on their remaining 
under American control? Quite clearly, many Republican 
statesmen hoped that the Philippines would always remain 
under American sovereignty and believed that this, not 
independence, represented the best interests of the 
Philippines. This insight casts in a new light William 
Howard Taft's policy of deferring the question of 
independence. After all, Taft always emphasized that after 
the United States had adequately laid the foundations of a 
modern state in the Philippines, the Filipinos would have an 
opportunity to decide whether they even wanted to become 
independent. Taft believed that eventual independence was 
politically inevitable, but privately hoped for some kind of 
permanent association.
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Several of Taft's colleagues took this private desire
further. Cameron Forbes, beginning in 1921, urged taking
steps toward the establishment of a "supervised government"
in the Philippines. Laying out his plan to Secretary of War
John Weeks, Forbes expressed serious doubts about the
Filipinos ever being able to maintain a stable independent
government. But it was important not to deny the
possibility. He felt that the Filipinos would be satisfied
with the symbols of independence (particularly having a
Filipino in’ the Malcanan Palace). The solution was to
reduce the American presence, leaving just an American
resident commissioner, with extensive powers, to rule over a
commonwealth form of government. Lord Cromer, Forbes noted,
performed miracles with fewer powers. Forbes described his
plan in terms appropriate for a businessman and significant
for the concept of trusteeship. The Filipino commonwealth
would rule with minimal interference, so long as the
government was conducted "with decorum, justice, efficiency
and economy," but the United States would reserve the right
of intervention. "This is ," Forbes wrote,
very much as the stockholders are allowed to 
manage the affairs of a corporation just so long 
as the terms of the mortgage are lived up to, but 
if at any point the conditions of the mortgage are 
violated, then under certain terms and conditions 
the trustee can step in and manage the property 
for the bondholders.
Forbes, five years earlier, cited this "receivership"
variant of trusteeship as a general rule for all nations
that fail to fulfill the obligations of a "franchise.1,54
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Henry Stimson's proposals for an "Association of free 
Nations" for which he began lobbying during his 1926 visit 
to Wood in Manila, similarly rested on the assumption that 
the Filipinos should not be completely independent. Stimson 
continually pointed out that there was a world of difference 
between "self-government," which the United States promised, 
and "independence," which it did not. He dedicated his 
efforts as Governor General and as secretary of state to 
finding "a middle course between the extremes of
55independence on one side and annexation on the other."
He confessed that his "dearest hope" was "that there shall
be a permanent connection between the Philippine Islands and
the United States. . . . "56
There were, Stimson testified on at least two
occasions, three perspectives on the Philippine question,
and three corresponding reasons why he was opposed to
Philippine independence. Independence would have adverse
effects on the Filipino people, on the American position in
the Pacific, and on the peace and progress of the Orient.
Stimson's president, Herbert Hoover, referred in even more
explicit terms to the elements of the triple mandate in his
veto message of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Independence Act.
The United States, Hoover declared, had a "triple
responsibility" in the Philippines; premature independence
. . . 57violated all three sources of responsibility. It was a 
short step from this belief to the conclusion that a 
permanent imperial connection was the only safe and sane
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future for the Philippines
In articulating this jonviction that a dependent
Philippine nation served everyone's interests, Stimson and
Wood occasionally expressed serious reservations over the
Filipinos' capacity for independent existence. Both men
argued that the United States must maintain a close
supervision over the Filipinos and that only American
supervision accounted for past Filipino progress. The
development of self-government was, Henry Stimson wrote,
''necessarily slow," and if the United States relaxed its
supervision prematurely, as it did during the Harrison
years, the "Malay tendency to backslide" manifested 
58itself. Wood similarly felt that immutable racial 
factors determined the future of the islands. The problems 
of American-Philippine, and West-East relation in general, 
were he often said, "biological rather than political, and 
in consequence will never be worked out 
entirely. . . . "59
Unlike Stimson, Wood was not so certain that the United 
States could or should always retain the archipelago. But 
he shared Stimson's pessimism over the fate of an 
independent Philippines. "I sometimes wonder just how 
permanent the efforts of the western civilization will be in 
the Eastern countries," he mused in 1926. The U. S. had 
raised the standard of living and "brought more humane 
conditions," but it would be "a long time before they are 
permanently accepted."60 Such thoughts could of course
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lead to several divergent conclusions. They suggested that 
American trusteeship was, in the larger perspective, futile 
and unwise. But for the men who formulated American policy 
for most of this period, the difficulties of tutelage simply 
reinforced the conviction that the United States must 
continue to do what it felt was right.
Ill
Despite the protests of Cameron Forbes, Henry Stimson, 
and other old Philippine hands, a Democratic Congress passed 
and a Democratic president approved the Tydings-McDuffie 
Philippine Independence Act in 1934. In many ways this act 
represented the triumph of what had been the minority voice 
in American Philippine policy. The coalition behind the act 
included many of the devoted anti-imperialists who had 
passed the Jones Act in 1916 and who believed that the 
Filipinos were ready to embark on their own national life. 
The Tydings-McDuffie Act was also consistent with the 
general tenor of Franklin Roosevelt’s administration, which 
shunned direct control over other peoples and consciously 
avoided the kind of imperialistic rhetoric so often 
associated with trusteeship.
It is possible, however, to exaggerate the degree to 
which Philippine independence represented a substantial 
change in the philosophy of dealing with backward peoples. 
For one thing, Roosevelt and his administration continued to
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believe in the necessity of supervising the development of 
backward peoples (see Chapter VII). More importantly, 
Philippine independence did not result primarily from a 
repudiation of trusteeship or a conviction that the 
Filipinos were prepared for graduation. The essential 
factor behind the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act was 
the triumph of the conviction that the Philippines had 
become a liability for the United States. With the United 
States mired in economic depression, Congress desired to end 
a colonial relationship that allowed cheap imports into the 
country. Many Congressmen no doubt believed that Philippine 
independence was also best for the Filipinos. After all, 
the Filipinos had been agitating for independence for 
decades. Nevertheless, Philippine "graduation" came not 
because a consensus of American policymakers decided that 
the Filipinos had earned passing marks, but because a 
majority of Congress decided that the costs of owning the 
Philippines outweighed the benefits.61
If we evaluate it critically and not merely by the end 
result, Philippine independence was a betrayal, not a 
fulfillment, of American trusteeship. Between 1898 and 1933 
the primary meaning of trusteeship in the Philippines was 
that the United States must continue to save a people from 
"the dangers of premature independence" and save the world 
from a "spurious counterfeit statehood." According to the 
men who formulated this policy, the United States was guilty 
of violating those duties in 1934. In contrast to the
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motivations behind the Tydings-McDuffie Act, the Taft-Root 
policy rested on the belief that American self-interest, 
Filipino interests, and the best interests of white 
Christian civilization coincided to demand American 
retention of the islands. That policy also rested on a 
consistent hierarchy of priorities which placed stability 
and prosperity above independence, and the interests of the 
many against the desires of the few. This hierarchy of 
priorities was the essence of American trusteeship in the 
Philippines;
And although American rule in the Philippines was an 
unusual example of formal and complete American control over 
a backward people, it revealed principles characteristic of 
American trusteeship in other areas. The Taft-Root policy 
represented a pervasive attitude about the value of national 
independence for small weak nations. The preconditions for 
•'stable" government required of the Filipinos suggested that 
American policymakers were unwilling to grant independence 
to anything less than a model republic. That other 
governments— especially small weak ones— could not pass the 
test of stability was precisely the point. The United 
States should not contribute to the further proliferation of 
unstable independent nations.
American policymakers drew explicit links between 
relations with the Philippines and with other backward 
areas. Most notably, defenders of U. S. retention of the 
Philippines often cited affairs in such Latin American
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nations as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and, after 1912, 
Mexico, to support their position. The United States owed 
it to the Filipinos, to its own interests, and to the world 
not to "Mexicanize" the Philippines. The Mexicans had 
independence, but the Filipinos had "freedom" ran a familiar 
refrain. Mexico was an example of "independence unguarded"
and of the "chaos" which would result if the United States
62abandoned the Philippines.
American rule in the Philippines was, as Franklin 
Roosevelt and Cordell Hull noted, exemplary of America's 
policy toward backward nations. But there was much 
more— and much less— to that policy than the preparation of 
backward peoples for eventual independence.
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CHAPTER V 
THE "LEADING STRING LAW":
American Trusteeship in the Caribbean and Mexico
Secretary of State Elihu Root articulated the typical 
American perception of the Monroe Doctrine when, in 1906, he 
called it "an assertion to all the world of the competency 
of Latin Americans to rule themselves."1 According to 
national mythology, the United States enforced the Monroe 
Doctrine in order to spare Latin America the fate that later 
befell much of Africa and Asia. In contrast to the 
imperialistic Europeans, the United States actually desired 
the establishment of stable independent states in Latin 
America.
But this declared support for Latin American
independence masked a more significant underlying American
attitude. Since the beginning of American relations with
its hemispheric neighbors, American officials held Latin
Americans in contempt, viewing them through the prism of a
racial hierarchy that deemed Latin peoples incapable of
Anglo-Saxon style self-government. One official wrote
Secretary of State Henry Clay in 1826 that the Latin
American peoples were like "children in their leading
strings," that is, like children learning to walk with the
2assistance and guidance of adults. American statesmen in 
the twentieth century continued to employ this revealing 
metaphor, and, more importantly, took it to its logical
197
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conclusion. Franklin K. Lane, Woodrow Wilson's former
Interior Secretary, declared in 1922 that there must be for
Mexicans and other "backward peoples" of the hemisphere
"another law than that of self-determination, a limited law
3of self-determination, a leading string law."
During the first third of the twentieth century,
American statesmen effectively promulgated a "leading string
law" first for Cuba with the Platt Amendment, and then for
the entire Caribbean with the Roosevelt Corollary. The
Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine essentially made
trusteeship the cornerstone of U. S. Latin American policy.
Rather than being "an assertion to all the world of the
competency of Latin Americans to govern themselves," the
Monroe Doctrine became an assertion to all the world of
America's willingness to be the trustee for civilization
4within its own "sphere of influence." American statesmen 
still desired the existence of stable independent states in 
the neighborhood, but were not content to patiently await 
their evolution. American policymakers insisted on their 
right to maintain at least a loose grip on the leading 
strings of immature states of the hemisphere as they learned 
to walk on their own.
For all intents and purposes, the leading string law 
was synonymous with trusteeship. Both meant that "adult" 
nations must supervise "child" nations during their 
minority. The influence of trusteeship in U. S. Latin 
American policy raises several questions. How did American
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statesmen justify trusteeship in Latin America, and, more 
importantly, how did they reconcile trusteeship with their 
ostensible respect for Latin American independence and 
sovereignty? What form did trusteeship take in Latin 
America? The answers to these questions reveal the utility 
of trusteeship in U. S. Latin American policy.
This chapter explores the meaning of trusteeship in 
American policy toward the Caribbean and in Mexico, 
especially the implications and the implementation of the 
Roosevelt Corollary. It illustrates how the United States 
accepted its natural role as trustee, or mandatory, for 
civilization in the region, and analyzes what this meant for 
U. S. relations with its southern neighbors.
I
The most salient question concerning U. S. -Latin 
American relations at the turn of the century was whether 
the United States would continue to tolerate the political 
disorder among its southern neighbors that it had so long 
deprecated. Theodore Roosevelt's enunciation of a corollary
i
to the Monroe Doctrine in 1903-4 decisively answered this 
question, and set the parameters of U. S. Latin American 
policy for the next thirty years.
American statesmen grew sensitive to the potential 
threat that the European presence in the Caribbean posed to 
U. S. security. Once content to tolerate European
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encroachments in the hemishpere, the United States in the 
1890s began to assert the Monroe Doctrine more vigorously. 
The surest way to prevent European intervention in the 
hemisphere was to eliminate its probable pretexts. At the 
turn of the century, this meant that the U. S. must somehow 
prevent European powers from using their right to collect 
debts from Latin American states as a means for obtaining 
political control. As early as 1881, Secretary of State 
James G. Blaine observed that if the U. S. really wanted to 
prevent European intervention in the hemisphere, it must act 
"as a trustee for the creditor nations."5
European observers pointed out the inconsistency of 
America's increasingly belligerent claim to primacy in the 
hemisphere and its unwillingness to discharge its 
international obligations there. Two English commentators 
in 1903 called the Monroe Doctrine "an assertion of power 
without assuming corresponding duties," and "a policy of 
protection without responsibility.1,6 Europeans would find 
the Monroe Doctrine more palatable if the U. S. were willing 
to "make itself responsible for the foreign policy of the 
petty, impetuous little states on the two continents."
The fundamental change in American attitude at the turn 
of the century was an increasing willingness to follow this 
advice. There was little debate over the character of Latin 
American peoples or whether they deserved protection from 
European creditors. The issue was whether the United States 
would assume a position of responsibility to the rest of the
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world. The editors of The Nation in the 1890s articulated 
the older view that there was no reason the U. S. could not 
tolerate the well-deserved punishment of its southern 
neighbors. Fearing a war with Great Britain over Venezuela, 
The Nation launched a campaign to demean the image of Latin 
Americans. Venezuela was "a semi-barbarous state," outside 
the family of civilized nations, a "republic" in name only, 
a state for whom the U. S. was in no way responsible.8
In contrast, journalist Walter Wellman berated the 
United States for abdicating its responsibility in the 
hemisphere. In a 1901 article, he condemned the Monroe 
Doctrine for putting up a "no trespass" sign around the 
hemisphere without taking any ameliorative action. The 
United States was blatantly hypocritical because it insisted 
on progress elsewhere in the world but was the only nation 
in the world to champion "the incompetent against the 
competent." Consequently, Wellman urged Theodore Roosevelt 
to lead the United States in assuming its rightful role as
Q
"trustee for civilization" in the hemisphere. Admiral 
Alfred Thayer Mahan also viewed America's position in the 
Caribbean in the larger world context. Mahan posited the 
general thesis that no community had an "inalienable right" 
to control the use of a region "to the detriment of the 
world" and equated America's rights and duties in the 
Caribbean with England's admirable work in India and Egypt. 
American statesmen must recognize that modern conditions 
brought peoples of widely unequal capacities and
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Reproduced with
civilizations into intimate contact. Since all areas of the
earth must be in competent hands, the United States must, if
it insisted upon excluding Europeans from the hemisphere,
accept "the responsibilities for that which is due to the
general family of our civilization.1,10
Theodore Roosevelt himself vacillated on the question.
In 1896 he impudently asserted that Europeans must sooner or
later abandon their Caribbean colonies and that Latin
American peoples could progress faster as independent states
than as dependencies. Nevertheless, the United States had
no desire "to establish a universal protectorate" over the
Latin American states or "to become responsible for their
misdeeds."11 In the first year of his presidency,
Roosevelt consistently advocated the policy that the
U. S. could allow European nations to "spank" a Latin
American miscreant as long as the punishment entailed no
12more than "transitory intervention." The metamorphosis
of Roosevelt's attitude was a result of the Anglo-German
13action against Venezuela in late 1902. The episode 
apparently convinced Roosevelt that letting European 
creditor nations "spank" Latin American states was fraught 
with potential political and financial dangers for the 
United States. When a similar situation soon arose in Santo 
Domingo (henceforth referred to by its modern name, the 
Dominican Republic), he reluctantly concluded that America's 
assumption of "an attitude of protection and regulation" 
toward the little states of the Caribbean was a necessary
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited wt
without permission.
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1 4corollary of its "'Hands Off" 1 declaration to Europe. 
Roosevelt and Elihu Root, at that time between stints as 
Secretary of War and Secretary of State, articulated the 
corollary in a series of speeches in 1904.
The story of the Roosevelt Corollary's genesis is of 
less concern here than the corollary's illustration of basic 
trusteeship principles. Specifically, the corollary 
entailed an American assumption of responsibility to the 
European powers for affairs in the Caribbean, and presented 
a comprehensive statement of what American statesmen 
considered the prerequisites for unconditional national 
sovereignty. The willingness to act as trustee or mandatory 
for Europe was the essence of the policy. It was a clear 
illustration of "preemptive" imperialism based on the 
perceived requirements cf national self-defense. The United 
States must remove all possible pretenses of European 
encroachment on its sphere of influence. As in the case of 
American action in Cuba and the Philippines, American 
statesmen at the very least revealed their understanding of 
how European powers treated small backward states. Even if 
American statesmen did not believe that Latin American 
indebtedness and disorder required punishment and 
"regulation," they must act as if they did; they could not 
realistically expect other powers to respect America's 
"hands off" declaration. In reality, Americans and 
Europeans shared the belief that sovereignty brought duties 
as well as rights. Americans came to agree that this maxim
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applied as much to their enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine 
as it did to the behavior of Latin American states.
The relevance of the Roosevelt Corollary for
trusteeship is most evident when we view it as a
manifestation of more general principles. Although it
obviously addressed a specific policy problem, it was also a
generic policy: the application in the western hemisphere
of the problem of the backward state. Theodore Roosevelt
advocated outright warfare against peoples and states that
resisted civilization. He also espoused the principle of
conditional sovereignty. "It is a mere truism," Roosevelt
declared in his 1904 annual message, "to say that every
nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires
to maintain it freedom, its independence, must ultimately
realize that the right of such independence cannot be
separated from the responsibility of making good use of 
15x t . "  ' The Roosevelt Corollary was a derivative of this 
truism. It was a statement of the minimum obligations that 
Latin American states must perform to avoid external, 
specifically American, intervention and regulation of their 
affairs:
If a nation shows that it knows how to act with 
decency in industrial and political matters, if it 
keeps order and pays its obligations, then it need 
fear no interference from the United States.
Brutal wrongdoing, or an incompetence which 
results in a general loosening of the ties of 
civilized society, may finally require 
intervention by some civilized nation, and in the 
Western Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore 
this duty. . . .
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The official explanation for the cause celebre of
Roosevelt's Caribbean policy, the "taking" of the Panama
Canal Zone in November 1903, further clarified the new
conception of America's hemispheric role. Roosevelt and
former Secretary of War Elihu Root sought to justify the
violation of the sovereignty of Colombia, the erstwhile
owner of the isthmus. They employed the chief principle of
the trusteeship Weltanschauung. In February 1904 Root
explained that the "rights of the other civilized nations of
the earth to have the canal constructed across the isthmus
and to have it maintained for their free and unobstructed
passage" "qualified and limited" Colombia's sovereignty 
17there. In an 1846 treaty Colombia had made the United
18States "the trustee of that right" of passage. By
facilitating the separation of Panama from Colombia, the
President declared in his official message on the incident,
the United States was merely acting as an executor of an
international "mandate," and exercising "the undoubted
ethical right of international domain" on behalf of 
19civilization. The conviction that "sovereignty has its
duties as well as its rights" was the official explanation
for U. S. actions in Panama as well as the cornerstone of
20the Roosevelt Corollary.
This reasoning struck a responsive chord among American 
policymakers and interested observers. An impressive array 
of scholars agreed with Roosevelt that the United States had 
a right and duty to act as the mandatory for civilization in
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Professor of International Law at Princeton and Taft's 
Minister to Honduras, bluntly pronounced the theory of 
absolute national sovereignty "unworkable." It was "a 
positive menace to the great constructive task of regulating 
the peaceful relations of nations. We need to recognize, in 
place of the archaic theory of sovereignty, the common 
interests of the nations of the world."21 Brown defended 
the right, indeed the duty, of one state to intervene in the 
affairs of another to prevent a lapse into barbarism, to 
abate an international nuisance, or for self-defense. In 
the absence of an international police force, nations must 
occasionally act on their own authority. He further 
speculated that, in the Caribbean, Latin American states 
"might be willing to give a generous recognition to the
pre-eminent role of the United States in the vigilant
. 22 assertion and defense of the basic rights of nations."
Columbia historian William R. Shepherd described American
policy in the Caribbean as one of "headship" and
"regulation." The United States arrogated to itself the
right to decide what was necessary for security and order in
the area, and to limit other nations' sovereignty
accordingly. The United States effectively "converted
itself into a trustee. . . a self-appointed mandatory for
23its weaker neighbors." The United States was a kind of 
broker between the Caribbean states and the European powers. 
It became not only a "policeman," but also a guardian and,
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when necessary, a tutor and welfare worker. In the context 
of fin de siecle world politics, the declaration of an 
American sphere of influence was neither unusual nor 
unexpected.
This is not to say that the Roosevelt Corollary did not 
elicit criticism among American policymakers and observers. 
From the inception of the new policy, many objected to the 
coupling of a policy of intervention with the Monroe 
Doctrine. The two policies seemed wholly incompatible. The 
Monroe Doctrine was supposed to be "an assertion to all the 
world of the competency of Latin Americans to rule 
themselves." Yet the corollary rested on the assumption 
that Latins were unable to rule themselves. The Roosevelt 
Corollary also conflicted with another pillar of U. S. Latin 
American policy, Pan-Americanism. American statesmen of the 
era sought to enlist the support of the ABC powers 
(Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) in making the Monroe Doctrine 
a genuine hemispheric policy. The interventions, financial 
control, and electoral supervision that occurred under the 
Roosevelt Corollary incurred the wrath of the South American 
states and posed an insuperable barrier to Pan-Americanism. 
As a consequence of these reservations, American statesmen 
sought to de-emphasize the role of unilateral intervention 
in U. S. policy. The efforts to do so in many ways only 
underscored the pervasiveness of trusteeship assumptions in 
U. S. policy.
American statesmen sought to divorce the Roosevelt
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Corollary from the Monroe Doctrine. There were several 
highly pragmatic motives for this. First, the Monroe 
Doctrine had no definite standing in international law. 
Intervention in foreign states based on a 
unilaterally-declared doctrine was illegal. Secondly, the 
United States hoped to salvage the reputation of the Monroe 
Doctrine among South American states by simply denying that 
objectionable policies were in any way associated with it. 
This did not mean, however, that the United States renounced 
the right to play trustee in the hemisphere and intervene to 
maintain order.
Instead, American statesmen drew a distinction between
the Monroe Doctrine and what they variously called the
"Panama policy," "isthmian policy," or "Caribbean policy."
They acknowledged the existence of two distinct U. S. Latin
American policies, one concerning the states of South
America, the other concerning the more vital and volatile
Caribbean basin. The isthmian policy declared that the area
between U. S. borders and the Panama Canal Zone and the
islands controlling its approaches were essentially
extensions of the U. S. coastline and were, therefore, vital
to U. S. security. The United States had the right to
intervene unilaterally anywhere in the region to preserve
order and rectify conditions that invited foreign
aggression. The right to intervene rested, in other words,
on the highest duty of any nation, the right of
24self-preservation.
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One of the most controversial proposals of the 1910s 
and 1920s was to invite the stable south American states to 
help enforce order in the troubled Caribbean basin. Many of 
those who worried that unilateral U. S. intervention 
undermined hemispheric good will yet believed that keeping 
order in the Caribbean was a necessary evil found a panacea 
in multi-lateral intervention, even the creation of a 
Pan-American police force. Clark University Professor 
George Blakeslee, Connecticut Senator Hiram Bingham, author 
of the era's most provocative critique of the Monroe 
Doctrine, international law authority Theodore Woolsey, 
former Secretary of State Richard Olney, former President 
Theodore Roosevelt, and Philippine Islands Governor General 
Cameron Forbes were among those who spoke in favor of "the 
stable, responsible and orderly states" of the hemisphere 
participating in the "thankless, irksome, and unpleasant" 
task of keeping order in the backward areas of the 
hemisphere.25
One important implication of those proposals was that 
they revealed that many self-styled anti-imperialists did 
not dogmatically oppose intervention. By applauding joint 
intervention, some of the harshest critics of American 
intervention consciously embraced the fundamental principles 
of trusteeship. Writer and missionary Samuel Guy Inman and 
Foreign Policy Association Chairman Raymond Leslie Buell 
agreed that intervention was often inevitable and that the 
crucial issues were the authority for and method of
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intervention. Both men were devoted internationalists;
they believed, as Inman wrote, that interdependence meant
that "the world is less willing than before to permit
anarchy or misgovernment which threatens peace, health and
2 6commerce, taking place in any part of the world." But 
interdependence was not a license for unilateral action. On 
the contrary, Buell asserted, interdependence dictated that 
no single nation was "great enough, strong enough, or wise 
enough, to decide for itself whether or not another part of 
the world is living up to its obligations." States could
only intervene with an explicit "mandate from international
27 . . . .society." Just as many erstwhile foes of "imperialism"
embraced the principles of international trusteeship
embodied in the League of Nations Mandates System (see
Chapter VII), American anti-imperialists believed that
intervention subjected to rules and supervision was not
necessarily objectionable.
Another implication of the proposals for joint
intervention was that it drew a sharper distinction between
the advanced and backward states of the hemisphere. The
United States sought simultaneously to draw closer to the
stable South American states and to justify and systematize
intervention in the Caribbean. Far from being inconsistent
or hypocritical, this two-track policy rested on the
i
consistent assumption that a state's standing in the family 
of nations depended on its ability to maintain order, live 
according to its constitutional procedures, and, especially,
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to protect foreign lives and property. American statesmen 
solicited the friendship of South American states by 
contrasting them with the unstable Caribbean states and even 
by inviting them to share in the common work of civilized 
nations. The United States did not, however, follow through 
on those initiatives, and it continued into the 1930s to be 
the lone trustee in the Caribbean basin.
II
As well as declaring America's willingness to be a 
trustee for civilization in its sphere of influence, the 
Roosevelt Corollary also made the United States trustee or 
guardian for the states of the region. U. S. policy under 
the Roosevelt Corollary rested on the triple mandate. What 
America's self-preservation required— the establishment of 
financial and political stability in the Caribbean— was also 
what the civilized nations demanded and what the Latin 
American nations themselves most sorely needed. Although 
motivated by American self-interest, American intervention 
under the Roosevelt Corollary ostensibly served a harmony of 
interests, and was, therefore, more legitimate than if it 
rested on self-interest alone. Furthermore, American 
policymakers disclaimed any desire for "territorial 
aggrandizement." Instead, Theodore Roosevelt declared in 
1905, interference in the affairs of Latin states was an 
expression of America's duty to "help upward our weaker
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2 8brothers." Armed with this ideal of service, a belief in 
a harmony of interests, and the conviction that U. S. action 
enhanced the ultimate sovereignty of neighboring states, a 
generation of American statesmen asserted their right to 
oversee the affairs of their Caribbean wards. This section 
examines the meaning of trusteeship in America's Caribbean 
policy through a selective chronological analysis of 
important events and American policymakers between 1904 and 
1933.
Elihu Root, Secretary of State from 1905 to 1909,
established the tone and pattern for American trusteeship in
the Caribbean. While Root acquired a reputation as an
enlightened statesman who injected U. S. Latin American
policy with a new spirit of tolerance and respect, he
operated from the same assumptions and outlook that
motivated all other policymakers of his age. Root believed
that the United States must try harder to understand and
appreciate the Latin Americans, but he was under no
illusions about their political and economic stability. The
central message of his many addresses and toasts during his
1906 good will tour of Latin America was that Latin American
states had traveled far "along the pathway of civilization,"
but that there was still much room for improvement. He
asserted in his principal speech that "The first fruits of
democracy are many of them crude and unlovely, its mistakes
29are many, its partial failures many, its s m s  not few."
In 1907 he opined that "the races that are capable of
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development beyond a certain point rule the world; the 
races that are not capable of it go down." The Latin 
Americans seemed unable to acquire more than "the most 
rudimentary capacity for consistent organization." But, he 
added optimistically, there were now "strong signs" of 
progress toward greater capacity, "with Central Americans 
lagging behind."30
Because of Latin Americans' political immaturity and
because of America's vital interests, the United States, he
wrote in 1908, "must exercise a predominant influence" in
the Caribbean. "We must control the route to the Panama
31Canal. But how, he asked, "are we to do it?" Root 
indicated his answer to this question seven years earlier 
when he helped devise the Platt Amendment (see Chapter III). 
Because of its right of self-preservation and its 
expenditure of "blood and treasure" in 1898, Root clearly 
believed that the United States had a right to exercise at 
least occasional control of the affairs of Cuba and other 
Caribbean states.
In his search for an answer to the paramount question 
of how the United States was to control the canal route, 
Root perfected the velvet glove approach to controlling 
backward nations of the hemisphere. He summarized the 
philosophy of this approach in 1906 when he told Theodore 
Roosevelt that, "It is very desirable for us to get the 
little Central American countries into better shape and to 
do it in such a way as to vrin their respect and kindly
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
2 1 4
3 2feeling." Root shared with his contemporaries the belief 
that American domination of other countries was neither 
necessarily evil nor a cause for resentment. The people of 
Central America were, he wrote, "perfectly willing to sit at 
the feet of Gameliel if Gameliel won't kick them or bat them 
on the head. If we can maintain for a time the right sort 
of relations with them, we can exercise an enormous 
influence over their conduct for their own good and for 
ours." The Central Americans accepting U. S. advice and 
assistance was "the only kind of hegemony we need to seek or 
ought to want."33
Root genuinely disdained complete and formal control
over the backward peoples of the hemisphere. Typically, his
motives reflected both concern for the peoples themselves
and for U. S. interests. During the negotiation of the 1905
customs receivership treaty with the Dominican Republic,
Root objected to provisions that "would practically destroy
34Dominican sovereignty, which none of us wishes to do." 
Destroying Dominican sovereignty would of course make the 
United States completely responsible for that troubled 
country. The United States did not want to "dilute [its] 
electorate" with the addition of inferior peoples and their 
institutions, he wrote in 1908. The United States wanted to 
be no more than a "next friend and powerful protector" of 
such peoples. Its primary objective was "to encourage 
orderly free governments" in Latin America, "so that we 
shall have a dominating influence along the path of the
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canal of which we can be proud and which will be 
35permanent."
Root's philosophy and policies guided the Roosevelt
administration's approach to enforcing the Roosevelt
Corollary in the Caribbean. Roosevelt was equally adamant
in his opposition to annexing Caribbean islands. He
declared in 1904 that he had about as much desire to annex
the Dominican Republic "as a gorged boa constrictor might
3 6have to swallow a porcupine wrong end to." Roosevelt and 
Root struggled to devise ways that gave the United States 
adequate control over disorderly nations without assuming 
complete control and responsibility.
The eruption of political rebellion in Cuba in 1906 
tested their ability to steer such a course. Despite the 
explicit applicability of the intervention clause of the 
Platt Amendment, Roosevelt wanted to avoid any American 
intervention, fearing that the United States would not be 
able to "haul down the flag" a second time. Nevertheless, a 
special mission to the island failed to reach a compromise 
between the warring parties, and, on September 29th,
Secretary of War Taft proclaimed a provisional
37 •government. As Roosevelt feared, the second occupation
stimulated renewed talk of annexing the "pearl of the
antilles." All were agreed that the United States must find
new safeguards to prevent another breakdown of Cuban
government, but Roosevelt vigorously rejected intimations
that the United States extend a formal protectorate over the
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island. As an alternative, he recommended that, after the
termination of the second occupation, the United States
leave advisers and appoint "a very strong Minister” to the 
38new government. It is likely that Roosevelt had in mind 
Lord Cromer's Egypt, another case in which a foreign power 
controlled essential areas of government and administration 
through the use of "advisers.” The parallel received wide, 
usually favorable public attention during the second 
occupation.39
As they did in 1898, American officials in 1906
rationalized the logic of control without ownership. Taft's
proclamation insisted that the provisional government was
temporary and existed only to facilitate the reconstruction
of a de jure Cuban government. In the meantime, Taft argued
that the Cuban government was, despite the presence of
Americans in key administrative posts, "a Cuban government
conforming as far as may be, to the constitution of 
40Cuba." In a telegram to President Roosevelt, Taft
explained his perception of the provisional government:
My theory in respect to our government here, which 
I have attempted to carry out in every way, is 
that we are simply carrying on the Republic of 
Cuba under the Platt Amendment, as a receiver 
carries on the business of a corporation, or the 
trustee the business of his ward; that this in 
its nature suspends the function of the 
legislature and of the elected executive, but that 
it leaves them in such a situation that their 
functions will at once revive when the 
receivership ^ r  trusteeship, is at an 
end. . . .
American control was thus entirely legal, temporary, and
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conditional. It expired when the Cubans were able, to
manage their own affairs, as a ward would be after reaching
maturity or a corporation would be after reorganization.
The purpose of American occupation was not to destroy a
working government, but, on the contrary, Roosevelt
explained, "to interfere so as to enable [the Cubans] to
42retain their independence." The second occupation of 
Cuba ended in 1909. The United States managed to avoid 
further full-scale interventions, and relied instead, as 
Roosevelt advised, on the services of advisers and "very 
strong Ministers."
The Roosevelt administration in 1905 discovered what 
became the most appropriate tactic for discharging America's 
trusteeship obligations in the Caribbean, the customs 
receivership. It was the tendency of Caribbean states to 
fall hopelessly into the debt of European states that most 
concerned American statesmen. Some kind of American control 
over the finances of these states (along with loans from 
private American financiers) would obviate the threat of 
European action and also secure the customshouses against 
the machinations of revolutionaries. The United States 
negotiated arrangements whereby American experts served as 
collectors and receivers in the Dominican Republic, 
Nicaragua, Honduras, and Haiti, guaranteeing the financial 
efficiency that modern states required and paying off the 
debts owed to foreign (including American) creditors.
American statesmen viewed the receivership as a virtual
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panacea, and it quickly became the primary embodiment of the
Roosevelt Corollary. It gave the United States the
essential degree of control with little political risk.
Thomas Dawson, the State Department's Latin American
troubleshooter who negotiated the Dominican receivership,
asserted that the "practical effect" of the treaty was to
give the United States a position analagous to that of
43England in Egypt. President Roosevelt explained the
logic of the treaty in a series of messages and speeches in
1905. The treaty benefitted Americans, foreigners, and the
Dominicans themselves; the only groups opposed to it were
dishonest creditors and "professional revolutionists." The
president assured the Senate that "this international duty
will be performed by us within our own sphere, in the
interest not merely of ourselves, but of all other nations,
44and with strict justice for all."
The administrations of William Howard Taft and Woodrow 
Wilson continued to conduct their policy on the assumption 
that, as Secretary of State Philander Knox testified in 
1912, "we are in the eyes of the world and because of the 
Monroe Doctrine, held responsible for the order of Central 
America. . . . "45 Taft and Knox tried unsuccessfully to 
replicate the Dominican receivership arrangement in Honduras 
and Nicaragua, but the Senate blocked these initiatives. 
Nevertheless, the Taft-Knox "dollar diplomacy" rested 
explicitly on the principle that American financial 
supervision and private American capital held the key to
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stability in the Caribbean.
Despite their anti-imperialist sympathies, Woodrow
Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan did not
repudiate the Roosevelt Corollary and the de facto American
protectorate in the Caribbean. They in fact added a new
dimension to American trusteeship and took it to its logical
conclusion. Wilson came to the White House determined to
reverse the Taft-Knox policy of "dollar diplomacy," but this
did not mean the renunciation of trusteeship or the
trusteeship Weltanschauung. Both Wilson and Bryan supported
the expansion of "legitimate" American enterprise and,
perhaps more than their Republican predecessors, placed a
premium on the existence of order, stability, and efficiency
46m  the western hemisphere. They also agreed that the 
United States must, for the interests of all concerned, 
accept responsibility for the existence of such conditions.
Wilson and Bryan sought to strengthen American control 
in the Caribbean basin and make it a powerful instrument for 
progress and stability. Contemporaries and historians 
dubbed Wilson's Latin American policy one of moral or 
missionary imperialism, a policy of aggression clothed in a 
veneer of idealism and altruism. More than any other 
statesmen, Wilson and Bryan drew a distinction between 
"imperialism" and a policy of selfless assistance and 
trusteeship, and used this distinction to justify the 
latter. As one apostle of Wilson's Latin American policy 
wrote, "moral imperialism" was in no way related to
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
2 2 0
"material imperialism." Moral imperialism sought merely "to
summon to the obedience of the cardinal principle of
civilization peoples who have been made wretched by their
disobedience; to constrain the foolish to the wisdom of the
just; to subjugate them, not to our will, but to the
ordinary civic virtues. . . . "  America's moral empire did
not seek "perpetuity for itself; it will have become
47perfect only when it shall become unnecessary." "Moral 
imperialism," essentially a euphemism for trusteeship, 
similarly derived its legitimacy from promises of eventual 
"graduation."
"Imperialism" was synonymous with "dollar diplomacy," 
the machinations of unscrupulous governments and "interests" 
against helpless peoples. Wilson determined to abolish 
dollar diplomacy, to displace foreign capital in the 
Caribbean, and make the United States the omnipotent force 
of good in the region. William Jennings Bryan lobbied 
unsuccessfully for an ambitious plan to put teeth into this 
"Wilson Doctrine." Bryan proposed that the United States 
government float low-interest loans to indebted Caribbean 
states, thereby allowing them to escape their creditors and 
regain their stability, and, in the process, insure American 
security. The United States would be in the position of a 
"Good Samaritan," "helping those who have fallen among 
thieves," and, incidentally, "make absolutely sure our 
domination of the situation." Through its generosity and 
selflessness, the United States would gain "increased
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influence" which it could wield to "prevent revolutions,
promote education, and advance stable and just 
48government." The interests of the civilized world, the 
United States, and the Caribbean nations coincided.
This attitude carried important implications for 
American dealings with the Caribbean states. Since the 
United States sought to protect and assist these states, 
they had no rational, or acceptable, cause for resisting 
American will. The ward could not, in other words, reject 
the guidance of the trustee. When states did resist, the 
Wilson administration escalated its pressure and, in several 
cases, invaded and occupied Caribbean states. Most notable 
was the military occupation and de facto rule of the entire
island of Hispaniola, beginning with Haiti in 1915 and the
. . . . 49Dominican Republic m  1916.
The influence of trusteeship on the Wilson 
administration was most evident in its policy toward Haiti, 
which culminated in a twenty-year occupation. Worried about 
Haiti's foreign debt and the spectre of German action 
against the island, William Jennings Bryan tried in 1913 to 
secure American influence in Haiti by purchasing its most 
valuable harbor and by negotiating a loan agreement and 
customs receivership. The Haitians spurned these overtures; 
at the same time, Haitian politics entered a cycle of 
instability and violence.
Wilson grew impatient and demanded that the Haitians 
accept American assistance. Ultimately he instructed Bryan
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to tell the Haitians that the United States "will not take
50no for an answer." Wilson and Bryan's successor, Robert 
Lansing, confessed that the United States did not have "the 
legal authority to do what we apparently ought to do." that 
American demands were "nothing less than high-handed" and 
"more or less an exercise of force and an invasion of 
Haytian independence." But both men appealed to expedience 
and predicted that "the better element of the Haytien 
people" would approve of measures designed to rescue their 
country from "anarchy and disorder."51 In September 1915, 
after the particularly gruesome murder of the latest Haitian 
president, U. S. troops landed and, with the help of a 
pliant new president, dissolved the assembly and promulgated 
a treaty that gave the U. S. the authority it desired.
The 1915 treaty governed Haitian-American relations 
until 1936. In theory the Haitian government was fully 
independent and sovereign, but in reality the government 
consisted of a succession of collaborator presidents who 
followed the dictation of a host of American "advisers" 
without significant input from elected officials. From 1915 
to 1922 the U. S. Marines were the dominant force in the 
country? they suppressed insurrections, trained a native 
constabulary, and carried out a wide variety of reforms and 
improvements stipulated in the treaty.
The occupation of Haiti and, to a lesser degree, of the 
Dominican Republic, was an anomaly in the annals of American 
interventionism in the Caribbean. While the United States
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still avoided assuming sovereignty over the island, it 
violated its customary "least cost" policy in the region and 
became formally responsible for regenerating Haitian 
society. This was in part attributable to circumstances, in 
part to the Wilsonian emphasis on "service" and "democracy," 
and in part to American perceptions of Haiti.
While Americans held all of the Caribbean nations in
some contempt, "Santo Domingo" held a unique mystique and
posed a special challenge. Journalist William Bayard Hale,
who later reported to Woodrow Wilson on conditions in
Mexico, declared Haiti "an offense in the nostrils of
humanity" and "a reproach to the civilized neighbor who has
suffered it to sink into utter degeneracy." While poverty
and filth repelled progressive era Americans, race was
undoubtedly the primary reason for the fascination with
Hispaniola. Hale's analogy between Haiti and "the life of
Central Africa and the Australian bush" was typical and 
52significant. American officials, including Secretary of 
State Lansing and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels,
drew parallels between Haiti and Africa, and between
. . . 53
occupied Haiti and the post-Civil War American South.
The military officers who implemented American policy 
in Haiti shared the perception of Haiti as a backward 
country requiring thorough regeneration. They sincerely 
believed that America's mission would benefit "civilization" 
and the Haitian people as well as the United States. "We 
were embued [sic] with the fact that we were trustees of a
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large estate that belonged to minors," Major Smedley
Darlington Butler later testified. The Marines believed
"that the Haitians were our wards and that we were
endeavoring to develop and make for them a rich and
productive property, to be turned over to them at such a
time as our Government saw fit before the expiration of the 
54treaty." General Eli Cole, who commanded the Marines
during the first years of the occupation, insisted that
intervention was necessary "unless [the U. S. ] wanted to
allow what I think to be almost the richest part of the
globe to become an African jungle." The objective was to
"eliminate a state of chaos and replace it by a condition
wherein the Negro Republic of Haiti could continue to exist
as an independent state and exercise its own functions of 
55government."
Echoing the opinions of Lord Cromer and of American 
imperial proconsuls, the officers asserted that the 
occupation was in the best interests of the Haitian people. 
Cole stated explicitly that the Americans "had the interests 
[of the people] more at heart" than did the Haitian 
politicians, whom he dismissed as "a class which had its own 
morals." Smedley Butler, the Georgia soldier who trained 
the Haitian constabulary, similarly believed that the 
Marines had a paternalistic duty to the common Haitians 
against the Haitian creole elite. Butler divided Haitian 
society into two classes, "those who wore shoes" and those 
who did not. The shoeless class "you could absolutely
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trust." "Those that wore shoes I took as a joke," Butler 
testified.57
American policy in Haiti and in the Dominican Republic 
resembled American colonial trusteeship in the Philippines 
in that the United States obligated itself to do more than 
simply impose and maintain order. The task in Haiti was to
Cfl
create "a first class black man's country." As a quid
pro quo for American control, the Haitians requested a
59systematic program of economic modernization. The
occupation of Hispaniola featured attempts at reforms that
earlier and later U. S. interventions in the Caribbean
60
adeptly avoided. For instance, Admiral Thomas Snowden,
the most ambitious of the military governors of the
Dominican Republic, submitted in 1920 a list of reforms
necessary for the creation of a stable government in that
61country worthy of Leonard Wood. The reform programs
enacted what most statesmen acknowledged to be the
requisites of deep-seated stability.
The United States was, however, unwilling and unable to
realize this vision of an American-led regeneration of
Hispaniola. Beginning with the presidential election of
1920, Republican partisans and liberal activists mobilized
against the occupations. Much of this criticism was
strictly partisan; many congressmen in fact condemned the
militarist character of the occupation, but approved of its
6?
underlying objectives. American public opinion,
Dominican and Haitian restlessness, and the inadequacy of
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reforms under the occupation regimes compelled the United 
States to arrange premature withdrawals from the Dominican 
Republic in 1924 and from Haiti a decade later. Abandonment 
of the great experiment in Haiti proved more painful. The 
way it occurred illustrated the direction of America's 
Caribbean trusteeship in the 1920s. Reforms of the American 
regime in the wake of the 1921-22 Senate investigation 
quelled American criticism. But the political abuses of 
Haiti's collaborator president provoked public 
demonstrations in Haiti in 1929. President Herbert Hoover 
reacted by dispatching an investigating mission, chaired by 
former Philippines Governor General Cameron Forbes, to the 
island in 1930.
The report of the Forbes Commision was a strange
i
document, as much a theoretical justification for continued
colonial trusteeship in Haiti as it was a rationalization
for premature withdrawal. What reconciled these
contradictory messages was the admission that, under
existing circumstances, the United States mission in Haiti
could not succeed. The "implied obligation" of the mission,
according to the Forbes Commission, was "to try to broaden
the base of the articulate proletariat and thus make for a
sounder democracy" in Haiti, an objective very reminiscent
of the Republican interpretation of the American duty in the 
63Philippines. The occupation was, however, "brusque" and 
rife with racial prejudice that alienated the powerful 
creole elite. Forbes personally believed that there had
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been "great material progress" as a result of American rule, 
and favored continued American efforts to regenerate Haiti. 
But he and the commission affirmed what critics of the 
occupation had argued for a decade: that American officials
held the reins of the Haitian government too tightly and 
denied the Haitians the "practical apprenticeship" in 
self-government that true progress required. The 
occupation was, in other words, not enough of a "school" for 
the Haitians; American officials did not attempt to prepare 
the "race children" for their "graduation" day stipulated in 
the treaty.
The Forbes Commission freely admitted the failure of
the American mission in Haiti:
The commission is under no delusions as to what 
may happen in Haiti after the convocation of the 
elected legislative assembly and, to a greater 
extent, after the complete withdrawal of the 
United States forces. . . . The commission is not 
convinced that the foundations for democratic and 
representative government are now broad enough in 
Haiti. The educated public opinion and literate 
minority are so small that any government formed 
in these circumstances is liable to become an 
oligarchy. The literate few too often look to 
public office as a means of livelihood. Until the 
basis of political structure is broadened by 
education— a matter of years— the Government must 
necessarily be more or less unstable and in 
constant danger of political upheavals.
Forbes confided to another commission member that he was
"sure" that "the great bulk of the Haitian people, the rural
population," are not "going to be granted adequate
6 6protection" after the occupation ended. Although Forbes 
hoped for the devising of a less direct form of American
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control and assistance, the practical effect of the report 
was to facilitate the "Haitianization" of the bureaucracy 
and the gradual relaxation of American control, which ended 
in 1934.67
The occupation of Haiti thus ended— much as colonial 
rule in the Philippines was then ending— without having 
accomplished its declared purposes. The United States set 
loose a ward that it knew to be "immature," unable to care 
for itself, and likely to again become a charge upon the 
community. • The United States did not repudiate its 
responsibility to the community, but American statesmen did 
recognize their nation's limited power and desire to make 
the stability of backward nations absolute and enduring.
The Forbes Commission report revealed much about the 
policy of "disengagement" pursued by the Republican 
administrations of the 1920s. With the glaring exception of 
the 1926-7 intervention in Nicaragua and the subsequent 
"chase" of Augusto Sandino's rebel forces, the United States 
did back away from the interventionism of the previous 
twenty years. The Hoover administration essentially 
renounced the Roosevelt Corollary in 1930. "Disengagement" 
did not, however, mean that American statesmen had renounced 
trusteeship or came to believe that Latin American peoples 
must be allowed to put their own affairs in order without 
outside interference. The persistence of a trusteeship 
worldview and of the principles underlying the Roosevelt 
Corollary was evident in the ideas and policies of two of
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the primary architects of disengagement, Henry Stimson and 
Sumner Welles.
Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State at the time of the
Forbes Commission, became one of the leading apostles of a
less ambitious American program in the backward nations of
the Caribbean; he resurrected the posture and policies of
"restraint" that were the hallmarks of his law partner and
mentor, Elihu Root. Stimson reentered public service in the
1920s as a self-proclaimed "itinerant governmental
68
missionary to immature nations." Before he succeeded 
Leonard Wood as Governor General of the Philippines, Stimson 
served the Coolidge administration as U. S. representative 
on a commission to settle the long-standing border dispute 
between Chile and Peru, then as Coolidge's special 
representative in Nicaragua in 1927. In the latter 
capacity, Stimson negotiated the Peace of Tipitapa, paving 
the way for new elections in Nicaragua, the gradual 
withdrawal of American troops, and the end to Coolidge's 
most embarrassing foreign policy debacle. As Herbert 
Hoover's Secretary of State, Stimson inaugurated a policy of 
restraint. He reversed the Wilsonian policy of refusing to 
recognize Latin American governments that came to power by 
force (except where the 1923 Central American treaty 
dictated non-recognition), resurrected Elihu Root's 
interpretation of the Platt Amendment, and even renounced
the use of force to protect American property in the
69interior of Nicaragua.
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It is, however, far from accurate to conclude that
these actions reflected a laissez faire attitude toward
Latin America. Stimson's desire was simply to reduce the
cost of America's commitment in the region. Stimson neither
counseled nor practiced abstention. Furthermore, his
restraint grew not from confidence in Latin peoples to
progress without assistance or from a philosophical respect
for national sovereignty, but from a fatalistic attitude
toward the destiny of Latin peoples. Stimson believed in
the influence of inherent racial differences. He noted the
difficulty of holding South American states to the terms of
peace treaties in part because their peoples were "really
only semi-civilized and contain a large infusion of Indian 
70
blood."
After the completion of his mission to Nicaragua, 
Stimson wrote of the need for continuing American 
involvement in that country and throughout the region of the 
Panama Canal. The "landmarks" 6f American policy in the 
area included the legitimate and indisputable interest in 
all those countries as far south as Panama. Stimson 
restated the fundamental trusteeship assumption that closer 
world communications compelled the United States to use its 
influence "to help [its neighbors] in the better performance 
of all those activities and responsibilities upon which the 
maintenance of independence and of world peace so largely 
depend."71 America's "isthmian policy" gave the United 
States "a very special interest as to how certain ones of
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
2 3 1
these nations fulfill the responsibilities which go with
sovereignty and independence."72
Stimson declared "scrupulous regard" for the
sovereignty and independence of Latin American states to be
another landmark of United States policy. But in common
with Wilson, Bryan, and others, Stimson believed that total
abstention from the internal affairs of other nations was
not in reality the best expression of respect for their
independence. Occasionally, outside interference was
necessary to insure continued independence. Stimson
considered the United States the protector of Latin
Americans' independence, "not only against Europe, but
73sometimes even against themselves." Stimson advocated
public and private technical assistance to and supervision
74of Nicaragua and other backward countries. Privately,
Stimson advocated much more. He urged President Coolidge to
continue American supervision of customs collection and
indeed to extend the receivership to control the expenditure
of public funds. He also desired to continue American
supervision of elections beyond the 1928 election (as
stipulated in the Peace of Tipitapa) as a "means for gradual
political education of Nicaraguans in self-government
75through free elections."
Stimson apparently grew disillusioned over the 
inability of the United States to reform Latin American 
politics. He continued to believe that the U. S. must exert 
its influence in Central America, an area coincidentally the
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most vital to American interests and the least stable in 
Latin America. But by the time he became Secretary of
State, Stimson abandoned his hopes for transforming
• 76Caribbean nations into genuinely democratic states.
Stimson1s priority was clearly (as it probably always was)
the establishment of order and stability. Thus the
Secretary of State resisted appeals from his Ambassador in
Cuba to pressure Cuban dictator Gerardo Machado to step down
or hold national elections at the constitutionally appointed
intervals. Stimson held firm in his belief that, since
Machado was popular with the Army and was successful in
"controlling his position," there was no need to intervene
in Cuban politics. During his briefings with the officials
of President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt, Stimson confessed
that he "did not approve of Machado or what he was doing,
but at least he was able to hold that country safe and
77suppress revolutions."
Stimson's willingness to scale down American meddling 
in the internal affairs of Caribbean states coincided in 
other words with a loss of faith in America's capacity for 
inducing reform. Never much of a social engineer or 
visionary, Stimson advocated internal reforms only so far as 
they were necessary to bring the stability necessary to 
protect American and foreign interests. At times the United 
States could best achieve this through coercion and 
supervision, and at other times by simply leaving Latin 
peoples to govern themselves in their own flawed manner.
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The only constant was that the United States held the
implied ultimate right to do whatever was necessary to save
the Caribbean nations from themselves.
Historians usually acknowledge that Stimson and Hoover
established the foundations of the "Good Neighbor Policy" of
the 1930s and 1940s, but credit State Department veteran
Sumner Welles with being its chief architect. But before he
came to believe that all forms of military and political
intervention in Latin America were counterproductive, Welles
spent a decade trying to prove that limited intervention was
the best expression of America's hemispheric
78responsibilities.
The basic assumption of Welles's blueprint for Latin
American policy during the 1920s and early 1930s was that it
was neither possible nor responsible for the United States
to ignore the internal affairs of its neighbors. He
bitterly condemned Henry Stimson's reversal of Wilson's
non-recognition policy. Stimson's recognition of de facto
governments bred instability because it lent support to
regimes that thwarted the popular will, and, hence,
79guaranteed further revolutions. The basic premises of
American policy were that political turmoil in Latin America
retarded economic development and "has repercussions in the
welfare of other nations." Since the stability of Latin
America was in American interests, United States policy must
80promote Latin American stability.
Amidst increasingly vocal protests against U. S. policy
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in the Caribbean, Welles in 1924 wrote one of the most
notable efforts to distinguish American interventionism from
"imperialism." The fundamental American objective in the
hemisphere was "to strengthen the foundations of
constitutional and stable government, to develop legitimate
commercial relations, and, by demonstration and friendly
advice, to further the settlement by peaceful methods of
81international disputes." The United States no longer
exercised "material influence" or practiced "dollar
diplomacy" in Latin America. Instead, the United States,
since 1913, promoted stability through electoral reforms,
treaties between Central American states, and economic
development. "Imperialism is not furthered by the
strengthening of moral influence of this Government in Latin 
82America." "Imperialism," in Welles's typically Wilsonian 
nomenclature, meant economic exploitation and militarism.
Welles conceded that the military occupation of the 
Dominican Republic had been a mistake, but a mistake since 
rectified. He refused, however, to condemn the continuing 
occupation of Haiti. It was not a strictly legal 
occupation, but, "from the practical standpoint," the 
occupation had substituted "the benefits of civilization 
(without the impairment of ultimate sovereignty) for a 
condition of anarchy and chaos. . . " Regardless of its 
abuses, the occupation could prove justifiable if it 
succeeded in rescuing Haiti from its suicidal national 
course.83 With a narrow definition of "imperialism" and a
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devotion to a "higher law" than that of strict legality, 
Welles found little difficulty in making the ends justify 
the means.
By the late 192 0s, Welles seemed to have second 
thoughts about this enthusiastic defense of U. S. policy.
In his 1928 study of the Dominican Republic, Welles 
criticized interventionism and posited a new "constructive" 
policy. But Welles's suggestions were hardly a declaration 
of abstention. What he condemned about earlier 
interventions was the tendency to heavy-handedness, and the 
consistent failure to live up to the ideals of social and
cultural tolerance that Elihu Root set forth in his April
. . . . . 841900 instructions to the Taft Philippine Commission. Yet
in even stronger language, Welles asserted that the United 
States must not stand aloof and allow the internal causes of 
unrest— which might necessitate full-scale American 
intervention— to accumulate. The objective was to take 
preventive measures so that military intervention would not 
be necessary. The United States could, through mutually 
advantageous commercial ties, legitimate investment, and 
assistance in educational development, insure the stability 
of Caribbean states without resorting to direct 
intervention. Welles continued to urge this policy on his 
old family friend and future president, Franklin
Q C
Roosevelt.
During the most infamous episode of his diplomatic 
career, the 1933 mission to Cuba, Welles sought to translate
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the "constructive" policy into effective action. Instead,
the episode revealed to Welles and to the administration the
ease with which preventive involvement escalated once the
United States claimed even minimal responsibility for Cuban
affairs. Welles travelled to Havana to find a solution to
the impasse between President Machado and his increasingly
hostile opponents. The instructions from Secretary of State
Cordell Hull (which Welles probably wrote) urged that he
take measures designed "to prevent the necessity of 
8 6intervention." Welles directed his efforts at inducing
Machado to allow genuinely free elections in 1934, and at
that time to step down as president. True to his Wilsonian
principles, Welles believed that true stability required a
government that ruled with popular approval. A constructive
policy apparently required the United States to rid foreign
governments of leaders who could no longer claim popular 
87support.
This reasoning was at the heart of Welles's subsequent 
personal involvement in Cuban politics. A general strike 
against Machado in August 1933 convinced Welles that Machado 
must go. Welles met with the man who served as the Chief of 
Staff of the Cuban Army and as Secretary of War and 
developed a successful plan whereby Machado took a voluntary 
"leave of absence" and passeed the reins of government 
ultimately into the hands of a cabinet officer, Dr. Carlos 
Manuel de Cespedes. The accession of Cespedes to the 
presidency in mid-August 1933 was a personal triumph for
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Sumner Welles, but it was to be a transitory triumph. 
Continued civil unrest compelled Cespedes to declare martial 
law, and, within several weeks, Welles himself concluded 
that Cespedes could not govern effectively.
But before Welles could develop a new plan calling for 
election of a new president and stabilizing the regime with 
trade concessions, noncommissioned officers of the Cuban 
Army took matters into their own hands. In a coup on 
September 5th, they replaced the Cespedes government with a 
five-man junta, which soon appointed a university professor, 
Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin, as provisional president. Welles 
believed that the Grau regime was both unconstitutional and 
intolerably radical. He convinced his own government not to 
recognize Grau, a policy that carried important political 
and economic implications. American opposition to Grau 
precipitated a January 1934 coup that replaced Grau with a 
president more acceptable to the United States.
Welles's opposition to Grau revealed his conception of 
America's duty to, and its consequent rights in, Cuba. The 
United States, he believed, had an obligation to save the 
Cubans from themselves. Welles believed Grau to be a 
usurper who did not have the support of the populace or of 
the educated and politically able classes. The Grau 
government consisted mostly of "self-serving, small caliber 
politicians" and "fuzzy-minded theorists who have neither 
the training, the experience, nor the capacity to govern." 
The United States had an obligation to the Cuban people, he
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wrote a skeptical critic, "not to assist in saddling upon
them for an indefinite period a government which every
responsible element in the country violently opposed, and
which is opposed today by the laboring classes and by the
farmers, as well as by the political parties and by the
8 8business interests."
Having decided what kind of government the Cubans 
supposedly wanted, or, at least, what was best for them, 
Welles felt justified in taking extreme measures to achieve 
it. For a few short, panic-stricken days following the fall 
of Cespedes, Welles expanded his constructive policy to 
allow for limited military intervention. In order to put 
the constitutional (Cespedes) government back in power, the 
United States should lend "a police force to the legitimate 
Government of Cuba for a comparatively brief period." He 
equated the landing of a small contingent of U. S. Marines 
with "the facilitating of a loan. In that case we would 
lend the Cubans police and in the other money, neither of 
which they possess." Welles explained to an incredulous 
Hull that the principle behind this proposal was that since 
"the necessity of full intervention on our part is to be 
avoided at all hazards, the limited and restricted form of 
intervention above outlined would be infinitely 
preferable.1,89
While this suggestion was certainly an aberration from 
Welles's usual policy, the decision-making process that led 
him to it was not inexplicable. Welles and those who shared 
his Wilsonian outlook tried to draw a fine, perhaps
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artificial, line between legitimate and illegitimate 
intervention, between "imperialism" and moral influence. 
Welles depended heavily on the free cooperation of affected 
nations to make these distinctions clear. When Latin 
American governments admitted their problems and their 
inevitable dependence on the United States and invited 
American economic assistance or political advice, 
"imperialism" was clearly an unwarranted accusation.
Explicit and unanimous consent from any government was, 
however, extremely rare. Thus the United States invariably 
found itself having to decide what elements represented the 
legitimate voice of the people. Then, in order to make its 
decision and subsequent policy effective, it must ensure 
that the legitimate voice predominated.
Sumner Welles tried to operate within an assumed 
hemispheric order in which Latin Americans voluntarily 
recognized American hegemony if America recognized the 
sanctity of their "ultimate sovereignty," and abided by a 
set of rules prohibiting exploitation and oppression. He 
believed, with Elihu Root, that the Latin Americans would be 
willing to sit at the feet of Gameliel if Gameliel would not 
kick and bat them. For Welles, Root, Wilson, and most other 
prominent voices of U. S. Latin American policy of the era, 
America's declaration of hegemony in the hemisphere was not 
in itself offensive. The right of the United States to be 
trustee in the hemisphere was a function of geography, of 
the consent of the "civilized" world, and the political
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incapacity of the Caribbean peoples.
Ill
The United States maintained a similar trusteeship 
posture toward Mexico, the origins of which long antedated 
the Roosevelt Corollary. A half-century before the 
enunciation of the Roosevelt Corollary, President James 
K. Polk remarked that because of Mexico's importance to the 
United States, the United States could never "become 
indifferent to her fate." This inevitable and persistent 
concern with Mexico's affairs became the Leitmotif of 
American policy, especially during the turmoil of the 
Mexican Revolution. A brief examination of divergent 
American reactions to the revolution between 1910 and 1920 
reveals the influence of the trusteeship Weltanschauung and 
brings several aspects of U. S. trusteeship in Latin 
America into sharper focus.
The Mexican Revolution erupted in 1910 and ended the 
thirty-four year reign of dictator-president Porfirio Diaz. 
Power ultimately devolved upon revolutionary leader 
Francisco Madero. Madero failed to crush the reactionary 
forces and to win the loyalty of the agrarian reform 
elements under Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata, and soon 
found his government under attack. Early in 1913, General 
Victoriano Huerta, Madero's erstwhile ally against a
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full-scale counterrevolutionary threat, staged a coup of his 
own and deposed Madero. In place of the reformist president 
Madero, Mexico had a "strongman" of the Diaz type. This was 
the state of affairs in Mexico when Woodrow Wilson became 
President of the United States in 1913.
Few American statesmen doubted that the United States 
had a legitimate concern with Mexico's internal turmoil.
The United States was ultimately accountable to the 
civilized world for conditions in Mexico and, therefore, had 
a right to intervene to prevent the revolution from becoming 
in effect too revolutionary. Beneath this superficial 
consensus lay a significant schism within policymaking 
policymaking circles over the proper American posture toward 
revolutionary Mexico. Woodrow Wilson and his disciples grew 
sympathetic with the revolution— which they believed Huerta 
had betrayed— and insisted on America's right and duty to 
support it and steer it in a safe and "constructive" 
direction. The United States was trustee for its own 
interests and those of European nations, but was also 
trustee for the best interests of Mexico itself. America 
could best fulfill its obligations by offering its wisdom 
and guidance. An opposing interpretation of American 
trusteeship responsibilities disdained guidance and constant 
interference in Mexican affairs. Instead, the United States 
should simply encourage and support any Mexican ruler 
capable of providing the order and access that were the real 
objectives of American trusteeship.
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Underlying this latter approach were attitudes and
assumptions that had governed U. S. Mexican policy
throughout the long and relatively placid reign of Porfirio
Diaz. The official American support of Diaz and the
subsequent widespread desire for "Diaz type" ruler were in
many ways the most revealing aspects of American trusteeship
in Mexico. Porfirio Diaz was in effect a surrogate American
trustee. American statesmen hailed Diaz for the same
reasons they hailed a Lord Cromer, and deferred to him as
they deferred to British rule in many areas of the world and
to Spanish rule in Cuba for most of the nineteenth century.
Diaz was seen as the archetypical "enlightened despot,"
using the strong hand of coercion and force to bring a
backward country into the modern world. A critic of the
Diaz regime argued that, "Every defense of Diaz is an attack
on the Mexican people. It must be so, since there is no
other conceivable defense of despotism except that people
are so wicked that they cannot be trusted to take care of 
91themselves." This was precisely the American view of 
Mexico and Diaz. While his admirers conceded that Diaz was 
a tyrant and had not gone far enough in educating the people
before his fall, they defended his priorities by citing the
. . 92racial and political degradation of the Mexican masses.
Diaz, like Cromer, was the "ideal trustee," doing 
better for the people than they could or would do for 
themselves. Diaz maintained the same relationship— and for 
the same reasons— with the Mexican people that the United
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States did with the Filipinos, Haitians, and other dependent
peoples. The Diaz regime wisely scorned idealistic
doctrines such as the present capacity of all peoples for
orderly self-government, and, instead, worked to lay the
economic foundations of a modern state. He satisfied the
legitimate interests of America and other civilized states
by bringing Mexico into what one historian labelled the
93"industrial-creditor order." He thus made direct and 
preemptive American intervention in Mexico unnecessary, and 
allowed the United States to pursue a "passive" trusteeship 
policy. Creating a modern Mexican state also served the 
interests of the Mexican people, creating a "trickle-down" 
effect, and laying the necessary foundation for the growth 
of democracy. Diaz, in short, fulfilled all those things 
that the United States would have done had it accepted 
direct responsibility for Mexico. Indeed, there was a close 
correlation between America's desire to avoid such a 
responsibility and the widespread support and exalted praise 
for Diaz.
After the long-dreaded fall of Diaz, most of his 
American supporters indulged in ceremonial breastbeating, 
publicly acknowledging Diaz's "sins" and the "morals" of his 
reign and fall. But they continued to believe that that 
only an indigenous enlightened despot could establish the 
necessary stability in Mexico. U. S. Ambassador to Mexico, 
Henry Lane Wilson, led the chorus of voices calling for the 
ascension of another Diaz. Wilson praised Diaz's
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"evolutionary" philosophy and denounced Madero's 
"idealistic" efforts to impose modern democracy upon "an 
illiterate nation clothed only with the superficial
Q A
vestments of modern civilization." Wilson fabricated and
altered reports about conditions in Mexico in order to
convince Taft to oppose the Madero regime, and he was
personally implicated in abetting Huerta's coup that
95resulted in Madero's murder. Ambassador Wilson tried
unsuccessfully to convince newly-inaugurated President
Wilson to recognize Huerta and to thus reestablish a strong
hand in Mexico. The United States must, he wrote Secretary
of State Bryan in March 1913, facilitate the restoration of
a figure able to maintain order and discharge its
international obligations, "without being especially
particular as to whether its character is in accordance with
9 6our ideas of genuine democratic institutions." President 
Wilson ignored the Ambassador's advice, and embarked upon a 
two-year personal campaign to depose Huerta, the usurper.
The reaction of a large segment (mostly Republican) of 
American official opinion to events in Mexico and to Woodrow 
Wilson's policy illustrated again how the support of 
surrogates could satisfy the trusteeship Weltanschauung. 
Critics of Woodrow Wilson argued that America's primary 
interest and responsibility in Mexico was the restoration of 
order and the protection of life and property. The United 
States should not, as Wilson was intent on doing, 
destabilize Mexico and endanger foreign lives and property
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• 97by trying to promote the development of democracy. Men
in this camp agreed with Henry Lane Wilson that supporting
Huerta was the wisest policy. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge,
who in 1898 argued that the United States could not allow a
Tagalog oligarchy to rule the Philippines, wrote in March
1913:
I hope [the Mexicans] have got a man now [Huerta] 
of the Diaz type who will do sufficient 
throat-cutting to restore peace. That seems an 
unpleasant thing to say but it is apparently 
impossible to maintain order or any approach to 
decent government in Mexico on any other 
terms.11
Lodge confessed distaste for Huerta's methods, but concluded
in a classic example of self-serving relativism that "they
99are Mexican methods. . . . "
Clearly, for Lodge and many of his fellow Republican 
statesmen, order was paramount, and the virtue of a 
dictatorship depended on its ability to maintain order and 
protect and facilitate western economic penetration. 
Conversely, relativism and gradualism could either support a 
laissez faire attitude toward the government of developing 
countries or provide a pretext for taking control and 
substituting benevolent tutelage for indigenous 
dictatorships. It was neither necessary nor profitable for 
the United States to exercise colonial trusteeship in 
Mexico. Diaz or a "Diaz type" could perform the same 
functions as a William Howard Taft or a Leonard Wood.
When it became clear that Woodrow Wilson would not 
recognize Huerta's "bloody" regime and Mexico slipped into a
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full-scale civil war, Republicans advocated limited American 
intervention designed to maintain order and, hopefully, 
facilitate the creation of a new, untainted authoritarian 
government. Henry Lane Wilson appealed to America's duty 
"as a civilized nation, pledged to the world to preserve the 
peace and order of the hemisphere," and to clean up its own 
"back yard."100 Wilson championed a plan whereby the 
United States would intervene in Mexico, police the area as 
far south as the twenty-second parallel, and even transform 
that region into an independent buffer state under American 
supervision.101
The positions of Woodrow Wilson and his critics were by
no means mutually exclusive. They agreed on important
assumptions concerning American trusteeship responsibilities
in Mexico. Wilson and Bryan recognized America's duty to
insure the safety of American and European life and property
in Mexico and, indeed, went to great diplomatic lengths to
102discharge this duty. Wilson and Bryan also desired 
stability and prosperity in Mexico, and believed that the 
United States had a responsibility to help Mexico achieve 
those conditions, even if it meant imposing America's will 
on that country. They believed that the United States "must 
practically speak for the rest of the world in Mexico," as 
it did throughout Latin America. The United States had "the 
consent of mankind" to act as "Mexico's nearest friend and 
intimate adviser."103
But the Wilsonians interpreted America's duty as
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trustee in and for Mexico to require the initiation of a new 
policy. Wilson aimed his denunciation of ’’dollar diplomacy” 
not only at the American and foreign capitalists who 
exploited helpless nations, but also at the selfish, venal 
leaders Latin leaders who colluded with foreigners to 
oppress their own peoples. The presence of Victoriano 
Huerta thus posed an immediate challenge to Wilson's 
determination to rid Latin America of unscrupulous 
leaders.104 Consequently, Wilson opposed the Republican 
solution of merely supporting another Diaz. He astutely 
argued that such a superficial solution failed to address 
the fundamental causes of revolution in Mexico.
Wilson's principled opposition to Huerta soon turned 
into a sympathy with the Mexican revolution itself. The 
Wilson administration escalated the pressure on the Huerta 
regime, landing troops at Vera Cruz in 1914 and occupying 
that city for six months. Primarily because of the extreme 
opposition from the opposition Constitutionalist Party, 
Huerta resigned in July 1914. Then Wilson sought to find 
and support a cooperative leader among the revolutionary 
factions vying for control of the central government. After 
flirting with Pancho Villa, Wilson reluctantly cast his lot 
with Constitutionalist "First Chief" Venustiana Carranza who 
acceded to the presidency in 1915.
Wilson's position rested on the insight that simply 
encouraging "order" in backward countries was not an 
adequate fulfillment of American trusteeship. More
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precisely, Wilson and his followers redefined "order” to 
mean more than the exercising of a "strong hand." Wilson 
employed the much-discussed "lessons" of the fall of
Porfirio Diaz. As the editors of The Outlook commented,
. . . . . 105"Stability founded on absolutism is impermanent." The
United States had a responsibility to foster the growth of
constitutional government in Mexico and throughout Latin
America. The Wilson administration made this the central
objective of its policy. In the famous August 1914
interview with journalist Samuel Blythe, Wilson declared
that he was primarily concerned with "the submerged
eighty-five percent" of the Mexican people. No government
that denied the exercise of self-government or failed to
improve the common people was acceptable. The basic fact
was that the "old order is dead." There must be an end to
foreign exploitation, and an equitable settlement of the
problems of land reform and peonage in Mexico. Wilson
denounced those who appealed for order. These cries were in
reality subterfuges for the "benefit of the old-time regime"
106and for "the vested interests."
Walter Hines Page, Wilson's Ambassador to the Court of 
St. James, articulated the tenets of this "new" American 
policy. Page was an anglophile and "progressive 
imperialist" who sponsored a plan for bringing the divided 
European states together in a joint venture to control and 
develop the "waste spaces" of the world for the benefit of 
all. In this vein, he initially favored American, even
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joint western intervention in Mexico "to reduce this
107turbulent scandal of a country to order." In subsequent 
months, Page changed his rhetoric and tried to reduce 
"order" to a four-letter word. "I've been writing the 
President that the Englishman has a mania for order, order 
for order's sake and for trade," Page wrote Colonel Edward 
House in November 1913. "He has reduced a large part of the 
world to order. He is the best policeman in creation; and 
he has the policeman's ethics. Talk to him about character 
as a basis of government or about a moral basis of 
government in an outlying country, he'll think you 
daft."108
Page wrote repeatedly of the British inability to
understand or appreciate Wilson's and America's enlightened
policy. But Page also made it clear that America's scheme
for regenerating Mexico would proceed regardless of Mexican
opposition or instability. Page supported armed American
intervention as a means to carry out its beneficent program.
He boasted that, unlike the British, who could only shoot
men to subjugate them, the United States would "shoot men
into self-government." Because of the incompetence and
disloyalty of Mexico's stubborn leaders, "We shall have to
109Cuba-ize the country— which means thrashing 'em first."
Indeed, the essence of Woodrow Wilson's posture toward 
revolutionary Mexico was that the United States knew and 
wanted what was best for Mexico, and that the Mexicans (like 
the Haitians) could not resist America's will. Wilson
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coupled his sincere concern for the Mexicans' future with 
the veiled warning that the United States shall be "watching 
them narrowly and insisting that they shall take help when 
it is needed."110 Throughout the history of Wilson's 
dealings with Carranza and the Constitutionalists, Wilson 
was unable to convince or coerce the Mexicans to accept his 
conceptions of America's duty. Carranza consistently 
spurned Wilson's efforts to guide the course of the 
revolution. When Pancho Villa's renegades raided American 
border towns in early 1916, Wilson dispatched a punitive 
expedition into Mexico to pursue Villa. Carranza correctly 
perceived that the presence of this force was in part a 
lever intended to compel the Mexican government to guarantee 
protection of American and foreign life and property, and to 
continue preferential treatment of foreign enterprise in 
Mexico.111 According to Wilson's scheme, the Mexican 
revolution must occur within the limits of the 
"industrial-creditor order." Any other result would 
threaten American and European interests and doom Mexico to 
permanent backwardness.
Wilson's determination to influence the course of the 
Mexican revolution did not, however, arise only from 
American self-interest. Wilson and his subordinates also 
believed that the Mexican people and the Mexican leaders 
were neither competent nor mature enough to wisely manage 
their own affairs. Officials consistently described the 
Mexicans as a people in their "childhood," as "more like
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
2 5 1
children than men," and "children exercising all the
112privileges and rights of grown ups."
The Wilson Administration also championed the interests
of the Mexican people against the selfish interests of the
Mexican leaders. This was, of course, most pronounced
during Wilson's long battle of wills with Huerta. But, as
Carranza proved intractable and unwilling to follow the
American lead, American officials leveled accusations of
betrayal at the First Chief. The delegates to a 1916-17
conference seeking to iron out differences between the two
nations grew incensed at Carranza's resistance to proposals
designed to develop Mexico's resources. The American
delegates told the President in early 1917 that they
"eagerly searched for indications that the revolutionary
government was fulfilling the avowed purposes of its
platform," but saw only economic, political, and social
decay that brought "untold misery and suffering for the
113masses of people." The chairman of the delegation wrote 
with frustration that "if only Carranza would take advice 
his government could be saved and the revolution brought to 
such an issue as would be of great benefit to the people of 
Mexico."114
The United States, as trustees for the Mexican people 
and for the interests of the world in Mexico, must have a 
controlling voice in determining the fate of that country. 
Carranza and his successors rejected this reasoning, and 
insisted on directing the course of their own revolution.
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Consequently, tensions continued for the duration of 
Wilson's presidency and beyond.
V
There were essentially two dimensions of American 
trusteeship in the Caribbean and Mexico. The most 
fundamental was America's willingness to act as a trustee or 
mandatory for civilization within its own sphere of 
influence. By committing the United States to this role, 
American statesmen revealed their adherence to a more 
general vision of a world in which civilized states 
"organized" and policed backward areas. The other dimension 
of American trusteeship was the posture of the United States 
toward the states of the region. American policymakers 
arrogated to themselves the ability and duty to interpret 
and serve the best interests of the peoples of the various 
states. They assumed the kind of trustee role which Lord 
Cromer prescribed and which America's proconsuls employed in 
the Philippines. Because American trusteeship served a 
harmony of interests, the United States had an implied right 
to coerce and even force Latin American states to follow its 
demands.
The position of the United States as hemispheric 
trustee did not, however, require that the United States 
discharge its trusteeship in a consistent manner. In fact, 
geopolitical circumstances allowed the United States maximum
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flexibility in deciding how to discharge its obligations. 
Consequently, American policies covered the spectrum from 
essentially colonial rule to the most indirect means of 
control. The United States established temporary colonial 
regimes in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba, 
maintaining direct control of the governments and initiating 
programs of political and economic reform. At the other 
extreme, was America's "passive" trusteeship toward the Diaz 
regime in Mexico and the Good Neighbor Policy of the 1930s 
and 1940s. In those instances, American statesmen passively 
tolerated native dictators and facilitated the creation of 
indigenous forces of order. Such policies abdicated the 
supposed obligation to help backward peoples create modern 
democratic states, but they insured order and access without 
violating the sovereignty of independent states. The ideal 
form of American trusteeship in the Caribbean was a limited, 
often indirect control of the finance and administration of 
backward nations through treaties and financial 
receiverships. Through legal treaties with sovereign 
states, the United States secured the degree of supervision 
necessary for discharging its trusteeship responsibilities.
Trusteeship in U. S. Latin American policy came to mean 
temporary and limited supervision that consciously avoided 
extinguishing the de jure sovereignty of dependent states. 
American policymakers employed the term and the concept to 
indicate their respect for Latin American sovereignty. 
Indeed, trusteeship was a means for guaranteeing the formal
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sovereignty of Latin American states. The motivation behind
American trusteeship, observed The New Republic in 1915, was
that the sovereignty of troubled states, "instead of being
damaged by being placed in trust, may gradually be made more
115real and more valuable."
Nevertheless, the primary significance of trusteeship 
in U. S. Latin American policy was not as a means for 
preserving the formal sovereignty of other states. It was 
not even the concept of trusteeship that dictated that the 
United States avoid extinguishing the sovereignty of Latin 
American states. American statesmen scrupulously avoided 
annexing neighboring states because the costs of annexation 
far outweighed the benefits of formal control. Trusteeship 
and annexation were hardly incompatible. On the contrary, 
formal colonial control manifested the principles of 
trusteeship more clearly than did informal imperialism. 
Trusteeship was the renunciation of the "spirit" of 
"ownership," but it did not preclude literal ownership.
Trusteeship was most significant as the theoretical 
justification for a policy of interference and intervention. 
Self-preservation alone was probably sufficient cause for 
American interest and interference in the internal affairs 
of its neighbors. The trusteeship Weltanschauung and the 
triple mandate raised this concern and interference from an 
exercise of self-interest to the performance of a selfless 
obligation. Trusteeship was not an idle desire to see the 
sovereignty of neighboring states made more real and
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valuable, but the assertion that the United States had an 
implied right to take other nations' sovereignty "in trust" 
in order to make it more real and more valuable.
And, despite the claim that American trusteeship 
enhanced the sovereignty of its wards, American policy did 
not fulfill the ideal trusteeship objective of preparing 
nations for "graduation." American policy, especially 
during the occupations of Cuba and Hispaniola, did 
occasionally entail the tutelage of backward peoples, but 
the United States was usually unwilling to establish and 
always unable to maintain a full-scale "race school." The 
rapid termination of all of America's Caribbean occupations 
seemingly proved the sincerity of the promises of 
"graduation." But it is specious to assume that the mere 
termination of occupations constituted a "graduation." For 
one thing, the United States terminated occupations out of 
self-interest or because of external pressures. No American 
statesmen believed or claimed that the end of American rule 
meant that a ward had reached "maturity."
t
More importantly, the end of formal occupations, 
receiverships, and other forms of supervision did not end 
American trusteeship. American trusteeship transcended the 
episodic interventions and occupations, and amounted to what 
one observer termed a right of "contingent oversight."116 
The responsibility of the United States for affairs in the 
hemisphere and the right of the United States to supervise 
the affairs of its neighbors was essentially interminable.
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As long as American statesmen adhered to a policy based on 
the logic of hemispheric trusteeship, no state in the region 
could really ever graduate.
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CHAPTER VI 
TRUSTEESHIP AND THE AWAKENING OF CHINA
The relationship between the United States and China 
has long been shrouded in myth. For much of the twentieth 
century, Americans believed that a "special relationship" 
existed between the two countries. This belief was 
solidified in the 1930s and 1940s when the United States 
aided China in its struggle against Japan. According to 
American mythology, the United States has throughout the 
century pursued a uniquely benevolent policy toward China, 
protecting it from partition and domination by the other 
great powers, and assisting China on its long march into the 
modern world.
Recent historians have illustrated the realities of the 
Sino-American relationship. Historian Michael Hunt has 
concluded that the only thing special about the relationship 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the high 
degree of mutual enmity. The Chinese considered all 
foreigners "barbarians" and the Americans were no 
exceptions. Conversely, Americans had not always exhibited 
the kind of sympathy toward the Chinese later evoked by such 
popular books as Pearl Buck's The Good Earth. Based largely 
on their contact with Chinese coolies in the United States, 
Americans considered the Chinese "heathens" and hopeless 
degenerates. It is unlikely that even the belief in a 
special relationship could have developed had not the United
268
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States closed its doors once and for all to the despised 
Chinese immigrant in 1904.1
The most relevant and important point about the 
American relationship with and policy toward China between 
1898 and 1933 was that they existed within the parameters of 
a trusteeship outlook and posture. Americans viewed China
as a backward or, more accurately, a "stagnant" state
. . 2 requiring "regeneration." Although it boasted the oldest
continuing civilization in the world, China was a mere child
in the ways of the modern world. The relationship between
the United States and China was, therefore, not one between
equals, but of tutor to pupil, and of guardian to ward.
The fundamental principles of trusteeship were among 
the important assumptions underlying American policy toward 
China. Because China was reluctant to allow the access and 
apparently unable to provide the internal conditions that 
the interests of the United States and other commercial 
nations demanded, it had to yield to the partial control and 
interference of advanced states. The same reasoning 
justified foreign interference that was intended to 
transform China and to make it strong and competent enough 
to hold its own under modern world conditions. Such 
interference and compulsion was not only legitimate, it 
supposedly served the best interests of China by bringing it 
the blessings of western civilization and preserving it from 
foreign domination, and served the interests of the United 
States and other civilized nations in peace and prosperity
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in China.
There were obvious difficulties in translating 
Americans' trusteeship outlook into a policy of trusteeship. 
The United States could not impose control over China in the 
same ways that it had over the Philippines or in the 
Caribbean. Americans were unwilling and unable to exercise 
direct colonial control over a large state of some 400 
million people. Nor was the United States in a position to 
exercise a "contingent oversight" over China or keep China 
on "leading strings" as it did the states of the Caribbean. 
Far from being a natural mandatory for other civilized 
states in China, the United States was only one of many 
powers vying for control and influence.
American trusteeship in China took the form of limited 
and indirect control over Chinese affairs. Through rights 
acquired in a series of nineteenth-century treaties, the 
United States was one of several states exercising control 
over China's financial and administrative affairs. This 
control, along with leverage gained by lending China capital
J;
and advice, gave the United States a means by which it could 
maintain access into China and gradually transform China 
into a friendly western-style state.
This chapter examines the influence of trusteeship as a 
factor in the formulation of American China policy between 
the late 1890s and 1933. The first section explores the 
nineteenth-century background of American interests and
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interference in China, then illustrates the ways in which 
American policy between 1898 and 1915 manifested a 
trusteeship worldview. The second section examines the 
influence of trusteeship in American China policy between 
1915 and 1933, focusing on the dilemmas that adherence to a 
trusteeship worldview created for American policymakers.
I
The fundamental premise of America’s China policy was, 
as Charles Denby, formerly America’s Minister to China 
(1885-98), articulated it in 1906, that "no nation had the 
right to exclude itself against the intercourse with other
nations, that ports which nature provided could not be
3closed to the world." From this assumption arose the
conviction that the United States and other likeminded
civilized powers had the right to break down the barriers to
outside contact that China had tried to maintain.4
Furthermore, according to this reasoning, America and other
western powers had a right to compel China to alienate
temporarily to other states whatever part of its sovereignty
was necessary to carry on peaceful contact on western terms.
Those assumptions were the foundation of American
trusteeship in China.
The trusteehip outlook evolved along with an American
fascination with China that began early in American 
5history. The fabled commercial voyage of the "Empress of
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China" in 1784 whetted American appetites for fabulous 
profits in the China trade. In addition, the work of 
American missionaries and physicians beginning in the 1830s 
attracted attention to another kind of market in China: 
"heathens" to be saved and helped to live civilized 
Christian lives. Hopes for profitable trade and extensive 
missionary work in China confronted Chinese determination to 
restrict the access of foreign "barbarians" and confine them 
to a small segregated area on the Pearl River outside the 
city wall of Canton.
The British took the lead in breaking down restrictions 
to trade. Britain defeated China in the so-called "Opium 
War" of 1840-1842, and negotiated the Treaty of Nanking in 
1842. Among other things, the treaty gave the British the 
right to trade and reside inside Canton itself; allowed 
access to four additional ports along China's southeast 
coast; and fixed at a favorable rate China's tariff on 
goods imported from Britain. Exploiting the British 
breakthrough, the United States in 1844 negotiated the 
treaty of Wanghsia, which gave American merchants access to 
the same five "treaty ports" in southern and central China, 
fixed China's import tariff, and forbade changes in the 
tariff without mutual consent. The United States also 
gained for its citizens in China the right of 
extraterritoriality, that is, the right to be tried by 
American consular courts according to American law, thus 
exempting Americans in China from Chinese law. The British
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and American treaties, and a French treaty concluded between 
1842 and 1844, constituted the foundation of the first 
treaty system, which underlay virtually all foreign 
penetration of China for nearly a century.
A second set of treaties, concluded between 1858 and 
I860, expanded the treaty system. The British and the 
French in 1858 dispatched a force to punish the Chinese for 
allegedly failing to live up to the terms of the treaties. 
Following several skirmishes between Chinese and western 
forces, new treaties opened more treaty ports and created a 
British-supervised customs service to oversee the collection 
of Chinese tariff revenues. As in the first treaty 
settlement, the United States again took advantage of the 
British (and French) initiative and negotiated the treaty of 
Tientsin in 1858. This treaty opened more ports to American 
merchants, extended most-favored-nation status to the United 
States (thus securing for American commerce whatever 
advantages the Chinese subsequently granted to other foreign 
nations), and recognized the right of American missionaries 
to proselytize in China. United States participation in 
the treaty system provided American citizens with a 
substantial foothold in China. By the turn of the century, 
American merchants were doing business at 24 treaty ports 
and 14 other customs stations, and about one thousand 
American missionaries were preaching the gospels in
7
China.
The treaty privileges constituted the legal foundation
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of American and western imperialism in China for nearly a 
century. They gave western governments a role in 
determining China's tariff and de facto control over the 
collection of China's revenues. They further eroded Chinese 
sovereignty by exempting foreigners from Chinese law. The 
United States and other western powers were determined to 
retain the privileges until China could provide on its own 
what westerners considered an adequate system of government. 
Promises to surrender their treaty privileges gave western 
powers the leverage by which they could compel China to 
modernize its administration, develop its resources, and 
accept foreign assistance in doing those things.
In the later years of the nineteenth century, Americans 
became obsessed not only with access to China, but with 
hastening China's supposedly inevitable "awakening." This 
obsession had commercial and religious causes. Searching 
for new markets for their products, American merchants and 
industrialists cast their eyes on China and its more than
Q
400 million people. In order to realize the benefits of 
the mythical China market, it was first necessary to 
consciously foster a demand for American products. This 
could only be accomplished by raising China's standard of 
living and thus creating new wants and needs. "Civilizing" 
the Chinese people and developing China's natural resources 
became an essential dimension of exploiting the China 
market.
An increasing number of Christian missionaries in China
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reached the same conclusion. The missionary movement in the 
late nineteenth century responded enthusiastically to the 
challenge of Christianizing China. Missionaries, who were 
the primary source of American public information on China, 
believed that the "heathen” peoples of China could and must 
be civilized. While converting Chinese souls remained their 
paramount objective, missionaries concluded that the Chinese
must also embrace western civilization, moral and
9 . . . .material. Because of the intense economic and religious
interest, the prospect of China's awakening and its
implications for the United States became a leading topic of
discussion during the 1890s.
Not coincidentally, the 1890s also witnessed a series 
of events that made China the focus of international 
attention. The chain of events began when Japan, vying for 
a sphere of influence in Korea and southern Manchuria, 
defeated China in an 1894-5 war and stripped China of Taiwan 
and the Liaotung peninsula. Taking advantage of China's 
post-war vulnerability, Germany demanded and received its 
own political and economic concessions on the Shantung 
peninsula in 1897. Germany's action provoked a scramble for 
concessions in China among the European powers and Japan. 
Observers in the United States and Britain warned of the 
imminent "break up" of China.
The scramble for concessions brought to a boiling point 
the long-simmering Chinese resentment of foreign aggression. 
Anti-foreign hostility erupted in June 1900 in the Boxer
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Uprising, which resulted in the siege of the foreign 
legations in Peking and in the murder of several hundred 
foreigners and an even greater number of Chinese Christians. 
A multi-national expeditionary force relieved the siege and 
crushed the uprising, but the presence of foreign armies in 
China raised the spectre of a "partition frenzy."
The impact of the events of the late nineteenth century 
was evident both in public discussion of the China question 
and in America's diplomatic reaction. It was an article of 
faith among American observers that the awakening of China 
was to be the seminal event in "the century of the Pacific." 
It was not clear, however, whether the effect of China's 
awakening was to be for good or for ill. Foreign aggression 
in China and the violent Chinese reaction raised the 
possibility that China would awaken only to become an avowed 
enemy of western civilization. Paul Samuel Reinsch, a 
University of Wisconsin political scientist who later served 
as American Minister to China (1913-1919), warned in the 
wake of the Boxer Uprising that western aggression in China 
would create an army of "anarchistical revolutionaries" that 
"might even endanger the entire world."10 China's 
understandable reaction to western aggression would, Reinsch 
feared, preclude "the pacific fusion of Oriental and Western 
civilization in China," which he and other Americans 
desired.11
The central question of the new century, Alfred Thayer 
Mahan asserted in 1900, was "under what impulse, under the
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genius of what great race or what institutions is [China] to
arise and progress?" ' Most Americans, including Mahan,
believed that China must arise and progress under the
tutelage of Christian ideals and western institutions. The
danger was that a powerful and unenlightened state such as
Russia would gain control of China. Many Americans also
feared that a "one-sided" western impact on
China— disruptive material and technological changes without
the necessarily concomitant "moral forces"— could transform
China into a distorted and dangerous image of the West. As
Theodore Roosevelt noted in 1908, the West must "implant its
ideas in the Orient, in such a fashion as to minimize the
chance of a dreadful clash between two radically different
13and hostile civilizations."
The prospect of China turning against the West or 
falling under the control of a hostile power convinced many 
observers that the United States must play a more active 
role in the Orient. Men such as Mahan and Brooks Adams 
warned that the United States must be willing to use force 
to prevent China from falling under a malevolent 
influence.14 This conviction did not arise wholly from 
national self-interest. It became an article of faith that 
the United States was the only enlightened and 
"disinterested" power capable of protecting and nurturing 
China through its troubled formative years. John Barrett, 
former American Minister to Siam, wrote in 1900 that it was 
the duty of the United States to "exercise such influence
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over the mighty forces of China as will direct them along
channels that shall not be destructive to her and other 
15nations." This was an important and consistent 
assumption underlying American policy throughout the first 
third of the twentieth century.
While American statesmen were concerned more with the 
immediate and tangible effects of foreign aggression and 
Chinese reaction on American commercial opportunities, they 
also saw the necessity of a more assertive American role in 
the Orient. The events of 1895-1900 suggested that the 
treaty privileges were not sufficient to guarantee American 
access in China. The United States must also protect its 
trade from exclusive foreign spheres of influence. It was 
in this context that Secretary of State John Hay issued his 
famous "open door" notes in September 1899 and July 1900. 
Those notes asked the great powers to promise that they 
would not discriminate against foreign, specifically 
American, commerce within their spheres of influence, and 
would not infringe upon China's territorial (as distinct 
from administrative) integrity. Contrary to some historical 
interpretations, the open door policy did not commit the 
United States to preserve and defend China's territorial 
integrity. It was simply a revised statement of America's 
traditional interest in unrestricted access— the open 
door— into China.16
The open door policy had another dimension directly 
relevant for the study of trusteeship. American statesmen
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asserted the necessity of maintaining an open door not only 
against the great powers, but also against China itself.
The open door was intended not only to limit foreign 
domination of China, but sought, simultaneously, to compel 
China to become stable and efficient enough to keep its own 
doors open. One objective of the open door policy was to 
buy time so that China could become strong and stable enough 
to resist future threats to its territorial integrity, 
threats that endangered the open door to American commerce. 
The open door policy was, in other words, an expression of 
the traditional American desire for access to and order in 
backward areas.
The open door was not a declaration of or demand for 
abstention from interference in China's internal affairs.
On the contrary, American statesmen expected that China 
would seek foreign, specifically American, assistance in 
modernizing its administration, developing its resources, 
and doing all those things that were necessary to resist 
future foreign aggression. E. H. Conger, American Minister 
to China between 1898 and 1905, ridiculed the notion that 
the United States should leave China alone "with her 
inexhaustible resources of material and trade still 
undeveloped." It was very possible for the powers to agree 
to preserve China, he remarked to John Hay in 1898, but "to 
what end?"
If simply to preserve the old China without
possibility of material development or trade
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progress, then it is not worthwhile. But if real
progress is to be made, mines opened, railways
constructed, resources developed, markets created 
and business established, orientalism must 
effectually give way to occidentalism. . . . the 
sooner it comes the better for China, as well as 
for those who seek1her development and the trade 
which will follow.
The central focus of American trusteeship in China
during the entire period, 1898-1934, was the effort to
compel China to create a modern, efficient, western-style
government and economy. American statesmen believed that
the preservation of China's integrity (and, therefore, the
protection of American interests) was conditional upon
China's transformation into a viable modern state. William
W. Rockhill, the principal author of the first open door
note and Minister to China during Theodore Roosevelt's
administration, was the most notable exponent of the
two-tracked open door policy. He stated in 1901 that the
United States desired "a strong, independent, and
responsible Chinese Government, which can and will be held
accountable for the maintenance of order and the protection
of our citizens and the rights under the treaties." Such a
state could not exist without economic development and
18modern administration.
This policy of buying time for China with the 
expectation that China would put its own house in order had 
several implications for American trusteeship. It revealed 
the influence of a worldview which held that only stable, 
efficient states could exist independently in the modern 
world. Weakness and incompetence invited aggression which
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posed an intolerable threat to the security of all nations. 
Just as American statesmen believed that the United States 
must supervise affairs in Latin America to prevent chaos and 
provocative behavior, so they believed that the United 
States had a right to interfere in China to insure a minimal 
level of order and efficiency. Needless to say, American 
statesmen operated from an ethnocentric assumption that 
China must conform to western standards of order, 
efficiency, and justice.
Most American statesmen went much further than simply 
desiring that China conform to western standards. Few 
policymakers tolerated a laissez faire policy in which the 
United States waited indefinitely for China to transform 
itself at its own pace. Because they believed China’s 
transformation to be inevitable and universally beneficial, 
American statesmen had no reservations about compelling 
China to adopt western-style reforms. The interest of the 
United States and of the entire world in having China 
developed and stable justified a benevolent and constructive 
foreign interference in China. The general interest took 
precedence over China's right to determine its own course in 
the same way that the general interest in access to China 
had taken precedence over China's desire for isolation.
Chinese reformers had, since the mid-nineteenth 
century, endeavored to adapt China to the new environment of 
western domination, but the results had not been
19satisfactory for China or for the United States. From
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the 1860s to the early 1890s, a few Chinese scholars and
officials had promoted a "self-strengthening" movement
designed to adopt facets of western technology and industry
in an effort to bolster China against foreign aggression.
The movement was superficial and consciously avoided a
genuine transformation of Chinese society. Inability to
resist encroachments against its peripheral possessions and
especially defeat at the hands of Japan in 1895 indicated
the failure of even the movement's modest objectives. The
most dramatic attempt to modernize China came in 1898, when
China's young Kiiang-hsu emperor, influenced by prominent
modernizers, issued a series of sweeping reform edicts
affecting China's educational system, administration,
government, and economy. After an unprecedented one hundred
days of reform, the Empress Dowager, Tz'u Hsi, the emperor's
aunt, staged a coup, deposed her nephew, and rescinded the
reform edicts. The Empress Dowager's determination to
prevent extensive westernization of Chinese government and
life was further evidenced by her court's support of the
anti-foreign Boxer Uprising. Early twentieth-century
American missionaries and observers not surprisingly
concluded that it was "futile to expect that China could
20ever regenerate herself without outside aid."
Consequently, American policymakers sought ways to 
assist and supervise China's transformation. In the years 
following the Boxer Uprising, Manchu rulers bowed to 
pressures for reform. Between 1902 and 1911, the Chinese
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government undertook a series of important reforms, 
including the abolition of the ancient system of 
examinations for government service, and the creation of 
provincial assemblies and of a national assembly. The 
government also solicited loans from foreign capitalists for 
building railways and developing China's economy.
Americans took advantage of this favorable climate and
redoubled their efforts to guide China's transformation.
The number of American missionaries in China nearly tripled
between 1906 and 1916. Private educational and
philanthropic institutions, such as Yale University, the
Rockefeller Foundation, and the Y. M. C. A., promoted
American thought, values, and medicine in China. The United
States government supplemented this private effort by using
the indemnity received from the Chinese government after the
Boxer Uprising to subsidize the education of Chinese
21students m  American universities.
The United States government took more direct steps 
toward inducing the modernization of China. The United 
States and China concluded a treaty in 1903 in which China 
agreed to revise its mining laws according to western models 
in order to attract foreign capital; to establish a uniform 
national coinage; to allow American missionaries to lease 
and rent property in China in perpetuity; and promised to 
bring its judicial system "in[to] accord with that of 
Western nations." The United States in turn promised to 
surrender its extraterritorial rights once China had
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2 2adequately reformed its judicial system. The promise to 
restore to China its full sovereignty thus provided leverage 
for compelling the reform of Chinese administration.
Perhaps the most important instrument for supervising 
Chinese reform was lending capital to the Chinese 
government. An important facet of American China policy 
beginning in the 1890s was American entry into the 
international competition for investment opportunities in 
China. Investment was an instrument of American policy in 
China as well as an opportunity for making profits. 
Investments had the obvious effect of giving China the 
infrastructure and financial stability that Americans 
considered prerequisites for any viable modern state. In 
addition, foreign loans to China often gave the lender the 
right to operate the railroad,and gave the lender a voice in 
the administration of China's financial affairs. The 
Chinese government commonly pledged provincial revenues or 
mining rights as security for loans, and agreed to employ 
foreign advisers to oversee the expenditure of the loan.
The strategy of using loans to strengthen American 
influence in China was an especially important part of the 
so-called "dollar diplomacy" of President William Taft and 
Secretary of State Philander Knox. Knox in January 1910 
articulated the trusteeship logic underlying dollar 
diplomacy. Explaining the reasons for the participation of 
American capitalists in an international scheme to finance 
the construction of railroads in China, Knox noted that such
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loans involved "important political considerations."
American participation in the loan scheme would, therefore,
give the United States a voice in any questions arising from
the pledge of China's natural resources, and enable the
United States "to support China in urgent and desirable
fiscal administrative reforms," such as the abolition of
internal commercial duties, revision of the customs tariff,
23and monetary reform.
An important variable in dollar diplomacy and in the 
overall effort to influence and supervise China's 
development was the intense economic and political 
competition which had developed with other powers in China. 
During the first decade of the twentieth century, the focus 
of international competition in China had, for the most 
part, shifted from acquisition of territory to the 
acquisition of special rights and concessions secured 
through loans to and agreements with the Chinese government. 
Efforts to develop and modernize China were also means to 
prevent foreign domination in China. Knox's railroad 
investment scheme was, for example, part of a larger plan to 
"neutralize" Chinese railroads and to deny the other powers 
exclusive control over their railroad concessions and over 
the revenues pledged to them. The threat of foreign 
aggression to Chinese integrity at the turn of the century 
had prompted the enunciation of the open door policy. The 
threat of a foreign power, specifically Japan, dominating
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China and closing the door to American access continued to 
be the primary context of American trusteeship in China in 
subsequent decades.
The American vision of an open, orderly, and 
western-influenced China ran afoul Japan's persistent 
ambitions in East Asia. The Japanese regarded control of 
neighboring territories, including Korea and parts of south 
Manchuria, as essential to their strategic security. Those 
ambitions had led to several serious diplomatic and minor 
military confrontations with the Chinese in Taiwan and 
especially in Korea in the 1870s and 1880s. Japan came of 
age as an imperial power in its 1894-5 war with China. The 
peace treaty ending that war gave Japan Taiwan and the 
Liaotung peninsula in southern Manchuria, and severed 
China's long-standing tributary relationship with Korea, 
requiring China to formally acknowledge Korea's 
independence. However, diplomatic intervention by Russia, 
Germany, and France immediately following the settlement 
forced Japan to relinquish its possession of the Liaotung 
peninsula.
Russia itself had for decades been expanding in central 
and eastern Asia and had its own designs on Manchuria.
After denying Japan control of Liaotung, Russia directly 
challenged Japanese ambitions. The Tsar's government 
secured a lease of two key ports on the Liaotung peninsula 
and the right to construct a railroad from those ports to 
another Russian railroad (the Chinese Eastern) that ran from
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Siberia to Vladivostok. Japan was, however, able to thwart 
Russia and realize its frustrated imperial ambitions in the 
1904-5 Russo-Japanese War. Japan assumed control of 
Russia's concessions on the Liaotung peninsula and imposed a 
protectorate over Korea, which it annexed in 1910. Japan 
thus gained a sphere of influence in southern Manchuria, 
eventually stationing "police" (in reality a sizable army) 
along the railroad and even in the city of Mukden and 
effectively deterring political and economic penetration by 
any other foreign power.
How to react to Japan's position in Manchuria and its 
potential domination of China became the primary question in 
American China policy. Significantly, none of the major 
American solutions to this challenge repudiated the 
trusteeship outlook. That is, each of the alternative 
policies accepted the premise that China was a backward (or 
at least a disorderly) state which must be regenerated and 
must endure some degree of foreign control and supervision. 
Disagreements arose over the questions of how and by whom 
those things were to be done, and over whether Japanese 
dominance in China was incompatible with American interests.
A few American statesmen, most notably Theodore 
Roosevelt, believed that the United States should recognize 
Japan's preeminent role in East Asia. Roosevelt viewed the 
East Asian situation through the prism of balance of power 
politics, and his favorable view of Japan grew from his 
belief that Japan offered the ideal counterweight to Russia,
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the paramount threat to the balance in China before 1905. 
Roosevelt asserted that it was to the advantage of the 
United States to support Japan as long as it was "playing 
our game."24
Part of that "game" was fulfilling the duty of advanced
states to enforce order in and promote the progress of
backward areas. Discussing the situation in China with two
Japanese officials in 1904, Roosevelt stated that it was in
"the interest of all the world that each part of the world
25should be prosperous and well policed. . . . "  This
conviction was a consistent aspect of Roosevelt's attitude
and policy toward East Asia. For instance, Roosevelt shared
with many of his contemporaries a contempt for the perceived
incapacity of the Koreans to rule themselves. He desired to
see the Japanese declare a protectorate over Korea, and in
the secret 1905 Taft-Katsura Agreement, the Roosevelt
2 6administration recognized Japan's position in Korea.
Roosevelt felt similarly inclined to view China as just 
another backward country in which some civilized state must 
impose order. He recognized, however, that American 
commercial interests demanded the preservation of an open 
door. He consequently advocated a version of the open door 
policy that he described as akin to the Monroe Doctrine by 
which "the Chinese could be forced to behave themselves— not 
permitted to do anything atrocious, but not 
partitioned. . . . "27
Manchuria, the cockpit of international intrigue in
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China, was a special problem demanding a special solution.
The ideal solution, Roosevelt told visiting Japanese
officials in 1904, would be the establishment of a "Chinese
Viceroy, able to keep order under the guarantee of the 
28Powers. . . . "  In subsequent years, Roosevelt came to
the conclusion that the only solution was to let Japan
dominate Manchuria as it did Korea. The Root-Takahira notes
of 1908 implied American recognition of Japan's position in
Manchuria. Roosevelt explicitly advised his successor,
President Taft, in a 1910 open letter to respect Japan's
29"vital interest" in Manchuria and Korea.
Roosevelt's perspective was based largely on an 
objective assessment of American and Japanese interests, and 
on a passive trusteeship outlook. He shared the consensus 
American belief that China was a backward area that must be 
stabilized and awakened. He would have preferred that the 
regeneration of China could occur without Japanese 
domination, but, out of expedience and out of his contempt 
for China's alleged backwardness, he was willing to defer to 
Japanese control.
In contrast, most American businessmen, missionaries, 
and statesmen determined to contest Japan's domination in 
Manchuria and China. Their position arose from economic and 
ideological assumptions. Business interests, led by United 
States Consul in Manchuria Willard Straight, warned that 
Japan's economic and political privileges in Manchuria 
constituted a serious threat to the open door. Contrary to
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Roosevelt's hopes, a Japanese trusteeship in Manchuria would 
not benefit foreign interests.
In addition, Americans began to perceive Japan as a
threat to "white" civilization. Japanese immigration to the
United States became a major political issue when the San
Francisco school board in 1906 established segregated
schools for Japanese and other Orientals. While Theodore
Roosevelt deprecated the school board's action, the episode
represented an emerging American perception of a Japanese
threat— a "Yellow Peril"— in the Pacific that exacerbated
international tensions. Japanese domination of China might,
in short, mean the exclusion of white, Christian
civilization from the Orient. The administration of William
Howard Taft marked the clear triumph of this perception of
the Japanese threat and of a policy of challenging Japanese
domination in Manchuria. Policymakers in the Taft and
Wilson administrations accepted a view of China as a weak
and friendly nation that looked to the United States for
3 0guidance and protection.
It is significant that the efforts to prevent Japanese 
domination of China did not imply support for complete 
Chinese independence. On the contrary, they rested on the 
consensus assumptions that China must sacrifice part of its 
sovereignty precisely because of foreign, especially 
Japanese designs on China. The most articulate spokesman of 
this reasoning was Thomas Millard, an influential American 
editor in Shanghai, an arch-Japanophobe, and a major
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influence on the China policy of President Taft. Millard
defended the necessity of American "interference" and
"paternalism" in China. Because of China's relative
weakness and backwardness, foreign powers would inevitably
interfere in China. The interests of the United States, of
China, and of "peace and civilization" dictated that foreign
31interference was benevolent and constructive.
Similarly, Millard admitted that American policy in
China was paternalistic, but argued that paternalism was
legitimate if it were followed to its "logical outcome."
The acid test of a paternalistic policy was accepting that
"an infant will grow to years of discretion (unless
arbitrarily restrained in swaddling clothes) when tutelage
32will not be needed or tolerated." While other
powers— the Europeans as well as the Japanese— wanted to
keep China in "leading strings" as "a permanent
international ward," Millard argued, "America wants to help
33China become ACTUALLY self-reliant. . . . "  Under 
American paternalism, in other words, China would eventually 
graduate.
Millard's case for American interference in China was 
an important assumption of the American statesmen who 
conducted United States policy toward China in the first 
third of the twentieth century. They believed that China 
could not be stable and, therefore, would continue to invite 
foreign aggression until it could be transformed into a 
viable modern state. With this worldview, they had no
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trouble justifying limited American control, supervision, 
and interference in China.
The American insistence on the development of a stable 
and orderly China and on the right of benevolent 
interference in Chinese affairs continued amid dramatic 
changes in the Chinese political landscape. A revolution in 
the winter of 1911-1912 toppled the 267-year-old Manchu 
dynasty and established the Chinese Republic.
Dissatisfaction with alien rule (the Manchus were an ethnic 
minority, different in many respects from the han Chinese 
majority) and with an ineffectual monarchical state had led 
to the formation of nationalist societies in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and had prompted a 
series of localized uprisings between 1906 and 1911.
Several were led by the legendary revolutionary theorist and 
activist, Sun Yat-sen.
The 1911 revolution began, however, without Sun's 
leadership. Demonstrations against the central government 
in Szechuan province in October 1911 started a chain of 
events that included a revolt of Chinese troops and 
uprisings throughout southern China. To lead the government 
troops against the rebels, the imperial court recalled Yuan 
Shih-k'ai, a former provincial governor and influential 
military leader, and perhaps the most powerful figure in 
late Manchu China. The fate of the revolution was decided 
when the ambitious Yuan counseled the court to compromise;
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the young emperor abdicated in February 1912. Sun Yat-sen 
had in the meantime returned from the United States to 
become president of a provisional republican government. 
Bowing to expediency, Sun then resigned in favor of the 
powerful Yuan, without whose support the Republic could not 
survive.
American policymakers were initially skeptical of the
ability of the Chinese to support a republic. Because of
this skepticism and because of the uniform demand of all the
powers for guarantees of their investments in China, the
Taft administration never recognized the Republic. But, by
early 1913, American statesmen were optimistic that the new
regime would respect foreign investments and would be able
to protect foreign lives and property. The apparent success
of Yuan',* vigorous leadership in controlling the
centrifugal forces in China and in maintaining stability and
unity encouraged American businessmen and statesmen. In
this context the Wilson administration recognized the
34Chinese Republic in April 1913.
Nevertheless, it soon became obvious that Yuan's 
leadership and genuine Chinese republicanism were 
incompatible. Yuan's hostility to republican principles and 
republican political parties was evident as early as the 
first months of 1913. Elections for the lower house of the 
new parliament were held in December 1912 and nearly half 
the seats went to the Chinese Nationalist Party, or 
Kuomintang (KMT), recently organized under the auspices of
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Sun Yat-sen. Apparently at the behest of Yuan, the titular 
head of the KMT, Sung Chiao-jen, was assassinated in March 
1913. A split developed between Yuan and the nationalists, 
leading to a failed nationalist attempt at a "Second 
Revolution" in July 1913. The uprising provided Yuan with a 
convenient pretext for abolishing the KMT. Over the next 
two years, Yuan revoked the Republic's constitution and
promulgated a new, more authoritarian, constitution, then
. 35tried unsuccessfully to make himself emperor.
American policy toward the Chinese Republic during the
presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai clearly illustrated American
priorities in China. While Americans in 1912-1913
celebrated the apparent victory of republican ideals in the
world's most populous nation, the paramount concern was, as
ever, with stability. American policymakers ignored and
even tacitly encouraged Yuan's betrayal of the Republic.
President Wilson, consistent with his earlier theoretical
writings on the necessity of a gradual, organic development
of democracy, believed that China would benefit most from a
3 6benevolent constitutional monarch.
The best statement of American priorities in early
republican China came from Frank J. Goodnow, a Johns Hopkins
political scientist who served as Yuan's constitutional
adviser in 1913 and 1914. Several months after leaving
China, Goodnow in 1915 wrote a memorandum which many people
interpreted as a theoretical rationalization for Yuan's
37subsequent attempt to make himself emperor. The Goodnow
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memorandum expressed the prevalent American assumption that 
because of its political "immaturity" and because of the 
Japanese threat, order and stability were more important to 
China than republicanism. Goodnow recommended that a 
benevolent constitutional monarchy would be the best way 
both to maintain stability and prepare the Chinese people 
for republican government. It is no longer possible,
Goodnow warned, for states to "work out their own salvation 
through disorder and revolution" as South American states 
had been allowed to do. "Under modern conditions countries 
must devise some method of government under which peace will
be maintained or they will have to submit to foreign
38control." Goodnow and American policymakers looked to 
Yuan— in much the same way that American statesmen had 
looked to Porfirio Diaz in pre-revolutionary Mexico— to be a 
"surrogate" trustee, an enlightened despot capable of 
providing the kind of conditions that modern states 
required.
But like Diaz, Yuan ultimately failed to provide the 
peace and stability which Goodnow believed that China needed 
and which Americans demanded. Yuan's 1915 monarchist scheme 
precipitated armed rebellions in several provinces. Yuan 
died suddenly in 1916, leaving China with no person or party 
capable of holding China together. China then entered a 
prolonged period of crisis and instability.
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Events of the era from 1915 to 1933 dramatically 
underscored the influence of a trusteeship outlook in 
America's China policy. During that period, the United 
States faced challenges that questioned the wisdom of a 
policy of continued American interference in Chinese 
affairs. American policymakers proved unable to surrender 
their conviction that China was not competent enough to be a 
fully independent sovereign state.
One tendency of the era which directly challenged 
American trusteeship was the rise of militant Chinese 
nationalism. Evident as early as the Boxer Uprising of 
1900, Chinese nationalism matured in the wake of World War 
I. The principal demand of the nationalists was the 
surrender of the treaty privileges and the kind of 
interference that were the cornerstones of American 
trusteeship. Despite their frequent rhetorical sympathy 
with those demands, American statesmen clung to a hierarchy 
of priorities that placed stability, order, and the rights 
of the world to free and safe access to China above China's 
abstract sovereign rights.
That viewpoint and hierarchy of priorities figured 
prominently in the American reaction to Japan's aggression 
in China during World War I and especially in Manchuria in 
the early 1930s. American statesmen found themselves in the 
awkward position of defending Chinese sovereignty against an 
aggressor even as they defended America's right to interfere 
in China. While there were important disagreements over the
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
2 9 7
proper American response to Japan's challenge, none of the 
proposed alternatives were completely free from a 
trusteeship worldview.
Upon its entry into World War I against Germany, Japan 
captured and occupied the German leasehold on the Shantung 
peninsula. Then, in January 1915, Japanese officials 
communicated to the Chinese government suggestions (since 
known as the Twenty-One Demands) for a bilateral agreement 
in which China would agree to recognize Japan's "special 
position" in South Manchuria, East Mongolia, and Shantung; 
not to cede or lease any port or harbor on the coast of 
China to any other power; to give Japan joint ownership of 
an important mining company in central China; and to employ 
Japanese military, political, and financial "advisers."
While the demands were a logical extension of Japan's 
continuing effort to carve out and secure its sphere of 
interest in Manchuria, Americans were outraged at the scope 
of the demands and the secrecy with which they were 
presented. In addition, the demands were blatantly 
opportunistic; Japan took unilateral action at a time when 
its usual rivals in China, including its allies, were 
preoccupied with the war in Europe.
The debate in the United States over how to react to 
this diplomatic crisis resembled the debate of the previous 
decade. A few observers reiterated Theodore Roosevelt's 
reasoning. "China is incapable of self-development without 
very substantial aid during the next two or three decades,"
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commented The Outlook in 1915, "and must be for a number of 
years under tutelage." Japan was in the best position to be 
China's "tutor and director15 if it "keeps faith," that is, 
if it maintained the open door. It would be even better if 
Japan went further and, like the United States in Latin 
America, offered protection and "disinterested 
helpfulness."3 9
However, such acquiescence to Japanese domination of 
China found little sympathy in the administration of Woodrow 
Wilson. The administration's strategy was to refuse to 
recognize Japanese infringements on China's sovereignty, and 
to compel Japan to rescind its most extreme demands (which 
it eventually did). The administration eventually found it 
prudent to acknowledge Japan's "special interest" in China 
in the 1917 Lansing-Ishii notes, and acceded to Japanese 
control of the German leasehold in Shantung, but the main 
thrust of Wilson's policy was to contest the Twenty-One 
Demands.40 An integral part of this strategy was to 
continue the pre-1915 effort to create a China strong enough 
to resist Japanese pressures. "If we can succeed in 
reducing the demands," E. T. Williams, then Chief of the 
State Department's Far East Division, wrote in February 
1915, "it seems to me that we ought to insist upon China's 
putting her own house in order and making her able to defend 
herself. We can and ought to assist her in 
this. . . . "41
During the Twenty-One Demands crisis and throughout the
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World War I era, the most articulate advocate of a 
preventive policy of putting China's house in order was 
America's Minister to China Paul Reinsch. Reinsch was an 
archetypical progressive era statesman who believed that it
was the duty of advanced states to civilize and develop
. . . . 42"primitive regions." He was an advocate of the open door
policy, which he defined in 1900 as "an open and frank
policy of international development and exploitation of
43China, with equal chances for all." He was also a firm
believer in the existence of a "special relationship"
between the United States and China. The United States was
for China a "counsellor and friend," a model which
"forward-looking men" in China emulated. The United States
did not have to coerce China through "dollar diplomacy" or
force. For Reinsch, "example freely followed" was in China,
as in the Philippines, the best means for bringing a people
into the modern world. Beginning from the premise that
China wanted American tutelage, he was quick to attribute
the ascendancy of any other power in China to the influence
44of coercion and intrigue.
Within a year of his arrival Reinsch developed an 
intense suspicion of the Japanese. Japanese opposition 
subverted several American loan projects (particularly a 
contract for an American company to improve a harbor in the 
province of Fukien) for which Reinsch had lobbied. Then, 
when Japan "was professedly acting as a trustee of the 
associated Powers in the Far East," it in reality used the
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worst kind of secret diplomacy (most notably in the
Twenty-One Demands) to gain unfair advantages against a
45supine China and against its allies. Japan, Reinsch
warned Secretary of State Robert Lansing, was using the
situation to arrogate to itself the role of China’s
"protector without whose assent and assistance no important
46action may be taken." In the eyes of Paul Reinsch and of
many other Americans, Japan stood as an example of a trustee
that violated its trust.
Reinsch began to search for ways to provide tutelage in
China and thus nullify Japan's justification for unilateral
action. China's fundamental need was "efficient
administration," which, in Reinsch's classic progressive
outlook, was the sine qua non of any government. Reinsch
fell back on a kind of modified dollar diplomacy. He was
enthusiastic about a railroad-building concession that
provided for China's employment of American experts. The
concession, Reinsch wrote, "offers an unequalled opportunity
for the participation of American expertship, energy, and
47capital in Chinese railway building." Reinsch began to
urge the employment of foreign experts to train Chinese
officials as a panacea for China. "There is," he stated in
a memo to the Chinese president, "no other way in which the
Chinese administration can be organized to fulfill the needs
of the modern government, and thus to preserve the power and
48integrity of the Chinese state." Because of its 
"non-political character," American assistance was "the last
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resort of Chinese independence and of international rights
in China." The United States must assist in "the necessary
• • 49auditing control required by [the] interest[s] of all."
As the threat of Japanese domination and the consequent 
"erection in the Far East of an exclusive regime hostile to 
western nations" grew more real, Reinsch recommended
50stronger measures for putting China's house m  order. In
April 1916 Reinsch broached the alternative of joint
international financial control of Chinese finance "forced
on China. . . to be enforced by Japan alone or the Powers
jointly." This could, he commented, be "a last resort" to
avert either unilateral Japanese control or internal 
51chaos. In Reinsch's hierarchy of priorities, American 
assistance was preferable to joint trusteeship which was in 
turn preferable to Japanese control or disorganization.
During the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, Reinsch 
lobbied for an international trusteeship over China as the 
solution to that nation's problems. The powers must 
surrender their localized privileges and renounce their 
separatist policies in favor of "the idea of a trusteeship 
in behalf of a united China exercised in the general 
interest. . . . " An international commission of experts 
would establish in China efficient systems of 
administration, finance, communications, internal 
improvements, and police, and abstain from interfering with 
China's political life. The powers would also guarantee the 
open door to foreign commerce and economic development
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52 . 'projects. Reinsch argued that China must temporarily
surrender part of its sovereignty as a means of preserving
its independence. International supervision of its
administrative reforms was "necessary to give the Chinese
government the efficiency required in modern times. Without
this efficiency," Reinsch warned, "the Chinese government
. 53cannot be sovereign m  any true sense."
The proposal for an international trusteeship over 
China to prevent Japanese domination garnered unofficial and 
official support during the period of the Paris Peace 
Conference. The conviction that some foreign power or 
powers must impose order in China grew as China's central 
government disintegrated following the 1916 death of 
strongman President Yuan Shih-k'ai. Thwarting Japanese 
aggression would not alone solve what many Americans saw to 
be the more fundamental problem of China's chronic disorder. 
Thomas Millard articulated this view most clearly in a 1919 
book in which he made a plea for increased foreign control 
over China. Acknowledging the growing popular Chinese 
resentment of foreign control, Millard employed the familiar 
trusteeship reasoning that "[a]lmost all educated" and 
"enlightened" Chinese admitted that foreign control was in 
China's best interest. "We have this paradox," Millard 
explained:
that to diminish foreign intervention in China's 
administrative procedures it is first necessary to 
increase it. . . . An enlightened foreign 
assistance, under the aegis of a league of
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nations, having the object of restoring China's 
complete administrative and fiscal autonomy by 
educating Chinese in modern methods and 
tranquilizing the country, would carry a real hope 
for that people and a real benefit for the 
world.
The Wilson administration made cautious, ultimately 
ineffective, gestures toward international trusteeship in 
China as a means for preventing Japanese domination of 
China. The administration resurrected the strategy of an 
international loan consortium (which Wilson had
ceremoniously scuttled in 1913) as a mechanism to neutralize
. 55Japan's economic influence m  China. Wilson hoped to
avoid a confrontation with Japan that might strangle the
League of Nations at its birth but was sensitive to Chinese
and American demands that Japan surrender the concession it
captured from Germany in Shantung. His strategy at the
peace conference was to recognize Japan's predominant
economic position in China (as long as it continued to
respect the open door) but compel Japan to surrender its
political privileges to the powers who would act as
"trustees" for the future disposition of the region. Wilson
and his advisers developed a master plan whereby all foreign
powers ceded their concessions to an international
trusteeship.56
The Inquiry, a staff of experts who formulated 
America's positions regarding the international settlement, 
elaborated on the plan. An early 1918 memorandum 
recommended that a "holding company" of "friendly powers"
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. . . 57lend aid and "teach China how to administer itself." The
Inquiry's final report on the question recommended the
nationalization of Chinese railroads, international loan
schemes, and other measures to eliminate special privileges
in China. An "Open Door Commission" should be created to
carry out the League's principles in China. Abolition of
special privileges was not, however, equivalent to
abolishing foreign interference in China. The report
described the "'open door' principle" as "essentially
resembling a[n externally-imposed] constitutional
regulation" in a country without a central authority or
C Q
standardized administration. Thus, while the Inquiry's 
recommendations addressed the specific situation in East 
Asia in 1918-19, they were a logical expression of the 
transcendent American posture toward China.
The United States did not find it necessary to
orchestrate an international trusteeship or "holding
company" for China. Under the leadership of Foreign
Minister Kijuro Shidehara, Japan pursued a more cooperative
policy and soon returned to the fold, abiding by a new
arrangement for regulating international conduct in China.
The 1920s provided an interlude during which the United
States did not have to play diplomatic brinksmanship with a
59power threatening China's administrative integrity.
Instead, the paramount threat to the existing order of 
western control in China came from the Chinese themselves.
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Significantly, the major thrust of American policy during 
the 1920s was to defend the essential elements of the 
existing order and thus defy the substantive demands of 
Chinese nationalism.
The Chinese nationalist movement was a reaction against 
alien rule under the Manchu dynasty, against foreign 
infringements on Chinese sovereignty, and against western 
racism. The Boxer Uprising of 1900 and a 1905 boycott of 
American imports following the passage of America's 1904 
immigration restriction law were early manifestations of 
nationalist feeling. Exiled nationalists and reformers, 
most notably Sun Yat-sen, had at the turn of the century 
formed organizations devoted to the overthrow of the Manchus 
and to the development of democracy in China. Under Sun's 
leadership, Chinese nationalists in 1905 formed the 
T'ung-meng hui, or Revolutionary Alliance. Elements from 
that important organization and from other nationalist 
groups eventually coalesced to form the Kuomintang in 1912 
and continued, under various titles, to carry the torch of 
nationalism and democracy in the fight against Yuan 
Shih-k'ai and in the civil war that followed his death.
Despite those early developments, the birth of popular 
Chinese nationalism must be dated to May 4, 1919, when 
students in Peking demonstrated against the decision of the 
negotiators in Paris not to compel Japan to restore Shantung 
to Chinese control. Mass demonstrations, strikes, and 
boycotts of Japanese products in 1919 encouraged longer-term
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developments, including the diffusion of nationalism among 
China's urban classes, the growth of the Chinese labor 
movement, and the birth in 1921 of the Chinese Communist 
Party. The Shantung decision and the great powers' failure 
to give a fair hearing to China's grievances (even though 
China had entered the war against Germany) also fueled 
Chinese resentment of their country's quasi-colonial status. 
Chinese officials determined to convince the great powers to 
surrender their control over China's administration.
The Chinese opportunity came at the Washington Naval 
Conference of 1921-1922, at which the status of China was 
one of the major topics of discussion. The Chinese 
delegates to the conference exhaustively presented their 
case for tariff autonomy, the surrender of 
extraterritoriality, and the removal of foreign "police" 
forces from China. The lack of a central government capable 
of imposing its authority over all of China made it 
difficult for the Chinese to sell their case to the powers. 
The American, British, and Japanese argued nearly 
unaminously that the real issue was the lack of adequate 
order and stability in China. American delegates Charles 
Evans Hughes, Alabama Senator Oscar Underwood, and Elihu 
Root reiterated American support for a sovereign, 
independent China and America's intention (first declared in 
the 1903 treaty) to eventually surrender its treaty 
privileges, but they continued to assert that this 
concession was conditional upon the development of genuine
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stability in China.60 The United States and the other 
powers pledged to confer again to consider restoring tariff 
autonomy and to investigate the possibility of surrendering 
extraterritoriality.
The Washington Conference produced the Nine-Power 
Treaty of 1922 which became the fragile foundation for 
international relations in China for the next two decades.
It embodied the Washington conferees' conditional promises 
to respect and restore Chinese sovereignty? it also 
formalized the two-dimensional open door policy that the 
United States had pursued in previous decades. The 
signatories of the treaty pledged to respect China's 
sovereignty, independence, and territorial and 
administrative integrity, and to "provide the fullest and 
most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and 
maintain for herself an effective and stable 
government."61 The treaty represented a quid pro guo. The 
powers essentially put China on "probation," giving it a 
grace period during which China must put its own house in 
order. The eventual surrender of the treaty privileges that 
abridged China's sovereignty was conditional upon China 
becoming a stable modern state. In the meantime, the United 
States and the other powers asserted their right to hold a 
lien on China's sovereignty.
The events in China in the subsequent decade convinced 
many American statesmen of the necessity of maintaining 
American trusteeship there but led others to conclude that
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the United States must yield to Chinese demands. Throughout
most of the 1920s, China was splintered into several armed
camps and thus, according to the logic of the Washington
Conference, was in no sense qualified to assume full control
over its own affairs. A de jure central government in
Peking battled with several regional warlords for control of
northern China. Parts of southern China were under the
control of Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang (KMT), which after being
dissolved by Yuan in 1913, had been reorganized and
eventually formed a rival government in Canton. The KMT,
under the sponsorship of Soviet agents, in 1923 entered into
an alliance with the nascent Chinese.Communist Party; the
tenuous alliance was based on a shared determination to free
62China of imperialist control.
Friction between Chinese and westerners intensified in 
this context of civil war and militant nationalism. The 
British massacre of Chinese civilians in the foreign section 
of Shanghai during a 1925 labor strike at a Japanese textile 
factory incited a wave of anti-foreign hostility. The 
strength and militancy of the KMT translated this hostility 
into an effective political movement. The KMT in 1927 
embarked on its "Northern Expedition," which succeeded in 
unifying most of China. Nationalist armies quickly captured 
China's major cities, harassing and clashing with 
westerners, most notably in Nanking. The Nationalists 
marched into Peking in 1928 and quickly won recognition as 
the legal government of China. American statesmen in the
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1920s thus faced a China which, while undeniably unstable, 
was also rife with a determination to rid itself of foreign 
interference.
Many Americans saw the rise of the KMT and the series 
of clashes between Chinese nationalists and Europeans as 
sure signs that the era of western imperialism must end.
The United States Congress in 1927 passed a resolution 
calling for the United States to set an example for the 
other powers by surrendering its treaty privileges. Idaho 
Senator William E. Borah, chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, perceived that the disorder in China was an 
inevitable phase in China's political evolution which the 
United States could not afford to obstruct.63
Even Frank Kellogg, Secretary of State in the Coolidge
administration, openly sympathized with the cause of the
Chinese nationalists. He predicted that "a great nation
like China will not long permit foreign control of its
domestic affairs," and on several important occasions
announced America's intention of yielding to the nationalist 
64demands. Nevertheless, Kellogg, like most other American 
policymakers, believed that the United States must continue 
its indirect control in China until China's domestic affairs 
were more stable. In a September 1925 speech Kellogg stated 
that the American people had no desire to control China's 
internal policies, fix its tariffs, or maintain consular 
courts there. But, rather than offer to renounce those 
practices unconditionally, Kellogg noted that the American
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people "look forward to the day when [they] will not be
necessary."65 Jacob G. Schurman, U. S. Minister to China,
between 1921 and 1925, shared Kellogg's ambivalence, but he,
too, concluded that a "progressive" and "evolutionary"
policy was the only feasible course. If the Chinese had
even a "tolerable" government by western standards, Schurman
wrote with obvious frustration, they could name the date for
the abolition of extraterritoriality and the recovery of
66tariff autonomy. The United States granted China tariff 
autonomy effective 1 January 1929, but retained its 
extraterritorial privileges until 1943.
Other American policymakers adamantly insisted that 
Chinese nationalism simply distracted attention away from 
the failure of the Chinese to achieve the rudiments of a 
stable government. American Minister to China 
J. V. A. MacMurray, and Silas Strawn, the Chicago 
businessman who joined MacMurray as representative to the 
1925 tariff conference and served on the 1925-6 
international Commission on Extraterritoriality, were the 
most prominent spokesmen of the hard-line view. In arguing 
against compromise both men employed reasoning startlingly 
similar to that used regarding American trusteeship in the 
Philippines and the Caribbean. Strawn returned to the 
United States in late 1926 with first-hand assessments of 
the "real" picture of China. The root of China's problems, 
he asserted in two noted speeches, was internal, not 
attributable to the so-called unequal treaties. The Chinese
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Republic, Americans must admit, was a "burlesque." Chinese
leaders acted irresponsibly when they appealed to popular
slogans such as "imperialism," "Unequal Treaties,"
"Extraterritoriality," and "tariff autonomy." "If the ideal
of a new China is to be realized," Strawn concluded, "less
attention must be paid by the politicians to the alleged
sovereign rights of China and more consideration given to
67the rights of the Chinese people."
MacMurray shared Strawn's contempt for the demagogic
slogans and' the perception that Chinese politicians would
not, if given full sovereignty, act in the best interests of
the Chinese people. "The more intelligent of the Chinese,"
and the "thinking Chinese" privately admitted that they did
not want the full abrogation of the treaties, since that
would certainly result in the cessation of China's foreign
68trade and economic development. MacMurray interpreted 
the Nine-Power Treaty as a bargain, and China had failed to 
live up to its end; the United States and the other powers 
could not, therefore, consider surrendering their 
privileges. And given China's "chaotic" internal 
conditions, MacMurray wrote, "an unrestricted exercise of 
sovereign rights would not conduce to the advantage of 
anybody except those desiring the funds to carry on civil 
warfare against one or another disjointed military 
leader."69
MacMurray continued to lobby Kellogg's successor, Henry 
L. Stimson, that "a premature concession" of America's
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
3 1 2
remaining treaty rights would not settle the situation, but
merely encourage yet more unrealistic demands. Even after
the KMT, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek , had
unified most of China, MacMurray in 1928 insisted that
"China was not yet in a position, as regards the
administration of justice, to exercise the responsibilities
70of sovereignty." Stimson agreed and the negotiations for 
the surrender of extraterritoriality broke down in 1931.
Several months later, on the night of September 18-19, 
1931, an explosion on the Japanese-owned and operated South 
Manchurian Railroad signaled the beginning of a momentous 
clash between China's effort to recover its sovereign rights 
and Japan's determination to defend its special position in 
Manchuria. The reaction of American statesmen to the 
so-called Manchurian crisis of 1931-1933 revealed again the 
ambiguities that adherence to a trusteeship worldview 
created in America's East Asian policy. As they did during 
World War I, American statesmen found themselves defending 
China against Japanese aggression even though they believed 
China to be unprepared to exercise unfettered sovereignty.
The Manchurian crisis was prompted by the desire of 
officers in Japan's Manchurian (Kwantung) Army to reassert 
Japanese control in that vital region. The bombing of the 
railroad was actually carried out by the Japanese 
themselves, but Japan blamed it on Chinese "bandits" and 
used it as a pretext for the military occupation of
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Manchuria. The Kwantung Army officers acted on their own 
initiative, but the divided Japanese Government generally 
supported their cause. The rise of the Chinese Nationalist 
government had serious implications for Japan's sphere of 
influence in Manchuria. Japan had long profited from the 
semi-autonomy of Manchuria and had opposed the 
centralization of the Chinese state. Japanese officials 
became predictably concerned when Manchuria's warlord in 
December 1928 declared his allegiance to Chiang Kai-Shek's 
central government.
The Japanese anticipated a direct Chinese challenge to 
its position at a time when Manchuria, which the Japanese 
had for decades considered vital to their strategic 
interests, was becoming even more vital. As the impact of 
the Great Depression deepened and the world's nations 
retreated into economic nationalism, Japan looked toward 
Manchuria for economic as well as strategic security. It 
was clear that the Nationalist regime was determined to 
contest Japan's predominance in Manchuria. Among other 
things, China violated a long-standing treaty provision 
prohibiting the construction of railroads parallel to 
Japan's vital South Manchurian Railway and incited 
anti-japanese rallies and boycotts in Manchuria and China. 
Japanese army officers apparently believed that the western 
powers would not contest their thinly-disguised invasion of 
Manchuria.
In the face of American-led outrage at the Manchurian
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Incident and subsequent Japanese action against the cities
of Chinchow and Shanghai, the Japanese government justified
its position in terms calculated to appeal to the West's
desire for order in Manchuria and to a shared wariness of
Chinese nationalism. The Japanese Government declared its
determination to uphold its treaty rights against the
excesses of China's "rights recovery movement." Japan's
action in Manchuria was not simply for the protection of its
own interests. "Only if peace and order prevail," the
Japanese government explained in December 1931, "can the
country be safe either for the Chinese or for the
foreigners: in the absence of peace and order it is futile
to speak of the Open Door or of equal opportunity for the
71economic activities of all nations."
Japan sponsored the creation of the supposedly
autonomous state of "Manchukuo" in 1932, claiming that it
was "the outcome of [a] local movement of
self-determination." Why shouldn't one region of troubled
China be allowed "to erect itself as an island of peace and 
72security?" Secretary of State Henry Stimson did not buy 
this argument, and in January 1932, he announced the 
so-called "Stimson Doctrine," a policy of refusing to 
recognize any changes in the East Asian status quo.
Japanese officials stepped up their public relations 
offensive. Government representatives asked the United 
States to give Japan time to prove the wisdom of a "policy 
of restoring order in Manchuria and developing that area."
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Manchukuo would become "a model state," prosperous and
populous. The United States, especially its cotton
industry, would profit by Japan’s actions. The Japanese
ambassador assured veteran state department sinologist
Stanley Hornbeck that "the world would have reason to be 
73pleased." Japanese officials went even further in their 
appeal to shared trusteeship values, and compared Japan's 
East Asian policy with America's Monroe Doctrine.
The Manchurian crisis therefore forced American 
statesmen to decide whether the right to interfere in China 
to insure order and stability justified Japanese aggression. 
There was considerable debate within American policymaking 
circles over how to react to the crisis. However, one 
important point of consensus among American policymakers was 
that China remained a disorderly, immature state requiring 
some kind of foreign supervision, assistance, and corrective 
handling.
The main thread of American policy was formulated by 
Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson. Stimson, United States 
Minister Nelson T. Johnson, and other statesmen accepted the 
premise that the Chinese must share the guilt for friction 
in East Asia, but rejected the conclusion that Japan's 
actions were therefore justified. "Japan has undoubtedly 
suffered great aggravation in the past," Stimson wrote in 
November 1931. He added, however, that the attack "went far 
beyond. . . any proper intervention on behalf of lives and 
property."74 Indeed, Stimson regarded Chinese agitation
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for full recovery of sovereign rights to be a major
irritant. Even as he denounced Japanese aggression, he
privately described the 1922 Nine Power Treaty— one of the
legal bases for his case against Japan— as a "weapon" to be
wielded to "protect our nationals against possible reckless
75manifestations of misguided nationalism in China."
General Frank McCoy, the American member of the League of 
Nations investigating commission on the Far Eastern Crisis, 
admitted having "much sympathy with the Japanese." "In 
recent years the Chinese have had a most irritating policy 
in Manchuria. . . . " It is enough to drive anyone crazy.
It happened not only to the Japanese but to all foreigners. 
The Japanese had a good case but they went about it in the 
wrong way."76
Stimson and his supporters believed that the threat of 
Japanese "militarism" to such principles as the rule of law 
and world peace made trusteeship logic irrelevant to the 
Manchurian crisis. They continued to believe that advanced 
nations had a legitimate right to control and supervise 
backward ones and that China was a backward nation, but held 
that the importance of China in world affairs, the 
importance of American interests in China, and, especially, 
the character of Japanese control made trusteeship logic 
inapplicable to the Manchurian question. The refusal to 
concede that Japan's actions were a legitimate expression of 
trusteeship was especially clear in their rejection of the 
Monroe Doctrine analogy.
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American observers had for decades resisted the notion
that American and Japanese conceptions of their respective
spheres of influence were on the same moral and political
plane. Japan, they argued, warped an essentially defensive,
self-denying policy into a blueprint for selfish aggression.
"The real Monroe Doctrine means political independence and
equality of commercial opportunity," insisted Foreign Policy
Association spokesman Raymond L. Buell in 1922. "The
Asiatic Monroe Doctrine means political domination and the 
77Closed Door." Earlier, In 1916, Stanley Hornbeck 
similarly asserted that the Monroe Doctrine is "defensive 
and all excluding" while "the Japanese Monroe Doctrine is 
aggressive and not self-excluding." Hornbeck, however, 
protested too much, and in his denial underscored the actual 
similarity between American and Japanese interventionism.
We have never, in time of peace and when there was 
no offense on the part of a neighbor, said: 'You
are weak, your administration is ineffective; 
therefore for your own good and ours we consider 
it our duty to come in and see to it that you 
manage your affairs as we think they ought to be 
managed.1
The demands that Hornbeck described were, of course, 
precisely the kind that the United States had made of its 
neighbors. Hornbeck's use of the qualifiers, "in time of 
peace" and "when there was no offense," suggests that he was 
sensitive to the actual similarity between the cases. Frank 
McCoy confronted the same dilemma in 1932. He, too, denied 
the analogy, resting his case on two points. "First, our
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interference [in Cuba and Nicaragua] took place some years
ago. Times have changed. . . . Also we were always asked
by both sides to the dispute to intervene and we always got
out when the job was finished. . . . There is no 
79analogy."
Henry Stimson also resisted the analogy. United States 
Army General William Lassiter reminded Stimson in November 
1931 of the constraints the United States faced in trying to 
restore order in Panama and especially Mexico. Lassiter 
conceded that the Japanese overreacted, but affirmed the 
general principle that a nation "when faced with intolerable 
disorder" can and must deal with the situation. "It is 
Japan's problem and she must work it out, just as we should 
have to do if we got involved with Mexico." He warned 
Stimson against assuming that mere "wishing" would create "a 
peaceful orderly society." "We ought to measure our words
carefully because tomorrow we may be up against the same
80 • sort of conditions ourselves." Stimson's mentor, Elihu
Root, similarly advised him not to overreact. "Manchuria
occupies very much the same relation to Japan that Cuba does
to the United States," the elder statesman counseled his
protege, "and it is well worth careful inquiry as to whether
81
Japan is doing anything more than defending herself."
Stimson's response to Lassiter revealed his conscious 
refusal to view the Manchurian crisis in objective 
trusteeship terms. After his visit to Leonard Wood in 1926 
Stimson had become convinced of the importance of the Orient
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in the future of world politics. The United States must
stand firm in the Philippines and China, maintaining and
extending American ideals against all comers, whether they
be Japanese militarists, Bolsheviks, or "politically
82immature races" and their "half-baked" ideas. With this
grand perspective Stimson reminded Lassiter that "China is
not Mexico— very far from it."
Other than Russia, it is probably the biggest 
inchoate potential force of the future; and the 
relations of our Government to China have, from 
their helpful idealism, given us a foothold in the 
minds of the Chinese people which is pregnant with 
possibilities for good, provided we do not forfeit
Whereas Mexico was exclusively an American problem, China 
was a world problem and, therefore, no single power could 
establish itself as trustee for all others. Stimson also 
denied the Monroe Doctrine analogy because he believed that 
there was a qualitative difference between America's helpful 
and disinterested trusteeship and Japan's thinly-veiled 
aggrandizement.
Far from bringing peace and order to East Asia,
Japanese domination of Manchuria would subvert the progress 
of the Nationalist regime toward stability, and plunge the 
Orient into a war of irredentism. The issue involved in the 
Manchurian crisis was not, in other words, the legitimacy of 
an advanced state protecting its interests and imposing 
order on a disorderly backward state in the best interest of 
that state and of civilization. It was, according to 
Stimson, a showdown between the "peace-loving states" and
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84the "aggressors."
Aside from Stimson's correspondents, Root and Lassiter, 
other American policymakers criticized Stimson's perspective 
on the Manchurian crisis. President Herbert Hoover and 
Undersecretary of State William Castle publicly contradicted 
and diluted Stimson's hard-line stance. Unlike Stimson, 
they simply did not believe that American interests in China 
were important enough to warrant a confrontation with Japan. 
Stimson's shrill rhetoric would, they believed, further 
alienate the Japanese and precipitate an even more serious
q e
^conflict. Former Minister to China and State Department 
official J. V. A. MacMurray warned in a 1935 memorandum that 
Stimson's policies encouraged "Chinese intransigence" and 
"high-handed behaviour" which forced Japan to take drastic 
action to "vindicate its rightful legal position in East 
Asia."86
One of Stimson's harshest critics was the ubiquitous
Cameron Forbes, American Ambassador to Japan from late 1930
to early 1932. While Stimson denied the applicability of
Philippines and Latin American precedents to China, Forbes
was consistent in his employment of trusteeship logic.
Forbes asserted that the Japanese were doing "a very
necessary thing in Manchuria," adding the obligatory
qualification that they went about it in "a most unfortunate 
87way. . . . "  Forbes submitted a memorandum on the 
Manchurian crisis in January 1932 which the staff of the 
Embassy unanimously approved. Conditions in Manchuria were,
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before Japan's demarche, "intolerable,11 and the 
administration of finance and public order were "medieval 
and chaotic." Japan's presence in the region was a 
"constructive" force. In other correspondences, Forbes 
argued that the United States must not lecture Japan on 
international morality but be patient and allow Foreign 
Minister Baron Kijuro Shidehara to gain control and exert a 
moderating influence on Japanese policy. Rather than treat 
Japan as an international criminal, the United States must 
recognize that the dark cloud could still have a silver 
lining. "If [the crisis] results in China asking assistance 
from the other powers to reorganize her internal affairs it 
might offer a happy solution," Forbes advised Stimson, "but 
further outside pressure on Japan would not necessarily be
Q O
helpful in bringing this about."
Forbes favored a solution similar to that advocated by 
Paul Reinsch in 1919. In a series of memoranda to Stimson 
and Frank McCoy, Forbes laid out an elaborate plan for an 
international trusteeship over China. Among the several 
analogies he employed to describe his proposal was that of 
Lord Cromer's Egypt. The focus of Forbes's plan was the 
creation of an international police force, "under the guise 
of Chinese control," to eliminate banditry. He outlined a 
nine-stage plan which also included the repression of 
student groups, the purging of "Red influence" from China, 
the disbanding of private armies, putting the ex-soldiers to 
work on building roads, and the floating of a large loan to
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China. The "regeneration of China" required the elimination 
of banditry, the stabilization of currency, the settlement
* Q Q
of China's debt, and road improvement.
After his prearranged departure from Tokyo in early
1932, Forbes explained the philosophical basis of his
quasi-public criticism of administration policy to Far
Eastern Division Chief Stanley Hornbeck. "The whole law of
nature," he wrote, is
the absorption by the strong of the materials 
derived from the fall of the weak, both in the 
vegetable and in the animal kingdom. We live 
largely by destruction and absorption and I have 
said that I think it folly to state at some given 
time, either of an individual or a group of 
individuals, whether vegetable or animal, that 
they shall no longer grow. . . .
In other words, the tendency may be checked; 
it may be possible to protect small peoples, who 
are inherently healthy, from rapacious conquest, 
but it cannot prevent those which are inherently 
unsound and weak from the ill effects of their 
failure to observe those sound laws and those 
practices which make for a healthy body politic, 
good government and inherent strength.
From this reasoning, Forbes concluded that the United States
should let Japan try to make Manchukuo "a model state." If
it succeeded, all nations would benefit; if it failed (as
Forbes suspected it would) , interested nations must devise
90an international solution.
Stanley Hornbeck himself agreed that Japan had some
justification for its action in Manchuria. China was
partially to blame for its fate because, "being inclined to
'pacifism,' being unprepared and being politically
disorganized, her resources arouse covetousness and her
91actions invite disciplining and despoiling." The
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situation in the Orient entailed two distinct conflicts,
Hornbeck noted a month after the Manchurian Incident, one
between China and Japan, the other between Japan and the
world. If china won the first contest, it would "be
encouraged to persevere in the role of trouble-maker." If
Japan won, it would become the self-appointed arbiter of
international rights in the Far East. If Japan won in her
struggle with the world, the principle of "might is right"
would reign. But if the world won, "China will have escaped
some at least of the rightful consequences of her own
92weakness and obstreperousness."
Hornbeck's memorandum summarized the dilemma that 
viewing China through a trusteeship worldview created for 
American statesmen between 1915 and 1933. Most tried to 
reconcile their policy of opposing Japan with a view of 
China as a "trouble-maker,11 a weak and obstreperous state 
requiring some sort of supervision. As a result of this 
ambiguity the United States was unable to win the trust and 
friendship of the Chinese or to reach an understanding with 
Japan.
Ill
The trusteeship Weltanschauung was clearly an important 
influence on the formulation of policy toward China.
China's desire before 1842 to isolate itself from the West
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violated the cardinal American belief in an accessible and 
orderly world. Consequently, opening China and keeping it 
open to America commerce and western civilization were the 
requisites of American policy. Consistent with the 
trusteeship Weltanschauung, Americans believed that, since 
China was not able or willing to provide the conditions 
conducive to contact on western terms, western states must 
provide those conditions for themselves. The right of the 
United States and other states to the markets, resources, 
and peoples of China took precedence over China's abstract 
rights of sovereignty and self-determination.
By the early twentieth century, Americans reached the 
conclusion that maintaining access to China required the 
transformation of China into a viable modern state. This 
transformation required foreign supervision and assistance. 
According to this logic, benevolent and constructive 
interference in China's affairs was legitimate, and, in 
fact, was necessary for the fulfillment of the interests of 
the United States and other advanced commercial nations, and 
was in the best interests of China itself.
The influence of trusteeship in America's China policy 
was significant on at least two levels. First, the tendency 
of American statesmen to view China as an immature and 
incompetent state requiring foreign supervision constrained 
America's policy toward China. As other historians have 
noted, American statesmen habitually treated China as a 
passive object and rarely recognized it as an actor in its
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93own right. The consequences of this myopia were evident 
in America's inability to come to terms with Chinese 
nationalism and in the American response to Japanese 
aggression in China. The typical reaction to both of those 
challenges was to insist that China must become "stable" 
before it could expect equal treatment from advanced states. 
In the meantime, China must endure some degree of foreign 
interference. Most American statesmen, concerned with 
defending the open door into China and believing that 
Japanese domination was antithetical to American interests, 
rejected the conclusion that China's backwardness justified 
Japanese aggression. But regardless of the complex debate 
over tactics, there was a consistent assumption underlying 
American policy: defense of the open door and of Chinese
integrity did not mean that China had a right to unfettered 
sovereignty.
The influence of trusteeship in American China policy 
was also significant because it illustrated the scope and 
flexibility of trusteeship as a factor in the formulation of 
American foreign policy. Trusteeship was not a specific 
type of policy, but was an attitude and posture toward 
allegedly incompetent or immature peoples. That trusteeship 
principles were embodied in policies of indirect control, 
investment, and assistance in a country over which the 
United States could not impose full and direct control 
illustrates that trusteeship was not restricted to colonial 
and quasi-colonial situations. On the contrary, it was an
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integral part of American policies toward all so-called 
backward nations, even one that Americans considered the 
most important country in Asia.
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CHAPTER VII 
INTERNATIONAL DUTY AND NATIONAL INTEREST: 
Experiments in International Trusteeship
Because of the existence of the United Nations 
Trusteeship System, trusteeship has become virtually 
synonymous with international trusteeship, that is, with 
some form of international supervision over colonial rule. 
This dissertation has shown that this unnecessarily narrow 
connotation of trusteeship distorts the real meaning of the 
concept. Nevertheless, international trusteeship was an 
important development, and in many ways it was the purest 
embodiment of the trusteeship model. Just as trustees or 
guardians in civil law necessarily acted with the authority 
of the community, trustee states in international 
trusteeship ruled with the authority of the community of 
civilized nations. Many American and British writers 
anticipated such a system long before it became a reality in 
1919. It was a logical development, since imperial powers 
had long claimed that they were already voluntarily 
following consensus standards in their colonial rule.
This chapter examines America's role in the evolution 
of international trusteeship from the Berlin Congo 
Conference of 1884-5 to the creation of the League of 
Nations Mandate System in 1919. It also offers a few 
general observations on the creation of the United Nations 
Trusteeship System. It emphasizes three major points.
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First, as other historians now agree, international 
imperialism was hardly a retreat from or a repudiation of 
imperialism.1 International imperialism constituted 
trusteeship in its purest form and rested, therefore, 
explicitly on the same assumptions that led to the building 
of colonial empires and other manifestations of control. 
Second, the United States actively encouraged and 
occasionally participated in efforts to assert international 
imperialism over backward areas. Contrary to prevailing 
assumptions (based on large part on the American trusteeship 
policy during the Second World War), American support for 
international trusteeship was not "anti-colonial” in its 
intentions. American statesmen favored the extension of 
international imperial control to previously independent 
regions for the same reasons it smiled upon the extension of 
"enlightened" imperialism. Enlightened imperialism and 
international trusteeship were, in fact, intimately related. 
Support for international trusteeship was perfectly 
consistent with American policy traditions and objectives, 
and was another manifestation of America's "passive" 
trusteeship policy. Third, the realization of a 
satisfactory international imperialism proved elusive. 
Suspicions, disagreements, and charges of bad faith 
characterized the several experiments in it. The attempts 
to internationalize the doctrine that control of backward 
peoples was legitimate only if it worked in the best 
interests of the native inhabitants and of the world at
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large underscored the importance of the third element of the 
triple mandate: self-interest.
I
The first significant efforts to regulate imperialism 
came in 1884-5 when the western powers met in Berlin to lay 
down the ground rules for the exploitation of Central 
Africa. At Berlin and at the 1890 Brussels Conference, the 
powers agreed on standards for their African native policies 
and pledged a concerted effort to civilize the "Dark 
Continent." The fundamental premise of the conferences was 
that civilizing Africa was desirable and inevitable. Far 
from being a repudiation of or a retreat from imperialism, 
the conferences simply formalized the humanitarian, 
paternalistic administration that each of the powers already 
professed to follow, and, more importantly, sought to avert 
conflicts between the western powers over the wealth of 
Africa. The Berlin Conference made trusteeship the 
prevailing slogan of western imperialism and was the most 
visible manifestation of the White Man's Burden in Africa. 
Virtually no one foresaw imminent independence for the 
peoples of Africa. In the centuries-long interim, the 
western powers had an obligation to give the Africans the 
material and spiritual fruits of their civilization while
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shielding them from its evils.
The United States was more than a casual observer 
during the Berlin Conference and the extension of 
trusteeship to Central Africa. American citizens had been 
instrumental in opening the Congo basin to white contact, 
and the American government was the first to recognize the 
Belgian-chartered company that governed the region.
U. S. policy toward the Congo was one of the earliest 
tangible indications of American support for "enlightened" 
western imperialism. The primary American objective in the 
Congo and in other areas of Africa and Asia was "access and 
order" and an open door to trade. In regions where the 
United States had only marginal interests and was clearly 
unwilling and unable to exert significant influence, the 
best way to achieve its objectives was by lending support to 
a friendly power. American statesmen conceived and 
discussed this kind of policy in terms of trusteeship. This 
was of course the "passive" trusteeship posture that the 
United States assumed toward Spain's remaining colonies in 
the Caribbean for most of the nineteenth century. And it 
was the cornerstone of American policy toward the European 
empires in Africa.2
In 1884 the United States saw in the Belgian-sponsored 
African International Association the means for opening and 
civilizing the Congo basin. In its report recommending that 
the United States recognize the Association as the 
legitimate government of the region, the Senate Foreign
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Relations Committee noted that the Association had succeeded
in building roads, establishing commercial relations with
and action as an "agent for the common welfare" of the
3peoples of the area. American policymakers perceived the
Association as a neutral force that would preclude the
domination of any single power, and would at the same time
develop the region and make it a thriving commercial center.
Secretary of State Frederick Frelinghuysen instructed
America's delegate to the Berlin Conference, former Iowa
Senator John A. Kasson, that the United States desired to
see the Congo basin neutralized and open to the world's
trade. He also expressed the hope that the International
Association could maintain a Central African state able to
guarantee that the region could "be for all time, as it
4were, m  trust for the benefit of all peoples. . . . "
American policymakers envisaged a Central Africa 
developed along western lines and open to the world's 
commerce, and toward that end they actively promoted 
European imperialism. John Kasson proved an enthusiastic 
and capable spokesman for American policy. He expressed 
sympathy with the objective of "reducing Africa to 
civilization." But those objectives were impossible if 
western powers exploited and oppressed the people and 
quarrelled over the spoils. Development and neutralization 
were essential instruments of trusteeship. Kasson reasoned 
that having "equal privilege" to trade in Central Africa was 
"not enough" to satisfy "the great producing power of Europe
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and America." In addition, western powers must "steadily 
encourage productive labor there, thus increasing the means 
of that people to buy the merchandise of civilized nations." 
Kasson also actively encouraged the powers to neutralize the 
Congo basin. The western powers must not only redeem Africa 
for Africans and for civilization; they must also save 
themselves from their own greed and jealousies. Kasson 
raised the spectre of European nations repeating in Africa 
the intrigue and intermittent conflict that occurred in 
colonial North America. The solution was for each 
government to recognize the African International 
Association as "the Trustee Government to administer it for 
the common interest, and subject to our rules of free 
commerce and free navigation.1,6
American policymakers in short concurred with the 
fundamental European conviction that African "savages" could 
not hope to avoid western domination and, therefore, the 
rational and ethical course was to regulate the terms of 
this contact. The consensus at Berlin was compatible with 
American conceptions of colonial trusteeship. It was not 
necessary for John Kasson to bring the Europeans around to 
an alien and visionary American attitude toward backward 
peoples. The basic American task was to insure that the 
future of the Congo conformed to American interests. The 
United States had no intention of serving as a trustee; it 
was merely part of the world community on whose behalf the 
imperial powers civilized and developed backward regions.
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American statesmen were happy to participate in a conference
that gave them some voice in supervising this development.
There were two groups at the Berlin Conference, John
Kasson wrote the new secretary of state in 1885: those who
wanted to colonize and those who merely wanted to trade.
The United States of course belonged to the latter group.
"Every concession was for their benefit;" Kasson boasted.
7"Every obligation was assumed by the former." There could 
hardly be a more satisfying formula for the United States in 
Africa. Despite Kasson's lobbying and the inclusion of a 
carefully-worded denial of any American responsibility in 
Africa, the U. S. Senate refused to ratify the Berlin 
treaties. It did, however, ratify the similar treaties that 
the conferees in Brussels produced in 1890. This gave 
American statesmen leverage to compel reforms in the Congo 
in 1908-9 when the Belgian government there fell under the
g
cloud of scandal for its land and labor policies.
The United States played a similar role at a conference 
in Algeciras Spain in 1906 that decided the future of 
Morocco. President Theodore Roosevelt helped arrange the 
meeting that sought to defuse Franco-German tensions that 
arose when Germany challenged French control over Morocco.
In this case the United States did not seek to encourage the 
extension of colonial control. Its policy in Morocco, as it 
was in most European-dominated regions of Africa and Asia, 
was simply to insure that the domination was efficient, 
humanitarian, and, especially, did not discriminate against
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foreign trade. Secretary of State Elihu Root spelled out
American goals in two sets of instructions to the American
delegates. Root was concerned with the existence in French
Morocco of the same conditions that the U. S. demanded and
often compelled in Latin America: "[s]ecurity of life and
property," "financial reform," and [e]ffective policing."
In a passage that historians have correctly cited as an
archetypical statement of the logic of "open door
imperialism," Root lectured the delegates that:
While it is to the advantage of the powers to 
secure the 'open door1 it is equally vital to 
their interests and no less so to the advantage of 
Morocco that the door, being open, shall lead to 
something; that the outside world shall benefit 
by assured opportunites, and that the Moroccan 
people shall be made in a measure fit and able to 
profit by the advantages of the proposed 
reform.
Where the United States could not and would not intervene, 
it was clearly willing to see others do so. Through 
international trusteeship, American statesmen sought to 
exert enough influence to make other nations' imperialism 
work to American advantage. Equally importantly, 
trusteeship allowed Root, Kasson and others to believe that 
enlightened, efficient foreign rule served a harmony of 
interests, and was as beneficial to "child" races as it was 
to the civilized races that coveted their resources.
These vignettes of American participation in 
international trusteeship illustrate more than a cynical, 
or, more accurately, pragmatic American attitude. They
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reveal a pervasive western belief that regulated, 
enlightened imperialism could be a positive good. Even many 
"anti-imperialists” believed that imperialism based on the 
principles of trusteeship was legitimate and beneficial to 
native peoples and to civilization as a whole. No doubt 
western rule could bring peace, order, stability, and 
material and spiritual improvements to backward peoples.
Many critics of imperialism did not deny this; they simply 
asserted that nations too often paid lip service to these 
ideals only to pursue policies designed primarily to garner 
profits for themselves. If imperial powers were sincere in 
their professions of trusteeship, they should be willing to 
submit to the scrutiny of the community of civilized 
nations.
Perhaps the most persuasive spokesman of this 
perspective was the English socialist, John A. Hobson. 
Historians usually cite Hobson's 1902 work, Imperialism: A
Study, as the first significant attack on the economic bases 
of imperialism and an influence on V. I. Lenin's later 
tract. But Hobson devoted a considerable portion of his 
study to justifying the theoretical legitimacy of the "white 
man's burden" and excoriating the western powers for failing 
to live up to it. Under certain conditions, Hobson 
admitted, "the characteristic form of modern Imperialism is 
not altogether illegitimate." He conceded three of the 
fundamental premises of the trusteeship Weltanschauung: 
that "complete isolation is no longer possible[;]" that "It
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is the great practical business of the country to explore 
and develop, by every method which science can devise, the 
hidden natural resources of the globe[;]" and that "there 
can be no inherent natural right in a people to refuse that 
measure of compulsory education which shall raise it from 
childhood to manhood in the order of nationalities.1,11
Hobson then outlined the requisites of "legitimate" or
"sane" imperialism. His chief complaint was that western
imperialism lacked the essential rationality to give real
meaning to trusteeship. "This claim to justify aggression,
annexation, and forcible government by the talk of duty,
trust, or mission can," Hobson asserted, "only be made good
by proving that the claimant is accredited by a body
genuinely representative of civilization, to which it
acknowledges a real responsibility. . . . "  The "first
essentials of a trust" were assurances that the trustee
represents "the interested parties" and that he does not
12violate or abuse the trust. With one of the chief 
critics of imperialism arguing this case, it is not 
surprising that trusteeship and formal supervision of 
colonial rule became a popular rationalization for the 
continuation or extension of imperial rule.
II
International trusteeship became the focus of intense 
discussion before and during the First World War. Its
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exponents conceived it as a means to continue the essential 
functions of imperialism, yet at the same time avoid the 
attendant evils, real and imagined. For one thing, if 
interested nations cooperated to impose order and regenerate 
a country or delegated one of their number to do so, it 
would free the intervention from suspicions of having 
ulterior motives. This was of course one of the primary 
arguments behind the proposals for multi-lateral 
intervention in the Caribbean that were so popular in the 
early 1900s. Humanitarian reformers long believed that 
standards such as those agreed upon at Berlin and Brussels 
required enforcement. The Belgian Congo scandals proved 
that abuses were inevitable without formal supervision.
Other abuses occurred in the form of commercial
discrimination and competition. Despite the universal lip
service paid to the "open door" in backward areas, most
imperial nations continued to dominate the economies of
their dependencies. Imperial nations therefore continued to
compete, even fight for economic privileges in the "waste
spaces" of the globe. Consequently, an obligatory element
in all internationalization schemes was what economist Simon
Patten simply called "a fair distribution of tropical areas
13among the commercial nations." Social worker and New^
Republic co-editor Walter Weyl made the "joint use" of
backward areas and the "internationalization of the great
commercial opportunities" cornerstones of his proposed
14"higher imperialism." Weyl affirmed many of the
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principles underlying western imperialism and even U. S.
Caribbean policy. Typical of American opinion during the
war era, Weyl's greatest objection was to the lack of
adequate safeguards and absense of efficiency in the flawed
existing system of imperialism.
Weyl's co-editor, the precocious intellectual Walter
Lippmann, authored one of the most important blueprints for
a new imperialism. Lippmann's vision was Euro-centered; he
viewed backward areas more as problems and opportunities for
western nations than as important entities in themselves.
The fundamenal problem of modern diplomacy, he wrote in The
Stakes of Diplomacy (1915) was the "weak state." States
that had "the pretension of political independence which
they do not fulfill" and which "lack the political
development that modern commerce requires" created vacuums
that industrial nations rushed to fill, colliding as a
consequence. The world could not wait for the "natural
development" of these regions because contact and commercial
15penetration was no longer a matter of will or of choice.
Significantly, Lippmann did not offer his plan for
internationalized imperialism as a substitute for all
existing empires. He explained to an English correspondent
in 1916 that his suggestions would not immediately apply to
countries such as Egypt and India already under effective 
16control. Lippmann was concerned with the extension of 
imperial control to areas of international friction and to 
areas without effective supervision. For instance, Lippmann
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often mentioned China as a country requiring some kind of
assistance. The United States had a special interest there
and in Latin America and Mexico, where it must eventually 
17intervene. Lippmann's scheme included the creation of
"miniature world legislatures" for friction areas of the
world. These bodies would substitute a single authority for
the anarchy of competing states, and compel the allegiance
of adventurers and other disrupting forces. Their mission
would be to "organize" backward territories by stabilizing
finances, modernizing administration, developing resources,
18and educating native peoples. Lippmann placed his hope
for the world's future in an alliance of civilized states,
especially England and America. "The kind of world we
desire," he wrote in 1916, was "a world of stable,
autonomous, interdependent democracies acting as guardians
19of less developed peoples. . . . "
Theodore Marburg, Taft's Minister to Belgium and a 
prominent internationalist, was probably America's leading 
exponent of internationalized imperialism. In 1911 he 
contributed to the discussion of an internationalized Monroe 
Doctrine. The following year he wrote an article on "The 
Backward Nation" that elicited voluminous comment from 
statesmen and scholars. A long-time advocate of 
intervention in Latin America, Marburg believed that the 
United States could allay foreign suspicion and even assert 
a "just claim upon the powers for their share of the 
expenses" if the United States acted as an agent for an
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2 0"international tribunal" of civilized powers.
Marburg elevated joint intervention into an instrument
of world progress, a means for diffusing civilized races and
their institutions. He had few qualms over justifying the
forcible regeneration of backward nations. Their inability
to exist on the same plane with civilized nations posed
"[a]n ever-present menance to peace." Anticipating Walter
Lippmann, Marburg believed that regeneration of the backward
nation was a requisite for world peace. Marburg confessed
that external control "does not embody ideal justice," but
he added that in this less than ideal world, backward
nations were simply not capable of self-regeneration.
Furthermore, especially with the safeguards of international
imperialism, external control was in the best interests of
backward peoples. "Conquest" in the future, he concluded
21optimistically, will be "life-giving, not life-taking."
Marburg carried these ideas and the trusteeship
Weltanschauung that underlay them into the most important
war era internationalist organization, the League to Enforce
Peace. The League's positions on imperialism and weak
states closely mirrored Marburg's own. A dazzling list of
prominent figures founded the League in 1915 to formulate
and publicize plans for a post-war world organization.
While Marburg and his associate, Hamilton Holt, editor of
The Independent, did publish suggestions for international
control of colonies, the future of backward areas was not a
22major focus of League discussion.
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But Marburg's and his colleagues' vision of a world of 
advanced states acting as trustees for backward ones 
pervaded the League's programme. Most fundamental of all to 
both the internationalist case and to the trusteeship 
Weltanschauung was the assumption that there was no right to 
absolute sovereignty. Nations in an interdependent world,
like individuals in civil society, must surrender some
23 . . .degree of autonomy. This general principle, applicable
to all, had special meaning for backward states. The
doctrine of limited sovereignty justified interventionism
and carried a corollary that neither were nations equal in
their sovereignty.
The League recommended an organization with exclusive
membership. Marburg and the League were convinced "That
membership of any smaller states except those able to
maintain settled conditions at home would prove fatal to the
A  4
League." The proposed League of Nations would not
oppress or ignore these excluded peoples and states. The
world organization was in fact to be for the benefit of
backward peoples, but not by them. The League "must accept
a trusteeship for backward nations" and create "conditions
which will make their progress possible," Marburg wrote in 
25
1 9 1 8.
With this perspective, Marburg and the League 
deprecated the talk about "self-determination" which 
followed in the wake of Woodrow Wilson's wartime idealism. 
Marburg considered self-determination "a most troublesome
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
3 5 1
doctrine," liable to abuse. He reminded the corresponding
secretary of the League of Small and Subject Nations that to
"multiply the number of small states in the world is simply
to multiply the causes of war." He explicitly opposed "the
2 6breaking up of the Empires."
Another prominent League member, former President 
William Howard Taft, agreed that the great powers would be 
"the trustees for all" in the new League of Nations. Taft 
warned that the probable creation of new states in Eastern 
Europe and the Near East would give the world "six or seven 
Cubas" that temporarily required "the kindly assistance" of 
the Western Allies. "Unless we exercise the power of the 
father over these new children of ours they will prove 
unruly," and perhaps plunge the world into another general 
war, Taft warned in December 1918. The tropical colonies, 
needless to say, could not be independent in any way and 
must be placed under an "agency" of the League of 
Nations.27
In 1918 and 1919 the questions surrounding 
international regulation of imperialism shifted from the 
theoretical to the very real. With American entry into the 
war, the United States assured itself a voice in determining 
the shape of the post-war world. Our focus must, therefore, 
shift from the public discussions of the issue to the 
evolving policy of the Wilson administration.
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III
Developments during the war set the parameters for the
colonial issue at the Paris Peace Conference. The defeat of
the Central Powers raised the tangible question of what to
do with Germany's colonies in Africa and the Pacific, and
the Turkish Empire in the Near East. The Allied powers
decided early in the war that they would strip the Central
Powers of their dependencies, and they concluded a series of
"secret treaties" dividing the spoils. Meanwhile, there was
a lively debate among British statesmen and intellectuals
over the fate of the German colonies. All agreed that
Germany, by its disrespect for sovereign rights and
treaties, had forfeited its place among the civilized
nations and its right to govern colonies. British
propaganda even dredged up all the dark spots on Germany's
colonial record and portrayed the Germans as archetypical
2 8imperial exploiters. But, in contrast to the terms of
the secret treaties, there was a consensus among public
observers that the Allies could not simply annex the defunct
colonies. Instead, the colonies must come under the direct
supervision of a league of nations (the position of the
Labour Party and the Fabian socialists) or under the
administration of a single state acting as mandatory for a 
29league.
American entry into the war and the Bolshevik 
revolution greatly complicated the future of the colonial
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scene. The Bolsheviks' exposure of the secret treaties in 
December 1917 threatened to undermine the Allies' carefully 
constructed public image. Wilson's idealism, which already 
caused uneasiness among the British and French, escalated in 
response to the Bolshevik ideological offensive and appeal 
to dependent peoples. Wilson, in his Fourteen Points 
address of January 1918, and even British Prime Minister 
David Lloyd-George, in an address three days earlier,
reiterated the Allied pledge of fair treatment of dependent
30peoples and small nations.
"Self-determination" became the popular slogan of the
Allied cause. But what exactly it meant and how far it
would influence American policy toward the colonial world
remained unclear. Wilson's political foes, and old colonial
hands were unanimous in their condemnation of the slogan.
Senator and former Secretary of State Philander Knox warned
against "letting the phrase 'self-determination of peoples'
31quite running away with us."
The harshest and most striking criticism, however, came
from within the president's inner circle. As Wilson was
contemplating his Fourteen Points address, Secretary of
State Robert Lansing warned him against caving in to the
Bolshevik propaganda. Applying self-determination to
peoples currently part of stable empires would, Lansing
32asserted, cause "international anarchy." Lansing vented 
his anxieties in a series of private notes circulated among 
the American peace delegation in Paris. Self-determination,
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he wrote, was no more than "consent of the governed" warmed
over and was equally invalid as a universal principle. The
more he thought about it, he wrote in December 1918, the
more convinced he was "of the danger of putting such ideas
into the minds of certain races. . . The phrase is simply
loaded with dynamite. . . What a calamity that the phrase
33was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!" The 
administration's colonial specialist, historian George Louis 
Beer, similarly noted that "loose talk about 
'self-determination" had aroused dormant forces which were 
dangerous to orderly development and sound progress."34
If self-determination were an invalid principle, what
then was the American position on the future of dependent
peoples? In response to this problem, American policymakers
first restricted all discussions of the subject to the
liberated colonies and territories. They assured British
officials that the peace conference would not seek to change
35the status of Allied colonies. And, instead of an 
indiscriminate application of self-determination to all 
peoples (especially non-European ones), the colonial 
settlement would rest on the more limited principle of 
international supervision over colonial administration. , 
Walter Lippmann, who served the Wilson administration as a 
member of The Inquiry, a group appointed to plan American 
objectives in the post-war world, authored an October 1918 
interpretation of the Fourteen Points. Referring to Point V 
on colonial questions, Lippmann wrote:
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It would seem as if the principle involved in this 
proposition is that a colonial power acts not as 
owner of its colonies, but as trustee for the 
natives and for the interests of the society of 
nations, that the terms on which the colonial 
administration is conducted are a matter of 
international concern and may legitimately be the 
subject of international inquiry and that the 
peace conference may, therefore, write a code of 
colonialgconduct binding upon all colonial 
powers.
This familiar logic constituted the foundation of the
proposals by George Louis Beer. Also a member of The
Inquiry, Beer was America's African "expert" and also
addressed the future of the Turkish Empire. Beer was part
of the American delegation in Paris and maintained close
contacts with European, especially British, colonial
authorities. An historian of British imperialism in North
America, Beer was a thoroughgoing anglophile, and an ardent
admirer of the British Empire. He believed that the United
States must cooperate with the Empire to insure future world
progress. Baer shared with Lippmann and Theodore Marburg a
conviction that an alliance of civilized (especially
Anglo-Saxon) peoples, acting on behalf of the rest of
mankind, was civilization's last best hope. The benevolent
and higher purposes of such an alliance took precedence over
"legalistic" theories of sovereignty and the "self-regarding
sovereignty" to which he attributed the war. Intervention
in the affairs of backward and disorganized states had a
37solid foundation in theory and necessity.
With those assumptions, Beer was one of the most
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articulate and influential spokesmen for international
trusteeship. In his memoranda written for The Inquiry, Beer
emphasized that Africans and Arabs needed protection from
themselves and were simply not prepared for
38self-government. But Beer was genuinely committed to the
maintenance of humanitarian standards of colonial rule.
Typical of official and unofficial wartime declarations,
Beer stated the case for stripping Germany of its African
possessions in terms of trusteeship. Contrary to the terms
of the Berlin and Brussels treaties to which it was a
signatory (and to which Beer was personally devoted),
Germany destroyed tribal life, failed to bring physical and
educational reforms to the people, failed to control the
liquor trade, and sought to use its colonies as a "means to
spread German Kultur." The forfeiture of its colonies was,
he concluded, a necessary punishment for "Germany's total
failure to appreciate the duties of colonial 
39trusteeship."
Beer's solution was the formalization of the principle
"that the state exercising sovereignty in Africa is
proceeding under an international mandate and must act as
trustee primarily for the nations and secondarily for the
outside world as a whole." The proposed world organization
should also extend, strengthen, and codify the provisions of
the Berlin and Brussels conferences for protecting native
40rights and for guaranteeing the open door in Africa. The 
trusteeship principle and the mandates idea were not the
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work of any one person, but George Beer certainly deserves 
credit for bringing it into official circles. In any case, 
the mandates idea already had wide currency when the 
American peace delegation arrived in Paris.
Woodrow Wilson actually accepted the necessity of 
international trusteeship even before he reached Paris. In 
a ship-board discussion on December 10, 1918, Wilson told 
the delegation that "mandates" over the former German 
colonies— to be administered by small neutral states— would 
be the glue of the new league of nations.43- Wilson soon 
retreated from the idea of having small states administer 
the mandates, but continued to believe that advanced nations 
must administer backward peoples as a trust accountable to a 
league. The December 16th proposal for a mandates system 
offered by South African Prime Minister Jan Christian Smuts 
merely reinforced Wilson's devotion to this solution.
It is neither possible nor necessary to recount here 
the vicissitudes of Wilson's stance at Paris on the question
A *)
of imperialism. Instead, we can learn much by simply 
noting the points on which Wilson would and would not 
compromise to the demands of the Allies. Wilson's attitude 
toward the Philippines, and his policies toward Latin 
America and China clearly illustrated that he was not a 
doctrinaire anti-imperialist. In his academic and political 
careers he was a consistent believer in the necessity of 
control over and tutelage of developing nations.
Wilson did not disagree with those critics who pointed
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out that self-determination could not mean immediate
independence for the peoples of Asia and Africa. Point V of
the Fourteen Points merely promised the "free, open-minded,
and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims,"
based on the principle that "the interests of the
populations concerned must have equal weight with the
equitable claims of the government whose title is to be 
43determined." In the several drafts of the League of
Nations covenant, and during the peace negotiations, Wilson
interpreted self-determination to mean that backward peoples
should have a voice in choosing their form of government and
who their mandatory state would be, not, significantly,
44whether or not they would have a mandatory.
Wilson embraced the international trusteeship concept 
and championed the Beer-Smuts proposals that capable 
imperial powers should assume control of the defunct German 
colonies and Turkish territories, and administer them as 
mandatories for the League. The mandatory was answerable to 
the League and its primary responsibility was to raise 
backward peoples toward adulthood in the family of nations. 
The mandates system was a reform of imperialism which 
Wilson, Beer and many other Americans hoped would soon 
encompass all empires. This settlement was not the 
discovery of a new principle, Wilson told the conference, 
but "the universal application of a principle. It is the 
agreement of the great nations which have tried to live by 
these standards in their separate administrations to unite
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in seeeing that their common force and common thought and
intelligence are lent to this great and humane 
45enterprise."
This affirmation of Allied virtue was doubtlessly
sincere, but it was also calculated flattery of the Allies,
intended to persuade them to accept the principle of
international supervision of colonies. Wilson and the
American delegation were deeply suspicious of the Allies'
obvious determination to fulfill the terms of the secret 
46treaties. The mandates system was compatible with
Wilson's own view of colonialism and with his goals at the
conference, but he was not sure that the Allies shared his
commitment to the creation of a new world order.
Wilson wasted no time in laying down the essential
terms of the colonial settlement. First and foremost,
"there shall in no case be any annexation" of the
territories in question. This was the irreducible meaning
of all the Allies' wartime rhetoric. Secondly, the League
of Nations must at least be "the residuary trustee with
sovereign right of disposal or of continued administration"
of these territories. The failure to establish some system
of formal accountability would subvert the whole league
idea. "The League of Nations would be a laughing stock if
it were not invested with this quality of trusteeship,"
Wilson told the conference. It was, he bluntly stated, "a
47test of their labours. . . . "
Wilson defended these essential principles against a
R e p ro d u c e d  with p erm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
3 6 0
series of assaults upon the very foundation of the colonial 
settlement. The most outrageous assaults were the 
aggressive claims by such nations as France, Italy, and 
Belgium to their "share of the mandates or 
territories. . . . "  This was of course hardly the language 
of selfless powers volunteering to share in what Wilson 
considered the thankless burden of uplifting backward 
peoples. Wilson was not blind to the inherent self-interest 
in the colonial settlement. But the sine qua non must be 
the rule of powers able and willing to conform to the 
standards of enlightened imperialism and to subject 
themselves to some degree of international supervision. 
Wilson and Beer felt that such powers as Italy and Belgium
were, because of their blighted records as colonial rulers,
. . . 48unqualified for this sacred duty.
The more subtle and substantial challenge to Wilson's 
and America's conception of international trusteeship came 
from the British Empire. In what some observers termed "the 
annexation plot," Britain and especially the Dominions of 
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa sought to convince 
Wilson that they should be allowed to annex the German 
colonies in their neighborhoods. Wilson's feud with the 
Dominion prime ministers produced the stormiest sessions of 
the entire Paris Peace Conference. The friction grew in 
part from a basic difference in opinion over the importance 
of formal supervision of colonial trusteeship. More 
importantly, the effect of it was to force Wilson to insist
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upon acceptance of what he acknowledged to be the 
theoretical fine line between annexation and formal 
international sovereignty. This is not to deny that this 
fine line conceivably meant the difference between the 
continuation of the old imperialist order and the creation 
of effective international imperialism. But Wilson’s fight 
against the "annexation plot" also illustrated the potential 
pitfalls of America's traditional acquiescence in 
enlightened European imperialism.
The Dominions' position at Paris was not wholly
unexpected. Britons during the war found in Germany's
alleged betrayal of its colonial trust more reason than ever
to feel proud of their own empire. Most believed that the
widely-discussed proposals for international trusteeship
were, as Wilson noted at Paris, simply extensions of British
49colonial principles. Lloyd-George and the Dominion 
leaders based their pitch for annexation of Germany's 
African and Pacific colonies on this point and on the 
potential security threat that these areas posed for the 
Empire if they ever again fell into hostile hands. They 
tried to minimize the differences between a mandate and 
annexation as "that between leasehold and freehold tenure." 
Naturally the latter would guarantee faster development. 
Furthermore, annexation was only an evil if it were 
"imperialistic." British and Dominion rule rested on 
principles of democracy and trusteeship. Annexation, they 
argued, was in the best interests of the Dominions, the
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peoples of the German colonies, and of "humanity." Even the
French delegate argued that since "[a]11 the great powers
worthy of the name considered their colonies as wards
entrusted to them by the world," why not simply allow them
50to absorb Germany's wronged dependencies?
How could the United States argue with such logic? Its
own colonial empire and protectorates rested on the
assumption that enlightened imperialism and intervention
were legitimate and qualitatively different from imperialism
in its pejorative sense. Wilson made his own position even
weaker by praising the virtue of British and Allied rule.
His criteria for service as mandatory further suggested that
he approved of Allied imperialism and would smile upon the
Dominions' claim for direct rule over the German colonies.
Wilson told the peace conference that the League should
entrust mandates to states "which have already shown that
they can exercise a conscience in this matter. . . " and "to
advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their
experience, or their geographic position, can best undertake
51this responsibility." The new order of imperialism was 
not to be a total repudiation of the old order, but an 
extension and refinement of the old order's virtues and 
successes.
Wilson was even willing to compromise on his vision of 
the ultimate fate of dependent peoples. Wilson persistently 
noted that the goal of trusteeship was to create 
self-governing peoples. Mandatories were, in other words,
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to prepare their charges for "graduation" and adulthood.
Yet Wilson in a startling speech to the delegates 
(undoubtedly intended in part as a ploy to gain the 
cooperation of the Dominions) raised the possibility that 
mandates would eventually become permanent dependencies.
Act as mandatories of the League, he advised the Dominions. 
If, after the mandatory had raised the people to a point at 
which they could decide their own future, the people chose 
independence over the continued rule of the mandatory, this 
would ipso facto prove the inadequacy of their rule.52 The 
mandatories would have an undetermined length of time to 
convince the peoples of the mandates that permanent 
attachment to the mandatory was preferable to independence.
In the end Wilson won the basic point and the 
mandatories did not formally annex their wards. But the 
legal status of the mandates long remained a subject of 
debate. Professor Quincy Wright concluded that the original 
idea was whittled down to "the semblance of annexation." 
Scholars and legal expe :s debated whether the sovereignty 
of mandates rested with the mandatory or with the League, 
but never conclusively resolved the issue. Contemporaries 
and historians agree that all but a few mandates became de 
facto possessions and that the powers succeeded in achieving 
under the guise of trusteeship ohe territoral partitions 
outlined in the secret treaties. Wilson and Beer knew that 
the compromise failed to embody the true ideals of 
international trusteeship. They continually pressed for
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revisions in the preliminary drafts of the mandates
agreements, but this was clearly something of a rearguard 
54action. Wilson was worried about appearances and he 
desperately wanted to avoid the appearance that the 
conference merely divided the spoils of war.55
The controversy over the mandates system was not the 
result of a simplistic struggle between European imperialism 
and American anti-imperialism. The disagreement, though not 
inconsiderable, was more subtle and restrained. Wilson, 
Beer, and the majority of American policymakers did not 
disagree that the former German colonies and Turkish 
territories needed further foreign control and tutelage 
before they could take their places as independent, or even 
autonomous states. Neither did they regard the existing 
colonial empires as evil throwbacks to a dark age of 
imperialism. The American willingness to recognize the 
virtue of enlightened European empires allowed the Europeans 
to prevent the creation of a real international trusteeship. 
In other words, Wilson's willingness to compromise on the 
mandates question at Paris revealed that the United States 
was not anti-imperialist enough in its sympathies to make 
the realization of international trusteeship a top foreign 
policy priority (if indeed the U. S. possessed the power to 
compel the creation of such a system).
International trusteeship was the purest manifestation 
of trusteeship, but it was not the only legitimate 
manifestation. Similarly, international trusteeship rested
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on the same foundation as national trusteeship and was, 
therefore, not a suitable vehicle for a truly 
anti-imperialistic program. And, if American statesmen were 
unable to argue unequivocally for international trusteeship 
in the disposition of the German colonies, they showed 
outright discomfort with the principle when the League 
requested that the United States itself accept 
responsibility for mandates.
IV
The League Mandates System differed from previous 
ventures in international trusteeship not only in the extent 
of international supervision, but also because it brought 
the United States into that circle of nations that would 
administer the backward peoples. Had the United States 
acted according to the plans of the League's fathers, it 
could no longer have received every concession while others 
bore every obligation. Not surprisingly, even this abortive 
role as mandatory gave American statesmen a new perspective 
on the question of international trusteeship.
Soon after American entry into the war, the British 
began pressuring the United States to play some role in the 
post-war colonial settlement. David Lloyd-George suggested 
to Colonel Edward House in November 1917 that the 
U. S. accept temporary control over Armenia and 
Constantinople. Shortly after the armistice of November
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1918, Lloyd-George intimated to House that Britain desired 
the U. S. to become a "trustee" for Germany's East African 
colonies. Although House was one of the earliest champions 
of the mandates idea, he was highly— and 
properly— suspicious of Lloyd-George's motives. The 
British, House told Robert Lansing, "would like us to accept 
something so they might more fully take what they 
desire."56 in short, the suspicion of Allied motives in 
the distribution of mandates was as strong among the 
League's friends as it was among its critics.
Despite some suggestions that the United States become 
the mandatory for German East Africa or the Cameroons, the 
most serious discussions involved American acceptance of a 
mandate over Armenia, Anatolia (Asia Minor), and 
Constantinople. This proposal went far beyond the planning 
stage. The United States sent two missions to investigate 
the prospects of American rule in the region. In May 1920 
President Wilson favorably submitted the powers' request 
that the United States become mandatory for these regions.
A month later the Senate rejected what many perceived as a 
secondary test of America's formal participation in the 
post-war world order.
The choice of the United States as mandatory in the 
Near East was a logical extension of a kind of "special 
relationship" between the United States and Armenia. 
Prominent Americans had led the philanthropic effort to aid 
the victims of the notorious 1915 Turkish massacre of
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Armenians. The massive relief effort built on an older 
foundation of American educational and religious 
institutions in Armenia and Lebanon. Thus there was a 
highly influential lobby in the United States in support of 
aid to the oppressed Christian peoples of the Turkish 
Empire.57
The Allied powers determined to strip the Turks of much 
of their former empire, including all of its European 
territory, Armenia, Mesopotamia (Iraq), Syria, and 
Palestine. Believing that these areas could not immediately 
support themselves as independent states (especially in the 
face of Turkish irredentism and Mustafa Kemal's rising 
nationalist movement), the powers sought mandatories for 
them and for Turkey itself. That the choice of mandatories 
suspiciously conformed to the terms of the wartime secret 
treaties became a prime issue in the American debate. 
Ostensibly, the powers offered the United States the mandate 
over Armenia because of its special relationship, over 
Constantinople because of the importance of neutralizing 
that important gateway, and over Anatolia because the other 
two areas were indefensible without it. Furthermore, unlike 
the Pacific Islands and tropical African nations, the 
Turkish territories required only a minimum of supervision 
and a short trusteeship, facts designed to appeal to 
American opinion. But Americans skeptically noted that 
their Turkish mandate was the most economically and 
militarily burdensome, and encompassed those areas that the
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Allies (excepting Russia which no longer figured in the
CQ
territorial settlement) had not wanted.
Woodrow Wilson was well aware of this situation as he 
dealt with the Turkish mandates issue at Paris. Arab and 
Armenian representatives presented their case for 
self-determination and many requested American assistance. 
Wilson, however, was strikingly reluctant to commit the 
United States to accepting a mandate, especially over all of 
Turkey. He constantly reminded the conferees that the 
American people and the U. S. Senate would balk at the 
economic and military cost of a mandate over any Asian 
people; they were in fact ready to drop their burden in the 
Philippines. Wilson pursued a strategy of delay, 
recommending further investigation of the Near Eastern 
situation. This irritated Lloyd-George and the Allies who
argued that their publics resented the continued cost of
. . . . . . 59maintaining armies of occupation m  the region.
Ironically, Wilson presented the case against accepting 
a mandate over Armenia better than he presented the case for 
it. Undoubtedly this was in part an effort to anticipate 
and satisfy a critical Senate. He succeeded in including in 
the revised League Covenant a clause explicitly allowing a 
power to refuse to accept the offer of a mandate. But it is 
exceedingly difficult to discern when Wilson merely 
anticipated Senate criticism and when he articulated his own 
views. He informed the peace conference Council of Four 
rather bluntly that the American people were not inclined to
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bear any part of the world's burdens and sacrifices in Asia 
Minor "where they had no material interests."
A month later he stated his own opinion that "a mandate
over Turkey [as opposed to one over just Armenia] would be a
mistake," but agreed that "some power ought to have a firm
hand." He did not deny that Turkey must leave
Constantinople and Thrace and affirmed the prevailing
opinion that the newly-liberated peoples of the Turkish
Empire required "guidance and some intimate
6 0superintendence" Wilson seemed to argue the traditional 
American position that someone must become the people's 
trustees, but that that someone must not be the United 
States. Most Americans, he conceded in late February 1919, 
wanted "to observe what I may call without offense 
Pharisaical cleanliness and not take anything out of the 
pile. . . even by way of superintendence."6  ^Wilson
concluded that he must consciously steer American opinion, 
and, in May 1920, he appealed to the Senate "that it would 
do nothing less than arrest the hopeful progress of 
civilization if we were to refuse to become the friends and 
advisers of such of these people as we may be 
authoritatively and formally requested to guide and 
assist."62
Wilson's belated and luke-warm support for the mandate 
contrasted sharply with an outpouring of support and 
sympathy from many prominent Americans. Those people 
emphasized the mandate as a symbol of America's commitment
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entered the war. The United States had a particular duty to
protect and nurture the Armenians, the largest population of
Christians in the Near East. James W. Gerard, former
Ambassador to Germany and Chairman of the American Committee
For the Independence of Armenia, enumerated a long list of
reasons for accepting a mandate. He coupled arguments of
duty and philanthropy with assurances that the mandate would
not endanger American security or, contrary to most reports,
saddle the United States with an economic liability. On the
contrary, he argued, Armenia was potentially one of the
world's "richest" areas. But Gerard relied on tempting
Americans with the call to a higher duty. The United
States, because of its disinterest and innocence, "shall set
an example to other mandatories and thus make the mandatory
duty 'a sacred trust for civilization.'" Furthermore, if the
United States accepted the Armenian mandate, it would
"become the outpost of American civilization in the East,"
and "a great opportunity for the propagation of Anglo-Saxon
6 3civilization in the Near East."
Former Ambassador to Turkey Henry Morgenthau joined 
Gerard in leading the fight for a mandate over Armenia and 
all of Turkey. Morgenthau emphasized America's unique 
qualifications for regenerating the region. The former 
ambassador acquired unbound contempt for the Turks, whom he 
dubbed "the habitual criminals of history," and he believed 
that their former territories required "a thorough
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reconstruction" of their institutions. His sympathy with
the Armenians and other oppressed peoples did not blind him
to what he felt was their incompetence for self-government.
If left to themselves, he asserted, they "will necessarily
continue to retrograde." "What the Armenian state requires
is a kind of receivership, and we should take it over in
trust, to manage it until it is time to turn it over when
64its government is solvent and on a going basis."
Talcott Williams, the Turkish-born Professor of
Journalism at Columbia, agreed that the United States was
the nation most capable of giving the rest of the world an
example of successful trusteeship. Like Morgenthau and many
others, he cited American experience in Cuba, the
Philippines, and even Hispaniola as proof of American
credentials as a trustee. And, like Gerard, Williams
believed that the United States could, through its
trusteeship, raise the plane of international action and
advance civilization. "The United States is the only land
which is looked upon as unselfish, having no ambitions, and
representing a system which desires not empire over the
65earth, but freedom m  the world," Williams argued.
That the United States was the most virtuous power and, 
therefore, must accept a mandate to insure world peace and 
progress was the essential conclusion of a major American 
mission to the Near East. Oberlin College President Henry 
C. King and Chicago industrialist and former Minister to 
China Charles Crane headed the American Section (in
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actuality the only section) of the International Commission 
on Mandates in Turkey in early 1919. This 
missionary-dominated group endeavored to take the pulse of 
the peoples of the Turkish Empire and discover their desires 
for the future. The King-Crane Commission report was 
notable both for its elaboration of the concept of 
trusteeship and its expansive vision of America's role in 
the Near East.
For most of the former Turkish territories, King and 
Crane recommended a short "tutelage," intended merely to 
create "a sound national spirit," educational institutions, 
religious liberty, and economic stability. In Turkey 
itself, and especially in Constantinople, they proposed to 
substitute for " selfish scramble" of nations a recognition 
of "a great and distinctly international or world 
interest. . . . "  They defended their proposals for an 
independent League-controlled state of Constantinople on the 
grounds that Turkey was "simply not conceivably equal to a 
great world responsibility; and the larger world interests 
must prevail."66
King and Crane recommended that the United States 
accept mandates not only for Armenia, Turkey, and 
Constantinople, but also for Syria and Mesopotamia (the 
latter they acknowledged was unrealistic). In all cases 
they based their recommendations on what they believed was 
the popular will. While the people professed to want 
"absolute independence," this was, King and Crane explained,
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a misnomer. The people really wanted "assistance." And,
faced with a choice between assistants, the people of all of
these areas favored the United States. The United Stats had
proven its good faith in Cuba and the Philippines, and
through its philanthropy in the Near East; and it was the
67only power without territorial interests in the region.
The Commission believed that the British were incapable of
surrendering their "colonial" frame of mind for the ideals
of trusteeship. They also submitted a secret appendix that
condemned French colonial policy and argued that continued
French and British rivalry in the Near East could encourage
the growth of destructive reactionary forces in the 
68region.
This critique of even the Allies' colonial policies was 
characteristic of America's approach to trusteeship. Rather 
than arguing simply that the United States must join other 
qualified powers in assuming its share of the mandates 
burden, Americans struck their customary holier-than-thou 
pose. Those favoring the U. S. accepting a mandate took a 
nationalist approach to international duty. Backward 
peoples and fledgling states must, they agreed, have 
mandatories so that they could develop into viable 
self-governing states and not become the centers of intrigue 
and competition. But only the United States was truly in a 
position to fulfill these objectives of trusteeship. The 
other powers, precisely because of their long experience as 
colonizers and established presence in the friction areas,
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could not summon the political detachment and commitment to 
the new ideals that international trusteeship required.
This American exceptionalism was hardly new. It was in 
fact the same argument Americans used for taking control of 
the Philippines, for intervening in the Caribbean, and for 
asserting its right to advise and assist China. It was the 
logic of "preemptive" unilateral imperialism. The United 
States must act because no other power could or would 
achieve the necessary ends. It was also a logical extension 
of the ambivalent view that American imperialists held of 
the European empires. While the Europeans worked to extend 
a common western civilization to backward areas of the 
globe, they could never shed the vestiges of the "old" 
imperialism and, therefore, could never perform the function 
of training peoples for self-government as modern 
trusteeship required. Thus the advocates of international 
imperialism in 1919 updated the rationale for imperialism in 
1898: America could and must participate in the mandates
system to "purify" it from within and insure— as no other 
nation could— that it would fulfill the trusteeship ideal.
One important difference between the advocates and 
opponents of the Armenian mandate was over the question of 
whether America could or should try to purify the mandates 
system. Advocates and opponents shared a suspicion of 
Allied motives in the distribution of mandates; the 
opponents, however, could not find the silver lining in the 
dark cloud of a scheme that called for the United States to
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underwrite the division of the war's spoils.
The proposed mandates distribution gave the European
powers those regions known to be storehouses of oil and
other resources that the industrial nations increasingly
coveted. Herbert Hoover, then U. S. Food Administrator and
later the key figure in America's search for raw materials,
opposed American acceptance of a mandate over Turkey and
Armenia unless it also included oil-rich Mesopotamia.
Armenia, he told the other American commissioners in Paris,
was "the poorhouse of Europe." The political and racial
quagmire there would require the prolonged presence of
50,000-100,000 troops. He proposed instead that the French
take Constantinople ("a terrific burden and a public act of
charity") and that whoever the League saddled with Armenia
69should also get Mesopotamia. Whether Armenia was an
unbearable economic liability or a potentially rich nation
became a key issue in the American public debate over the
mandate. The Springfield (Illinois) Republican captured the
irony of this debate when it editorialized in April 1920:
"It is Armenia's crowning misfortune with a 'mandate' going
begging, that it has no oil wells. . . . What a difference
70oil makes in the white man's burden."
Opponents also believed that a mandate in the Near East 
was too dangerous and threatened to embroil the United 
States in a region outside its traditional spheres of 
interest. Some Senators suspected the Allies of 
intentionally placing the United States as a buffer against
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the Bolsheviks. Others described the proposed mandate as a
"hornet's nest" of Moslem fanatacism, a "cesspool of
criminality, of cruelty, of villainy, of race hatred," and
71"the plague spot" of three continents. The Senate
opposition drew upon the report of a U. S. military mission
to the Near East headed by General James G. Harbord, former
Chief-of-Staff for General John Pershing and former
commander of the Philippine Constabulary. This report
systematically contrasted the admittedly high costs (in the
forfeiture of America's splendid isolation, in money and in
troops) of accepting a mandate with the prestige, sense of
accomplishment, and humanitarian benefits that it would
bring. The Senate chose to interpret the report as a
repudiation of the mandate, but historians still debate the
. . 72report's and Harbord's personal position.
An important argument in the Harbord Report, the Senate
debate, and public discussion of the issue was that the
United States had a duty as a mandatory, but not in the Near
East. Harbord's final reason for accepting a mandate was
simply to quote with approval Genesis 4:9 in which Cain
asked God, "am I my brother's keeper?" Against this
argument Harbord posited that "The first duty of America is
73to its own people and to its nearer neighbors."
Opponents of the League of Nations feared international 
interference with the Monroe Doctrine and, by implication, 
the Roosevelt Corollary. One of the Republican opposition's 
paramount demands, which Wilson tried to meet, was to exempt
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the Monroe Doctrine from League jurisdiction. This effort
to limit the scope of international action and maintain the
"two spheres" approach of American foreign policy had
significant implications for the question of trusteeship.
Another dimension of this defense of the Monroe
Doctrine was the belief that the United States already
carried its fair share of the world's mandatory duty. The
renewed war scare with Mexico between 1918 and 1920
underscored what many saw as a clear distinction between
America's natural trusteeship in Latin America and the
unnatural one in the Near East. That the United States was
or should (formally) become the mandatory for Mexico was a
74recurrent argument m  the mandates debate. Henry Cabot
Lodge raised this point in a March 1919 public debate with
League advocate and Harvard president A. Lawrence Lowell.
Lodge contrasted the "grave responsibility" of a Near East
mandate with the work that the United States was aldready
doing in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.
"That is all within the Monroe Doctrine; that is all within
our 'ring fence.' We must do it; we owe it to the world,
and we are quite capable of doing it successfully. But [the
Near East mandate] is a demand to go out through Asia,
Africa, and Europe, and take up the tutelage of other
people." Lodge protested against this expanded
responsibility and against the prospect of the League
preventing the United States from taking legitimate action
75within its own "ring fence."
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While George Beer and others of like mind urged the
United States to accept mandates in other regions of the
world in the name of international unity, probably the
majority of American statesmen looked at the issue from the
standpoint of cost and benefit. Navy men wanted America to
annex Germany's Pacific colonies in order to give the United
States a strategic advantage over Japan (or at least to
prevent Japan from gaining an advantage over the United 
76States). Territories or mandates elsewhere must at least 
pay for themselves and preferably yield some kind of 
strategic or economic profit. Americans were no more 
willing to forego the strategic advantage of their natural 
trusteeship in the western hemisphere and to selflessly 
assume new burdens than Europeans were to forfeit their 
spheres of influence and subject their colonies to 
international supervision.
V
The historian who closely examines American 
participation in the early international trusteeship 
experiments and expects to find proof of a deep-seated 
American hostility to imperialism finds instead a general 
acceptance of the necessity of imperial control and further 
evidence of the pervasiveness of the trusteeship worldview. 
International trusteeship may have been the apotheosis of 
trusteeship, but there was an important continuity between
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it and national trusteeship. They shared fundamental 
assumptions and were in effect points on the same continuum, 
not polar opposites.
The League of Nations Mandates System did not require 
the Allies or the United States to significantly revise 
their conceptions and policies of colonial trusteeship. The 
central premise of the system was that outside control of 
backward peoples was still necessary. That serving the 
welfare of the native inhabitants and the interests of theiI
world at large were the only legitimate grounds for
!
controlling other peoples had long been part of the 
imperialist orthodoxy. The alleged transgressions of 
Germany and Turkey against these standards compelled the 
war's victors to demonstrate to the world that they would 
adhere to these standards in their rule of the areas 
stripped from the vanquished powers.
The continuity between national and international 
trusteeship and the difficulties of actually applying the 
principles of international supervision were also evident in 
the most familiar context for trusteeship, the Second World 
War and the genesis of the United Nations Trusteeship 
System. While this episode lies outside the chronological 
limits of this study, it is instructive to consider briefly 
the meaning of trusteeship in the World War II era.
American statesmen sought to use America's wartime leverage 
to impose a system of international trusteeship over all the
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world's colonies (including those of its allies) as part of 
an effort to abolish the colonial empires. Yet the colonial 
settlement of 1945, like that of 1919, was limited in its 
scope and authority. Despite the intense discussions of 
making trusteeship the basis of a post-imperial order, 
trusteeship ultimately conformed to the existing imperial 
order.
The term and concept of trusteeship gained its widest
currency in the context of what one recent historian termed
the "universal condemnation of colonialism in the United
States" in the 1930s and 1940s.77 President Franklin
Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and many other
American policymakers publicly expressed their abhorrence of
European colonialism, and sought the universal application
of the self-determination clause of the 1941 Atlantic 
78Charter. Indeed, American planners did try to compel the
western powers to surrender their empires (or, at least, to
dismantle the closed systems of imperial trade). The
resurgence of Wilsonian idealism, coupled with the rise of
Asian nationalism, popularized the previously limited
opinion that the United States must align itself with, not
against emerging backward peoples. FDR chastised the
British and the Dutch for their failure to concede enough to
79their Asian dependents. On and after his 1942 world 
tour, former presidential candidate Wendell Willkie told 
Americans that they must make World War II a "war of 
liberation," and must not allow the great mass of the
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world's people to "slip back into colonial status."
In the context of the Second World War, "trusteeship" 
became a codeword for the substitution of international 
supervision and the establishment of timetables for 
independence in place of the existing order of national 
trusteeship. The new and improved world organization would 
either take over the responsibility of caring for backward 
peoples and preparing them for independence, or assume 
substantial supervisory authority over imperial powers. In 
either case, this conception of international trusteeship 
appeared to be a significant departure from existing 
conceptions of national trusteeship. Trusteeship came to 
imply a determination to make international supervision more 
real and effective than it had been under the League 
Mandates System, and, more importantly, it reflected a 
conviction that the ultimate result of trusteeship must be 
"graduation." Instead of emphasizing the necessity of 
controlling backward peoples, trusteeship now seemed to 
imply that such control was an evil to be terminated as soon 
as possible. This connotation of trusteeship reflected an 
ongoing transformation of western opinion: it was no longer
fashionable— as it had been in previous decades— to speak of 
"backward" peoples, and to argue that such peoples were 
incapable of enjoying self-determination until the distant 
future.
But even with the great transformations of opinion and 
circumstance, older assumptions and reservations prevailed.
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Historians agree that FDR and most Americans were 
"gradualists," and did not advocate "precipitous
p n
decolonization." FDR's oft-quoted criticism of French
rule in Indochina echoed the customary American contempt for
"bad" imperialism and did not imply that he believed all
control over backward peoples to be immoral. After all, FDR
at one point during the war championed the notion of great
powers "policing" their respective spheres, and supported a
82scheme of "regional colonialism."
The course of American attitudes and policies during
World War II closely resembled the experiences of 1917-1920.
While some American policymakers in 1942-3 enthusiastically
drafted plans for a comprehensive trusteeship system that
would ultimately result in the independence of all dependent
peoples, others voiced familiar objections to such schemes.
The State Department's Stanley Hornbeck argued that a
general trusteeship system could "boomerang" against
America's own empire in the Caribbean. American wartime
planners did not include the area defined as America's "ring
8 3fence" in the proposed new order.
Predictably, the British reacted to the frontal 
assaults on the future of their empire much as they had 
reacted to the mandate question in 1919. They protested 
that their empire embodied the most enlightened principles 
of colonial trusteeship. International trusteeship was, 
therefore, unnecessary. By 1943, American officials had 
begun to retreat from its sweeping proposals. Cordell Hull
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assured the British that the trusteeship system would not
84
affect the British empire. In 1945 the United States 
abandoned its insistence that the trusteeship system and the 
accompanying non-binding Declaration Regarding Non- 
Self -Governing Territories specify independence as the 
necessary outcome of colonial rule. The trusteeship system 
was not universal nor did it impose timetables for the 
independence of the few territories placed within it. In 
fact, the United States, for reasons of strategic security, 
even exempted the former mandated islands in the Pacific
q e
from full trusteeship status.
Even more dramatically than in 1919, American 
policymakers compromised on an extreme interpretation of 
international trusteeship in the interests of expedience and 
stability. Despite the close rhetorical association between 
trusteeship and the proposals for phased decolonization, 
trusteeship ultimately meant the same thing it always had: 
the necessity of some degree of enlightened external control 
over "immature" peoples. Without denying the existence and 
significance of the emerging antipathy toward imperialism, 
we must recognize that trusteeship embodied the coexistent 
conviction— too often taken for granted— that many of the 
world's peoples required further control and supervision. 
Statesmen hastened to pay homage to self-determination and 
scrupulously avoided any intimation that Asian and African 
peoples were "backward" and unfit for self-government. But 
amid this bold-faced renunciation of imperialist logic was
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what one observer later termed the "small print" of American 
policy: a "realistic" recognition of the dangers of
Q g
"indiscriminate independence." Even Wendell Willkie
conceded that "Not all the peoples of the world are ready
87for freedom, or can defend it, the day after tomorrow."
In effect, trusteeship was a reassertion of the 
legitimacy of imperial control. The Trusteeship System left 
colonies presumably not yet ready for independence in the 
possession of their imperial rulers and gave former mandates 
and captured territories to trustee states under the 
supervision of the United Nations. Trusteeship amounted to 
a series of guidelines, closely resembling those of the the 
League Mandates System, for the governing of colonies. Most 
notable were the obligations to develop the resources for 
the benefit of the inhabitants, to prepare the inhabitants 
for eventual self-government, to maintain the open door to 
world commerce, and to rule so as preserve world peace and 
security. Imperial powers must regard their colonies not as 
possessions, but as sacred trusts. Those of course were the 
fundamental principles of national imperialism. Rather than 
subverting the colonial empires, trusteeship provided a 
strong argument for their necessity and value.
The experience of World War II, like that of earlier 
experiments in international trusteeship, underscored 
several important points about trusteeship. First, while it 
was the apotheosis of trusteeship, international trusteeship
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was not a departure from other forms of national 
trusteeship. Both rested on the assumption that control of 
immature peoples was necessary and legitimate under certain 
restrictions and regulations. International trusteeship was 
not the only manifestation of the trusteeship 
Weltanschauung, but was merely the most refined and 
elaborate of the many alternative trusteeship policies. Its 
implementation depended upon national interests and 
international circumstances. Failure to appreciate the 
continuity between national and international trusteeship 
makes the compromises of 1919 and 1945 inexplicable.
American statesmen accepted those compromises because they 
were not willing to sacrifice national interests to 
international duty and because they were not inimical to a 
world order based on national trusteeship.
Similarly, the customary equation of trusteeship with 
international trusteeship has resulted in an undue 
association between trusteeship and the end of imperialism. 
Close study of international trusteeship alone dispels such 
a simplistic association. But a failure to appreciate the 
continuity between national and international trusteeship 
precludes a full understanding of the concept of 
trusteeship. In hindsight, international trusteeship 
appears to have been a strategic retreat from imperialism, a 
symptom of its demise. Imperialism was on the defensive; 
trusteeship implied that imperialism was legitimate and 
defensible only if it fulfilled specific requirements and
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obligations. While there is a kernel of truth in this 
interpretation, it is incomplete and misrepresents the 
primary significance of trusteeship. We must remember that 
the same logic that served as a strategic retreat from 
imperialism in the wake of World War II also served to 
justify the establishment, extension, and perpetuation of 
imperial control. To assert that imperialism was only 
legitimate if it met specific criteria was not necessarily 
to repudiate imperialism. On the contrary, when all states 
claimed to follow the standards of enlightened imperialism, 
trusteeship could be— and was— a pillar of imperialism. 
Trusteeship was not merely a phenomenon of the waning days 
of empire; it developed and flourished along with 
imperialism when there was little indication that the days 
of imperialism were numbered.
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CONCLUSION:
TRUSTEESHIP AND THE AMERICAN IMPERIAL TRADITION
Trusteeship is too often equated specifically, even 
exclusively, with international trusteeship and with the 
historical experience of the United Nations Trusteeship 
System. It consequently becomes indirectly associated with 
the eclipse of western imperialism. This association 
flatters and, not coincidentally, conforms to the imagery of 
an American anti-colonial tradition. The basic contention 
of this dissertation has been that we can only properly 
understand the significance of trusteeship in a much broader 
chronological and thematic context. Seen in a broader 
context, trusteeship did not conform to a simplistic picture 
of American anti-imperialism, but underscored the existence 
of a complex American imperial tradition. It is useful to 
reiterate and clarify the implications of trusteeship for 
this American imperial tradition.
Trusteeship was the orthodox American attitude toward 
the non-European world for at least a half-century before 
the inception of the U. N. Trusteeship System. It was 
manifested in America's management of its formal colonies 
and informal empire, and in American views of the position 
of backward peoples in the world order. In all of its 
applications, trusteeship reflected the American ambivalence 
toward imperialism. Trusteeship repudiated a stereotypical 
old-style imperialism, but it rested squarely on an
395
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
3 9 6
elaborate imperialist rationale for the control of backward 
peoples. Trusteeship employed the language and logic of 
anti-imperialism as a means of rationalizing imperial 
control.
Trusteeship is an extremely difficult concept to 
analyze because, depending on one's perspective and 
assumptions, trusteeship can appear to be a euphemism for or 
a repudiation of imperialism. While exploring the ways in 
which trusteeship employed the attributes of imperialism, 
this study has for several reasons emphasized trusteeship as 
a manifestation of imperialism. The assertion of the right 
to rule another people— even if only temporarily and for 
whatever reasons— was the often-overlooked sine qua non of 
trusteeship. The assertion of the right to rule was also 
the most salient dimension of trusteeship in the era between 
the 1890s and the 1930s. Furthermore, because of the 
still-persistent image of American anti-colonialism, 
emphasizing the imperialistic dimension of trusteeship 
serves as a valuable corrective.
A study of the diverse applications of the trusteeship 
concept illustrates an American imperial tradition in 
several ways. Most basic was the existence of a coherent 
and pervasive worldview which drew from many currents of 
contemporary thought. This worldview led to the conclusion 
that the denial of self-determination to backward peoples 
was often necessary and legitimate. If we understand 
imperialism to be the control or attempt to control the
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affairs of other nations, then trusteeship was the very 
definition of imperialism. The worldview also drew 
explicitly upon European, especially English imperialist 
thought. Despite the continuing myth of American 
exceptionalism and despite conscious innovations in 
America's imperial style, the United States forged its 
imperial identity well within the confines of the western 
norm.
The trusteeship worldview was not an idle intellectual 
construct, but was translated into actual policy in a 
variety of circumstances. The logic of trusteeship or 
guardianship pervaded U. S. Indian policy more than a 
half-century before the U. S. acquired a formal colonial 
empire. American statesmen employed trusteeship principles 
to justify the acquisition of a colony in the Pacific, the 
Philippine Islands, the exercise of a de facto protectorate 
in the Caribbean, and the limited supervision of the 
internal affairs of China. U. S. policymakers viewed each 
of those regions through the trusteeship Weltanschauung, 
defining their inhabitants as "immature" and in need of 
benevolent supervision and their estates in need of 
efficient administration. The nature and extent of American 
control in each of those areas depended on the overall 
objectives and priorities of U. S. policy there. The 
diversity of regions and circumstances in which trusteeship 
served to rationalize some form and degree of U. S. control 
illustrated the fundamental unity of U. S. policy toward
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what we today call the "third world." It also underscored 
the necessity of defining "imperialism" broadly and not 
simply as synonymous with "colonialism."
The essential objective of American imperialism was to 
forge a world order thaat was stable and accessible to 
American commerce and influence. American statesmen felt 
justified in exerting control over peoples and areas that 
obstructed this vision. American imperialism rested on the 
assumption that civilized powers had a legitimate right to 
"organize" backward areas in a manner that inured to the 
benefit of all peoples. Because the extension of American 
control promoted peace, prosperity, and the progress of 
civilization, this control did not constitute what most 
Americans chose to call "imperialism."
Indeed, this denial of imperialism was the most
outstanding feature of the American imperial tradition. The
American tendency to condemn imperialism even while
habitually interfering in the affairs of other states has
long perplexed historians. They customarily attribute it to
blatant hypocrisy, a refusal to surrender the belief in
American innocence, a distorted sense of mission, or a
"Wilsonian" compulsion to make others do things "for their
own good." The concept of trusteeship provides a framework
for better understanding this enigma. Trusteeship was
inherently dualistic or, to avoid confusion with the term
triple mandate, ambiguous. It is not really accurate to 
*
assert that the American approach to imperialism was
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inconsistent because, according to the logic of trusteeship, 
imperialism and anti-imperialism were reciprocal and 
symbiotic. By definition, trusteeship both embraced and 
rejected imperialism. To a large degree, this was a 
function of semantics and definition. By defining 
"imperialism" in terms of oppression and exploitation, 
advocates of trusteeship could portray trusteeship as 
something fundamentally different. The validity of 
trusteeship rested on just such a distinction.
More importantly, trusteeship offered an elaborate 
explanation for the apparent contradiction between the 
American reverence for self-determination and the frequent 
U. S. denial of self-determination to other peoples. The 
case for American trusteeship as an "anti-imperialistic 
imperialism" rested on two major principles. One, the 
triple mandate, was endemic to trusteeship. The other, the 
doctrine of "graduation," was a conscious American
f
innovation. The implication of these principles was that 
American control of backward areas was not "imperialism" 
because it served a harmony of interests and because it was 
a necessary means to the higher goal of creating stable 
independent states. The foregoing chapters indicated how 
ubiquitous this reasoning was. American statesmen argued 
that U. S. policy in the Philippines, Latin America, China, 
and in the prospective Near Eastern mandate desired nothing 
more than the creation of the stability and prosperity that 
peoples of those countries needed and which the civilized
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world demanded.
Was this reasoning valid? This study has suggested 
that the triple mandate and the graduation doctrine were 
logically flawed, both in theory and practice. For
instance, despite the lip service paid to a harmony of
interests, the trusteeship Weltanschauung and, especially, 
the various trusteeship policies rested on a foundation of 
self-interest. Self-interest was the most important 
operative factor in determining whether and how a state 
chose to exercise trusteeship control. Self-interest 
determined whether a trustee state established a "race 
school," simply kept its wards in "leading strings," or 
relied on some other power to do so.
There was of course nothing remarkable about a state
putting its own interests first, or anything unusual about 
the assumption that a coincidence of interests supported a 
particular policy. Modern states invariably claim to follow 
a policy of "enlightened self-interest," serving others 
while serving themselves. No doubt American control 
occasionally worked to the benefit of dependent peoples and 
the world at large. The triple mandate, however, was far 
more than the assumption of an occasional coincidence of 
interests; it amounted to a "law" that American control of 
backward nations could (if properly conducted) be inherently 
beneficial to others. The theoretical underpinning of this 
law was the assumption that because backward peoples were 
"children," they could not be trusted to know or act in
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their own self-interest. In contrast, trustee states had 
the ability and the authority to decide and serve all 
interests. Regardless of any appearance of inconsistency or 
of friction between trustee and ward, a wise and sincere 
trusteeship always worked in the "best" interests of the 
ward. According to this iron-clad reasoning, there could be 
no disharmony between the interests of trustee and ward.
Despite this logical sleight of hand, examples of 
conflicts of interest abounded. For one thing, it was 
impossible to assume that the interests of a state, a 
people, or the family of civilized nations as coherent and 
monolithic. Short of tailoring the term "civilization" to 
fit only those states whose interests coincided at a 
particular time, how could anyone identify the "interests of 
civilization?" The states that comprised "civilization" 
were constantly in competition and occasionally at war with 
one another. The supposed interests of "civilization" 
inevitably reflected the perceptions and particular 
interests of the trustee. Similarly, there was no single 
interpretation of what constituted the best interests of the 
United States. Divergent and changing interpretations of 
the national interest resulted in inconsistent, often 
hypocritical U. S. trusteeship policies. It was equally 
impossible to identify and serve a single set of "best" 
interests of another people.
Even more specious was the assumption that one state 
could or would act for the best interests of another.
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States were capable of assisting and benefitting others, but 
could a relationship exist in which one state systematically 
served the best interests of another? Trusteeship did not 
require the trustee state to sacrifice its interests to 
those of its wards, since it assumed that those interests 
coincided. This assumption could only be valid if we also 
assume that what was good for the trustee was necessarily 
good for the ward. American trusteeship rested on just that 
assumption. American policymakers usually stated this 
proposal in its reverse— that what was good for the ward was 
good for the trustee— but the proposition is essentially a 
tautology. From either perspective, the trustee had the 
power to decide what constituted the best interests of all 
concerned. The obvious effect of this reasoning was to 
tether the fate of the ward to that of the trustee and to 
that of the world in which both operated. Trusteeship was 
an elaborate and systematic denial of the right of 
self-determination. A backward people could not decide its 
own fate, and, more ominously, the trustee did not decide 
the ward's fate on the basis of the ward's interests alone. 
The ward did not have the right, as advanced states had, to 
set a future course that might conflict with the interests 
of other states and disturb the waters of international 
affairs.
Trusteeship essentially held backward peoples hostage 
to the interests of all other states. Ideally, a trustee 
state must govern its ward in such a way as to make its
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eventual independence as compatible as possible with 
divergent, often conflicting interests. Backward nations 
could not become totally independent, or free from 
"contingent oversight" or compulsory assistance until their 
independence did not pose a danger to international peace 
and security, the interests of concerned powers, or to their 
own best interests as they were decided by a trustee state. 
As long as this logic prevailed, the end of 
trusteeship— "graduation""— essentially required a 
reformation of the world order. Until and unless relatively 
weak, backward, and underdeveloped nations were no longer 
susceptible to internal instability or vulnerable to 
external pressures, they could not really escape 
trusteeship. In addition, trusteeship remained a necessary 
policy as long as the so-called civilized powers tended to 
conquer and exploit weaker states. Not only must backward 
states be tutored in the ways of modern civilization; 
civilized states themselves had to advance to a higher stage 
in their respect for the the rule of law. Such a world 
order was and is utopian. Rather than being a temporary 
policy, an unfortunate means to a noble end, trusteeship was 
potentially a formula for permanent control or supervision. 
Backward nations could not really "graduate;" they escaped 
trusteeship only when they attained enough power to defy 
their erstwhile trustees or when their trustees decided that 
the trust was not worth their while.
Regardless of their logical and practical flaws, the
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triple mandate and the graduation doctrine served to make 
trusteeship a viable foundation for American imperialism. 
Trusteeship incorporated many of the contemporary objections 
to imperialism and, through a restricted definition of 
imperialism, the triple mandate, and the doctrine of 
graduation, offered satisfactory solutions to those 
objections. Trusteeship was not the egoistic pursuit of 
national self-interest at the expense of other peoples, but 
the fulfillment of obligations to those peoples and to 
civilization. Trusteeship was not a policy of exploitation 
and oppression, but one of development and liberation. 
Trusteeship was not proprietary ownership, but provisional 
control. Once successfully divorced from "imperialism," 
trusteeship transformed a critique of imperial control into 
an effective defense of it. Similarly, the triple mandate 
became less important as a set of conditions qualifying 
imperial control than as a literal mandate for it. Because 
states could satisfy the conditions of the triple mandate 
without sacrificing their own interests, the triple mandate 
constituted a convenient theoretical justification of the 
right to rule.
Trusteeship cannot explain away the hypocrisy of 
American imperialism, but it does provide an explanation for 
it. A study of trusteeship suggests that there was an inner 
logic to the seemingly inconsistent American approach to 
imperialism. Whether or not we find the logic valid or 
persuasive ultimately depends on our own perceptions of
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imperialism and about the place of backward nations in the 
world order.
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